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A rule that age, not sense; years, not intelligence; length of
life, not experience, should govern responsibility for human
action is unsound and should be discarded.'
INTRODUCTION
Allison and Kathy are in kindergarten. One afternoon, Kathy
comes to play at Allison's house, where Allison shows Kathy a
trick she learned from her older brothers: A Bic lighter and a can
of hairspray make a fun "blow torch" effect. Allison has played
this "game" several times, and she once had a brief scare when a
small pile of leaves caught fire. When Allison's parents discovered
the fire, they scolded her and told her never to play with fire again.
Allison did not heed the warning. Tragically, on the day that Kathy
comes to play, the girls set Allison's tree house on fire and both
girls are severely burned. They each sue the hair spray
manufacturer for failing to provide a child-proof can. In its defense,
the manufacturer argues its liability, if any, should be reduced by
the amount of the girls' comparative negligence. Allison, however,
is two months younger than Kathy and was only 4 years, 11
months, 29 days old as of the day of the accident. Citing the rule
that a child below the age of five is incapable of exercising any
degree of care for her own safety,2 Allison argues that, due to her
age, she cannot be charged with comparative negligence.
Is Allison's position correct? Must the issue of 5-year-old
Kathy's comparative fault go to the jury, while Allison is immune
from any examination of her own conduct? This Article discusses
past legal precedent and modern theories of child psychology
bearing on the issue of the appropriate standard of care required of
young children.
Part I presents the various policy rationales implicated in the
determination of the standard of care required of minors.3 No court
1. Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 840 (Mich. 1938) (Potter, J., dissenting).
2. Yarborough v. Bemer, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. 1971); Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 650, 655, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (1961).
3. See infra notes 11-158 and accompanying text.
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or legal commentator has explicitly articulated a theory of child
development to support an analysis of the appropriate standard of
care the law should exact from children. Part I of this Article
represents a first attempt to do so. Modem research in child
psychology suggests that young children have the capacity to act
negligently in situations with which they are familiar and that
children vary widely in this capacity
Moreover, the article examines the "law and economics" view
of tort law which suggests that a legal rule recognizing young
children's capacity for negligence will cause caregivers to refrain
from socializing their child about safety in order to reduce the
child's liability exposure. This contention, however, is not
supported by the research in child psychology.5
Part I also explores the notion that age-based presumptions of
incapacity are justified on the ground that they promote judicial
economy,6 and concludes that a rule based on expediency which
ignores the findings in child psychology is manifestly unfair. It
imposes different standards of care on children of similar capacity,
unjustly denies recovery to plaintiffs injured by minors, and, in
contravention of principles of comparative fault, requires a party
partially at fault for injuries to pay one hundred percent of
damages.
Part I1 introduces the two existing judicial approaches to the
problem of children and negligence.7 First, the Illinois rule looks
no further than a minor's age to determine capacity and sets an
arbitrary age (usually seven) below which children are considered
incapable of negligence as a matter of law. In contrast, courts that
have adopted the Massachusetts rule have balked at setting a
"bright line" Age which conclusively determines a child's capacity
for negligence. These courts look to the particular circumstances of
each case or the particular child's knowledge and experience to
determine the standard of care required of minors. The Illinois rule
4. See infra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 115-132 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 133-158 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 159-207 and accompanying text.
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is inconsistent with theory and research in child psychology, while
the Massachusetts rule comports with sound theories of child
development. Part II shows that there is much confusion in the case
law that is attributable to the different assumptions regarding child
development embraced by courts.' Courts erroneously interpret
decisions which declare young minors incapable of negligence as
holding that all children of the child's age are incapable of
negligence in all circumstances. Courts also mistakenly overlook
or narrowly apply decisions which suggest there cannot be an
arbitrary age of discretion below which minors are conclusively
deemed incapable of negligence.
Part Ill presents the development of the law in California as an
illustration of the problems that plague this area of negligence
law.9  Early California case law endorsed the flexible
Massachusetts rule. The supreme court and the courts of appeal
established a formula that was workable and which effectively and
fairly dealt with a wide range of factual situations involving
minors. By endorsing a subjective standard of care and rejecting
arbitrary rules which fix an age of discretion without regard to the
circumstances of each case, California courts rejected attempts by
minor plaintiffs to absolve themselves of a duty of due care on the
basis of age in instances where there was sufficient evidence of
capacity. At the same time, California courts declined to hold a
minor liable for contributory negligence in the absence of sufficient
evidence showing that the child had the capacity for exercising due
care. Over time, however, unanimity among the courts on the issue
of the standard of care required of children dissipated. New rules
of negligence law emerged which relieved some minors of any
duty of due care for their own or others' safety on the basis of
chronological age alone, regardless of the minor's knowledge and
experience. As such, California has applied both the Illinois and
Massachusetts rules to children of the same age, therefore
embracing conflicting legal rules and inconsistent theories of child
psychology.
8. See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 208-337 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV offers a proposal for courts which fairly
resolves disputes involving young children charged with
negligence."0 Drawing from the findings in child psychology, the
proposed approach protects children from unreasonable liability
standards while holding them accountable for their actions where
the facts justify it.
I. THE PuBLIC PoLIciEs WICH INFLUENCE
THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF MINORS
An adult's conduct is measured by an objective "reasonable
person" standard, whereby the adult's knowledge and experience
is irrelevant to whether he acted negligently." In contrast, it was
long ago recognized that children should be held to a less stringent
standard of care than competent adults. 2 Subjective factors are
critical in cases involving minors, and courts have applied a
standard of care that is part subjective and part objective. The
subjective component tests whether the particular child had the
capacity, i.e., sufficient knowledge and experience, to appreciate
the risk of injury. t3 If so, the objective element of the standard
tests the child's conduct against that care which a child of like age,
knowledge, capacity, and experience would exercise under similar
circumstances. 1
4
10. See infra notes 338-365 and accompanying text.
11. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oF TORTS § 32, at 176-77
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEEToN]. See generally Warren A. Seavey, Negligence -
Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1927) (-The law does not consider... whether one
is capable of distinguishing what the community calls right from what it calls wrong; nor does it
consider whether one is able to resist protecting his own interests at the expense of another's. Thus
*fault' becomes a failure to exercise the will or the improper exercise of it with reference to a
standard will and a standard valuation of desireables and undesireables. There is no subjective legal
fault.").
12. Harry Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE LJ. 618, 618
(1928) (cases cited therein); see also Sioux City & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 660
(1874). See generally Annotation, Modern Trends as to Contributory Negligence of Children, 32
A.LR.4th 56 (1984) (cases collected therein).
13. See Shulman, supra note 12, at 625.
14. Id. See generally REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) op TORTS § 464(2) (1965); PRossEn &
KELTON, supra note 11, § 65. One commentator has advocated the adoption of a purely subjective
standard against which to judge a child's conduct. Oscar S. Gray, The Standard of Care for Children
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This standard of care, however, has not been applied to children
of all ages. Consequently, minors below a certain age (usually
seven) often are not required to exercise any care for their own or
others' safety.15 Various policy rationales have been advanced to
justify immunizing a particular class of children from liability for
negligence. Briefly, these reasons are: The inability of young
children to command the requisite mental capacity for negligent
conduct; the positive social consequences of insulating young
children from the results of their own conduct; and the
conservation of judicial resources.16
A. Child Psychology
Courts and commentators who have fashioned rules that set the
standard of care for children have adopted certain assumptions
about child psychology. 7 For example, those who endorse a
conclusive presumption rule based on age only embrace the notion
Revisited, 45 Mo. L REv. 597, 602 (1980). Under this approach, "this child's capacity, however it
may have been limited, [should be] the standard by which the child should be judged, not the conduct
or capacity of othem." lId (emphasis in original).
15. Harper, James and Gray have suggested that "the prevailing view is to set an age below
which a child is held to be incapable of contributory negligence, regardless of whether there is a
theoretical basis for considering any age as one below which contributory negligence is always
impossible." FOWLER V. HARPER, Er AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.8, at 438, 440-60 n.19 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter HARI'E, Er AL.]. However, the way in which they have categorized the cases is
flawed. They sought to determine which courts have found three-, four-, and five-year-olds incapable
of contributory negligence. Id. at 437-39. This method of categorization overlooks a crucial element
in all negligence cases involving minors, namely, the question whether there was evidence to support
a charge of contributory negligence in the first place. See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text
(discussing this fundamental error of interpretation).
16. Absolving children from liability for negligence has also been justified by analogy to the
criminal law, which refuses to hold children under seven liable for a criminal act. See Jones v.
Strickland, 77 So. 562, 565 (Ala. 1917); Swindell v. Hellkamp, 242 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1971);
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E. 997, 1003 (11 1902); Dunn v. Tet, 421 A.2d 782,784 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1988) (children under 14 are rebuttably
presumed incapable of committing a crime). The Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, has
explicitly applied a criminal statute to a civil case. See Strong v. Allen, 768 P.2d 369, 372 n.1 (Okla.
1989). However, this rationale has come under widespread attack on the ground that the mental
capacity necessary to commit a crime is fundamentally different from the mental capacity requirement
in negligence law. See, e.g., PROSSm & KEMTON, supra note 11, § 32 ("the analogy of the criminal
law is certainly of dubious value where neither crime nor intent is in question").
17. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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that children are impulsive, cannot foresee the consequences of
their actions, and that chronological age alone is sufficient as a
measure of mental capacity.18 Conversely, proponents of a rule
which bases the standard of care on knowledge, experience, and
age recognize that children do have the capacity to inhibit impulses
and foresee consequences of action, but that children vary widely
in this capacity.' 9 They view chronological age as an insufficient
indicator of mental ability.20
This section analyzes these two competing portraits of children
against the backdrop of modem research in child psychology. The
discussion presents a brief overview of the role of psychology in
constructing legal rules, highlights trends in thinking among child
psychologists, reviews the modem research on a child's capacity to
foresee the consequences of action and regulate behavior, and
outlines the various factors in addition to age that influence a
child's mental development.
1. An Overview of Psychology and the Law
In recent years, findings in psychology have made their way
into various legal debates.21 This phenomena is part of a larger
trend in legal scholarship that seeks insights into resolving legal
questions from academic disciplines outside the law, particularly
the social sciences and humanities.22 Few legal issues need more
18. See infra notes 24 & 160-174 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 175-187 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The
Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. RLv. 391, 437-38 (1990) (citing the impact of
findings in cognitive psychology on various legal 'debates).
22. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN & LAuRENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, at xxi (1985) ("We here view social science as an analytic tool in the law, familiarity
with which will heighten the lawyer's professional effectiveness and sharpen the legal scholars'
insights. The principal alternative to this 'inside' perspective on the relationship of social science to
law is the 'law and society' or *sociology of law' approach which seeks to understand the functioning
of 'law' as a social system."); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent
in the Moral and Political Visions ofFranz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985)
(showing that Kafka's fictitious world casts a different shadow over the legitimacy of legal
transactions than a view of the world based on autonomy). Recent scholarship has even looked to
metamathematies. See Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable
1331
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
enlightenment from the social sciences, particularly psychology,
than the question of the appropriate standard of care required of
minors. As one commentator has noted: "Apparently there has been
little attempt to investigate the question [of a child's capacity] on
a factual basis by resorting to studies of child development by
psychologists or educators. A 'Brandeis brief' on the subject might
serve to clarify some of the presumptions and assumptions indulged
by the courts." '23
The central reason underlying the application of different
standards of care for minors is the notion that very young children
do not have the capacity for negligent conduct because minors
cannot foresee the potentially dangerous consequences of their
actions, are impulsive, and do not possess sufficient discretion to
avoid harm.2' Proponents of this view contend that absent the
Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HAST. L.
J. 1439, 1487 (1992) (-Gdel's proof reveals that the law cannot be a determinate formal system.
Like mathematics, the law is either incomplete and must look outside itself for guidance, or it is
inconsistent and contradicts itself. As a mechanical system, the law is and must be indeterminate."),
23. Annotation, Modern Trends as to Contributory Negligence of Children, 77 A.L.R.2d 917,
920 n.13 (1961). Cf. HARPER, Er AL., supra note 15 § 16.8, at 440 n.18; Taylor v. Bergeron, 449
P.2d 147, 150 (Or. 1969) (O'Connell, J., concurring) ("Very probably there are psychological studies
throwing light upon the manner in which children of various ages can be expected to react to various
circumstances involving danger but we have not been able to find them.").
24. See Gault v. Tablada, 400 F. Supp. 136, 140 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th
Cir. 1975); Kopera v. Moschella, 400 F. Supp. 131,135 (S.D. Miss. 1975), af'd, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th
Cir. 1975); Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d 474, 476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961); Christian v.
Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 652-53, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507,508-09 (1961); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116
Cal. App. 2d 310, 315-16, 253 P.2d 675, 678 (1953); Benallo v. Bare, 427 P.2d 323, 324 (Colo.
1967); Tupman's Adm'r v. Schmidt, 254 S.W. 199, 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923); Tyler v. Weed, 280
N.W. 827, 835 (Mich. 1938); Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263, 267 (Mont. 1967); Walston v.
Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. 1958); Holbrock v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 629-
30 (Ohio 1967); Taylor v. Bergeron, 449 P.2d 147, 150 (Or. 1969) (O'Connell, J., concurring); Dunn
v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 404 (Pa. 1957);
MacConnell v. Hill, 569 S.W.2d 524,527 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978); Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d
188, 190 (Tex. 1971); Endicott v. Rich, 348 S.E.2d 275,277 (Va. 1986); Cox v. Hugo, 329 P.2d 467,
469 (Wash. 1958). See also United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Van Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1922)
(Justice Holmes commenting that children indulge temptation "as mechanical as a fish"); Maskaliunas
v. Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 149 N.E. 23, 26 (II1. 1925) (children are "as irresponsible as dumb
animals"). But see David W. Holub, Note, The Contributory Negligence Defense asAppliedAgainst
Children in Indiana, 16 VAL. U. L. Ray. 319, 322 (1982) ("[C]ourts have made little effort to justify
giving such special consideration to children charged with contributory negligence.").
Some courts have also held that young children are non suijuris, which is defined as "[]acking
the legal capacity to act for oneself." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1058 (6th ed. 1990); see Echevarria
v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F.2d 885, 888-89, 892 (7th Cir. 1968); Verni v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d
1332
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capacity to exercise care for one's own safety, charging children
with a standard of care they cannot meet would be manifestly
unfair.' With a few exceptions,26 courts and legal commentators
have cited no psychological authority for the proposition that young
minors do not have the mental capacity for negligence. In fact,
some courts have looked no further than their own "common
sense" for guidance on this issue. In the following discussion,
431, 432 (N.Y. 1946); Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 16 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
25. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 27 N.E. 899,903 (I. 1891) ("To guard against
an unseen danger, or one which has not come within the sphere of his observation, requires an
exercise of reason and reflection of which so young a child [6-year-old] is seldom capable, and for
which the law, administered on humane principles, will scarcely hold him responsible."); Note,
Contributory Negligence of Children in Indiana: Capacity and Standard of Care, 34 IND. LU. 511,
514 (1959) [hereinafter Capacity and Standard of Care] ("A child cannot be incapable of
contributory negligence and still be held to a standard of care.").
26. In Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827 (Mich. 1938), the Michigan Supreme Court cited the
early views of European child psychologists in support of a seven year "bright line" rule. The court
commented:
What is there in actual fact, science, or research to justify a different treatment of children
under the age of seven years from those that have passed this age? One cannot fail to be
impressed with the fact that these conclusions which crystalized [sic] centuries ago
regarding the special status of a child of this age, have been confrmned by present day
observers and scientists in the specialized field of child care, education and psychology.
In recent times, the studies of Alfred Binet, in France, Hans Gross, in Austria, Jean Piaget,
in Switzerland, and Maria Montessori, in Italy, have brought a new light upon the
mysterious mind of the child, and have elucidated many of the obscure areas in the
understanding of mental development and growth in infancy and adolescence.
S.. [Tihe age of seven years marks a transitional line in the mental development of
children. In the copious and rich literature devoted to the subject, there repeatedly recurs
the emphasis upon this age as marking the inception of thought and reason, the
commencement of exchange of ideas, the beginning of concepts of justice. Authorities
hold that this age marks the passage from the period of self-centered speech and thought
to verbal understanding and social thought and cooperation. In short, the age of seven
years can be said to be the threshold over which a human being passes from the realm of
imagination and dream to the world of reality "and fact.
Id. at 832; see also Toetschinger v. THmot, 250 N.W.2d 204,222 (Minn. 1977) (Yetka, J., dissenting)
(same); cf. DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 112, 113 nn.2 & 3 (Ohio 1975) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting) (noting findings by child psychologists which suggest child under 7 is capable of
committing an intentional tort); Gray, supra note 14, at 601 n.24 (citing to a 1964-1965 study of 9-12
year olds living on the Isle of Wight which concluded that "a variety of identifiable factors other than
those contained in the standard judicial formulas ... define the standard of care for children.").
27. See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 316, 253 P.2d 675, 678 (1953) ("We are
satisfied from our own common knowledge of the mental development of 4-year-old children.., that
they have not at that age developed the mental capacity for foreseeing the possibilities of their
inadvertent conduct"); see also Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 652-53, 10 Cal. Rptr.
507, 509 (1961) (same).
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we briefly review the trends in thinking among child psychologists
and present research on the capacity of children to foresee the
consequences of their acts and regulate their behavior in accord
with rules of safety and interpersonal contact.23
2. Trends in Child Psychology
In the past twenty years, there have been fundamental changes
in the way psychologists view children. Prior to the 1970s, the
work of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget was the dominant paradigm
among developmental psychologists. Piaget sought to understand
the developmental "laws" that affect a child's ability to reason
deductively.29 He wanted to describe the mental processes that led
a child to (1) impose propositional logic on the way in which
classes and relations in the physical world are comprehended, and
(2) construct mental schemata that serve as guides for future
interactions with the physical world." Piaget's four age-based
stages of development offer a detailed description of how children
acquire this capacity.31
Central to Piaget's view of development is the child's
interaction with the physical world. "[R]eality is built up by
intelligence, which means that reality, as it appears to the child, is
the fruit of a genuine collaboration between the mind and the world
28. It is beyond the scope of this article to summarize the evidence in the medical literature.
29. BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAaEr, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM
CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 3-106 (1958) [hereinafter THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKINO].
30. Id. at 335 (Piaget sought to understand what led children to "superimpose[] propositional
logic onihe logic of classes and relations" and to "control ... operational schemata which [the child]
will use repeatedly in experimental and logico-mathematical thinking.").
31. According to Piaget's theory, the sensorimotor period begins at birth and proceeds to age
2. In this stage, children develop the cognitive ability to understand the physical world by interacting
with it. During the preoperational period-ages 2 through 7-children acquire certain representational
skills such as language, mental imagery, and drawing but can only view the world from their own
perspective. In the concrete operational period, children between 7 and 11 are able to assume another
person's point of view and solve problems involving concrete objects, but are not yet capable of
considering all logically possible outcomes nor comprehend abstract concepts. Finally, in the formal
operationalperiod children aged 11 and older are able to reason logically and understand theoretical
as well as concrete possibilities. See THe GROWTH OF LOGICAL TnNKING, supra note 29, at 342-50.
1334
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around it."'32 Piaget thought that the physical world was comprised
of logical relations, and that, by acting within this logical sphere,
a child acquires the capacity for logical thinking.33 For Piaget, a
child reaches the cognitive milestone of deductive reasoning at
about the age of fourteen or fifteen.
Moreover, for Piaget, children under the age of seven adhere to
"childish notions" of the world because they do not understand the
objective relations underlying physical occurrences.35 For instance,
Piaget explained a child's failure to understand certain physical
phenomena in this way:
For to do no more than combine the data supplied by immediate
perception is to forget the part played in perception by the self or by the
personal point of view: it is, therefore, to take a false absolute instead
of objective relations as a foundation for reasoning. Thus when a child
says that a boat floats because it is heavy, he does so because, in his
mind, the weight of the boat has not been compared to its volume nor
to the weight of the water, but has been evaluated as a function of the
subject's own point of view, taken as absolute. In the same way all
those instances of reasoning which bear upon the concepts of force, life,
and movement, will be found to contain false absolutes, mere pre-
relations, simply because the laws of physics have not been
desubjectified."
In other words, Piaget believed that children under the age of seven
are incapable of understanding the physical world because they
have not grasped the conceptual underpinnings of physical
phenomena. From the perspective of a young child, "[tihe concepts
of life, of weight, of force, of movement, etc., are not concepts
properly so called, they are not defined by means of exact logical
32. JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY 256 (1951) [hereinafter
TH CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSALrTY]; see also id. at 272 (understanding causality "is the result
of a sort of bodily contact between the organism and the world, which is prior to consciousness of
self...-).
33. JEAN PNAGEr & BARBEL IN-ELDER, THE CHILD'S CONCEION OF SPACE 454-57 (1948)
[hereinafter THE CHiL's CONCEPTION OF SPACE].
34. Tim GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING, supra note 29, at 335.
35. IHE CHILD'S CONCEPnON OF CAUSALITY, supra note 32, at 253.
36. Id. at 293.
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additions or multiplications."37 As a result, Piaget believed
children under seven are unable to foresee the consequences of
action because they are incapable of "hypothetico-deductive
reasoning."" A young child cannot plan his behavior because he
is "not able to handle the complete range of interpropositional
operations; as a result, even though he may observe the genesis of
implication, exclusion, etc., we do not yet find him able to organize
a systematic proof conforming to the schema 'all other things being
equal' .... ,39 In addition, from Piaget's perspective, the capacity
to grasp these concepts is an all-or-nothing proposition: Either a
child is capable of understanding objective relations and using this
knowledge to behave intelligently across all tasks and situations or
the child is not.4"
Piaget's views have been challenged by cognitive psychologists
who question his basic assumption that intelligent thought and
action require that a child have the capacity to reason deductively.
A host of researchers have disputed Piaget's conclusions about
young childrens' understanding of a variety of phenomena.41
Critics of Piaget have noted, for example, that a child need not
grasp the concept of physics to understand cause-effect
relationships.42 In addition, cognitive psychologists have contested
Piaget's belief that mental capacity is an all-or-nothing phenomena.
Rather than view competence as consistent across task domains,
researchers have asserted that "[c]ognitive development . . .
37. Id. at 292.
38. THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL TanNKINO, supra note 29, at 56.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSALTrry, supra note 32, at 258-73 (discussing
the rigid stages of development that lead a child to reason causally); see also ROBERT S. SIEGLER,
CHILDREN'S THINING 54 (1986) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S THINKING] ("Within Piaget's theory, an
8-year-old ideally would grasp all concrete-operations-level concepts - conservation of liquid
quantity, class inclusion, sedation, and so on - and would fail to grasp all formal-operations-level
concepts - thinking in terms of all possible combinations, conserving motion, and so on.").
41. CHILDREN'S THNKIN, supra note 40, at 52-3.
42. Merry Bullock et al., The Development of Causal Reasoning, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME 209, 219 (William J. Friedman ed., 1982) ("without precise knowledge of
elementary physics, explanations will be less precise and, according to the Piagetian position, less
advanced developmentally").
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involve[s] advances in skills and knowledge in particular domains,
rather than increases in general capacity."43
Moreover, cognitive psychologists have objected to age-based
descriptions of cognitive capacity.44 These child psychologists
recognize that children vary widely in their mental development
and do not move magically from one developmental stage to
another simply because they have celebrated a birthday.45 Critics
of Piaget argue he paid scant attention to individual differences in
the rate of progress through the stages of development,46 greatly
underestimated children's capacity for understanding and learning
ability,47 and "devoted little attention to the role of the social
world in providing structure to reality or in helping the child make
sense of it."' Unlike Piaget, who assumed children's thinking was
qualitatively and structurally different from that of an adult,
49
cognitive psychologists presume that the structure of children's
thinking is identical to adults and that differences in capacity are
43. BARBARA RoGOFF, APPRENTICESHIP IN THINKING: COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL
CONTExT 6 (1990) [hereinafter APPRENTICESHIP IN THINKING]; see also JOHN R. ANDERSON,
CoGNmVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPUCATIONS 416 (2d ed. 1985) ("the improvement in children's
intellectual abilities depend[s] upon increased knowledge of what to do rather than increased ability
to do it").
44. ANDERSON, supra note 43, at 403,421 ("Obviously a child does not suddenly change on
an 1 th birthday from [one stage to another]. There are large differences among children and cultures,
and the ages given are just rough figures.").
45. IL
46. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: PsYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH AND THE
PARENT-CHiL RELATIONSHIP 21 (1980) (Piaget "paid little attention to individual differences in rates
of progress through the developmental stages").
47. CHILDREN's TINKIN, supra note 40, at 53, 56 ("Piaget's observations ... tend to
underestimate children's understanding."); cf. Iris Levin, The Development of Time Concepts in Young
Children: Reasoning about Duration, 48 CHILD DEy. 435, 442-43 (1977) (a change in the
characteristics of the experiment showed that 5-year-olds had a better understanding of time than
Piaget assumed); JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 234 (1984) (same; involving a 6-year-
old).
The methodology used to test a child's mental capacity also changed. Piaget's data consisted
primarily of childrens' verbal responses. See, e.g., THE CtILD'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY, supra
note 32, at 1. Over time, however, researchers discovered that incompetency on Piagetian tasks
resulted more from a lack of verbal skills than a deficiency in mental ability. See Bullock et al., supra
note 42, at 219 ("there always remains the distinct possibility that children's poor explanations reflect
their limited verbal skills, and/or inadequate understanding of what constitutes a good or satisfactory
explanation [of causality]").
48. APPRENTICESHIP IN THINKING, supra note 43, at 5.
49. See THE CHILD's CONCEPTION OF CAUSALry, supra note 32, at 253-54.
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due to the child's limited grasp of language, knowledge, and
experience rather than some inherent defect or immaturity in
thought processes.50  Accordingly, new understandings of
childrens' cognitive ability have challenged the old view that
children are incapable of understanding their environments or
behaving in an intelligent manner. Indeed, "[d]iscoveries of
unsuspected cognitive strengths in infants and young children have
been one of the leading stories in the recent study of cognitive
development."
51
3. The Modern View of Planning: The Capacity to Foresee
and Avoid the Harmful Consequences of One's Actions
Viewed from the standpoint of cognitive psychology, very
young children are more sophisticated in their thinking than
previously assumed. Cognitive psychologists who have studied the
mental processes necessary for negligent conduct have found that
50. See Bullock et al., supra note 42, at 218-21, 251. Compare Albert J. Moore, Trial by
Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273 (1989) (arguing that jurors use
scripts and schemas to interpret evidence and decide cases) with Katherine Nelson, Social Cognition
in a Script Framework, in SoCIAL COGNITIvE DEVELOPMENT. FRONTIERS AND POSSIBLE FuTuRES
97, 116 (John H. Flavell & Lee Ross eds., 1981) ("children's knowledge of the social world is script
based") and Ellin Kofsky Scholnick, Why are new Trends in Conceptual Representation a Challenge
to Piaget's Theory?, in NEw TRENDs IN CONCEmUAL REPRESENTATION: CHALLENGES TO PIAGET'S
THEORY 41, 52-7 (Ellin Kofsky Schoinick ed., 1983) (children employ schemata in processing
information).
Piaget also used the concept of a schema to describe mental development and reasoned that a
schema of action "is an internalized act of imitation, a copy or transfer, not of the object as such, but
of the motor response required to bring action to bear upon the object." THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION
OF SPACE, supra note 33, at 294. Piaget's use of the concept, however, differs significantly from the
way in which it is used in cognitive psychology. See Nelson, supra, at 100 ("The particular level of
knowledge about the world, particularly the social world, that the current use of schemata is meant
to capture, is neglected in Piaget's conception, for the very reason that Piaget is concerned with the
child's construction of a logically consistent knowledge system, and such a system does not well
describe the social relationships that the child is engaging in [citations].").
51. CHILDREN'S TNmro, supra note 40, at 52 (original emphasis); see also Rochel Gelmnan,
Cognitive Development, 29 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL 297,298-319 (1978) (presenting studies that dispute
the traditional view that children under 5 are "remarkably inept"); cf. Karen Wynn, Addition and
Subtraction by Human Infants, 358 NATURE 749,750 (1992) ("The results from the three experiments
support the claim that 5-month-old human infants are able to calculate the precise results of simple
arithmetical operations.").
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young children can foresee the consequences of their actions.52
An area of child research especially applicable to the question of
whether children have the capacity for negligence is the ability of
children to plan, which is broadly defined as "a set of complex
conceptual activities that anticipate and regulate behavior. 5 3 To
plan, then, is to understand and anticipate the causal connection
between actions and outcomes.54 Accordingly, if young children
have the capacity to plan, then they have the capacity to foresee the
consequences of their actions."
There are three key ingredients to planning: A child must (1)
have the ability to understand cause and effect relationships in the
physical world; (2) believe that actions produce outcomes in the
physical world; and (3) have the ability to exercise self-
regulation.56 These three factors will be discussed in the following
sections.
a. Recognition of cause and effect
For a child to have the capacity to plan, the child must
understand that causes precede their effects.57 Some courts which
have endorsed a rule declaring young children incapable of
52. See infra notes 57-96 and accompanying text.
53. Ellin Kofsky Scholnick & Sarah L. Friedman, The Planning Construct in the
Psychological Literature, in BLUmRINTS FOR THINKING: THE RoLE Of PLANNING IN COGNITIVE
DEvELOPMENT 3 (Sarah L Friedman et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter The Planning Construct]; see also
Henry W. Wellman et al., The Early Development of Planning, in CHIrDRN's SEARcHING: THE
DEVELOPMENT op SEARCH SKILL AND SPATIAL REPRF-sNTAION 123, 126 (Henry M. Wellman ed.,
1985) (planning "requires evidence of looking ahead").
54. Rodney R. Cocking & Carol E. Copple, Social Influences on RepresentationalAwareness:
Plans for Representing and Plans as Representation, in BLuEPRImS FOR TlINNG: THE ROLE OF
PLANNING IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 428 (Sarah L. Friedman et al. eds., 1987).
55. The definition of planning is the same as the legal definition of foreseeability, which is
"[t]he ability to see or know in advance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (6th ed. 1990).
56. The Planning Construct, supra note 53, at 6 ("Several planning theorists claim that the
content of plans is determined by a person's model of physical and psychological causation."); see
id. at 17 (-The motivation to plan has to be coupled with the capacity for self-control and self-
regulation if planning is to occur").
57. Ellin Kofsky Scholnick & Sarah L. Friedman, Planning in Context: Developmental and
Situational Considerations, _ INT'L J. BEHAV. DEv. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 24, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Planning in Context] ("Planning depends on having an adequate causal
model of a domain.").
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exercising due care for their safety have asserted that "[c]hildren
are necessarily lacking in the knowledge of physical causes and
effects." 8  This is the view articulated by Piaget.59 However,
modem research in child psychology shows that young children do
understand cause-effect relationships. 60 And, most importantly, as
a child's environment requires more complex causal reasoning, the
child's capacity to make accurate cause-effect judgments depends
upon his familiarity with the given situation.6" "[Y]oung children
can be reasonable about their choice of possible causes, that they
do assume that a mechanism of some kind relates cause to effect,
that they do recognize that causes precede their effects . .
58. Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 140 So. 798,800 (Fla. 1932); Taylor v. Bergeron,
449 P.2d 147, 150 (Or. 1969) (O'Connell, J., concurring); see, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Stokes,
74 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1954); Connell v. Petri, 30 So. 2d 922, 923-24 (Fla. 1947); Pendarvis v.
Pfeifer, 182 So. 307, 309 (Fla. 1938); Burnett v. Allen, 154 So. 515, 519 (Fla. 1934).
59. THE CHmD's CONCEPTION OF CAusALrrY, supra note 32, at 303 (Piaget found that
children under 7 are "precausal" and therefore cannot understand cause-effect relationships.).
60. Bullock et al., supra note 42, at 251 (3-year-olds reason causally); Merry Bullock &
Rochel Gelman, Preschool Children's Assumptions About Cause and Effect: Temporal Ordering, 50
CHILD DEv. 89, 96 (1979) ("We conclude from this study that children as young as 3 years notice
and use temporal order when reasoning about a mechanical sequence of events"); Frank Keil, The
Development of the Young Child's Ability to Anticipate the Outcomes of Simple Causal Events, 50
Crmw DEy. 455, 460 (1979) (1 b- and 21h- year-olds understand simple causal events.); Anna Kun,
Evidence for Preschoolers' Understanding of Causal Direction in Extended Causal Sequences, 49
CHnx DEV. 218, 221 (1978) ("[T]he present investigation strikingly demonstrates that... the notion
that causes precede their effects in time is clearly comprehended by children as young as 3 years of
age."); Alan M. Leslie, Spatiotemporal Continuity and the Perception of Causality in Infants, 13
PERCEPTION 287, 303 (1984) ("So far the evidence suggests that infants around 7 months of age
encode various degrees of spatiotemporal continuity or discontinuity between two moving entities.");
Lisa M. Oakes & Leslie B. Cohen, Infant Perception ofa Causal Event, 5 CoaNITIVE DEv. 193, 205
(1990) (10-month-olds perceive causal events); see also Barbara A. Younger & Leslie B. Cohen,
Developmental Change in Infants' Perception of Correlations among Attributes, 57 CHILD DEV. 803,
810 (1986) ('10-month-old infants [process correlations among attributes]").
61. See, e.g., Bullock et al., supra note 42, at 251 ("ITihe development of causal
understanding is more a process of learning where, when, and how to apply the rules of reasoning
rather than figuring out what those rules might be."); Bullock & Gelman, supra note 60, at 96 (study
of 3- to 5- year-olds; "young children need considerable experience with unfamiliar events before
they will render confident [cause-effect] judgments"); Keil, supra note 60, at 460 (study of 1 I/- and
21/- year-olds concludes that "to understand increasingly complex physical events, the child must
have a prior knowledge of each of the conceptual components of such events") (emphasis added).
See generally Michael D. Berzonsky, The Role of Familiarity in Children's Explanations of Physical
Causality, 42 CtLnD Day. 705, 711 (1971) (study of children between the ages of 6 years, 3 months
and 7 years, 5 months, in which the authors concluded "that a child's familiarity with the objects or
events he is being questioned about is a decisive factor in causal reasoning.") (emphasis added).
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provided care is taken to use events the child might know
about."62
b. Recognition of self as a causal actor
The child's capacity to act with due care is dependant upon his
knowledge that his actions have consequences in the world.
Developmental psychologists have shown that children as young as
two years of age understand that their behavior has consequences
in the physical and social world, and this understanding becomes
more sophisticated in domains with which they are well
acquainted. 63 Early in life, children begin to view themselves as
causal actors within the social and physical worlds and recognize
that they can 'make things happen."
c. Ability to exercise self-regulation
A common view among supporters of age-based presumptions
of incapacity is that young children are impulsive and cannot
control their behavior in safety conscious ways.65 As one court
62. Gelman, supra note 51, at 312 (emphasis added).
63. Michael Lewis, Ways of Knowing: Objective Self-Awareness or Consciousness, 11 DEv.
PSYCHOL. 231, 237-39 (1991) (between 8-9 months and 21/ years, the child "knows that certain
actions lead to certain consequences, knows what it is like when s/he engages other people. The child
knows what it is like when s/he falls"; beyond 21/ years of age, the child develops "true means-end
capacity and causality. They allow the child to come to recognize these means-ends relationships and,
therefore, to have... objective intentions.").
64. Celia A. Brownwell & Claire B. Kopp, Common Threads, Diverse Solutions: Concluding
Commentary, 11 Dav. RL. 288, 298 (1991) ("[I]nfants begin to understand causation, to make
inferences, and to represent... self and other as causal agents ... 'I make things happen.' . . . By
integrating across interactive and communicative experiences, the physically bounded self in a
physically bounded world now becomes organized as a social and causal self in a social and causal
world.").
65. See Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 27 N.E. 899, 903 (Ill. 1891); Tupman's Adm'r v.
Schmidt, 254 S.W. 199,200 (Ky. C. App. 1923); Kuhns v. Bragger, 135 A.2d 395,404 (Pa. 1957);
Endicott v. Rich, 348 S.E.2d 275, 277 (Va. 1986); Cox v. Hugo, 329 P.2d 467, 469 (Wash. 1958).
One commentator has argued that children under the age of seven should be conclusively declared
incapable of negligence because:
While the infant may have knowledge of the possibility of injury when he runs in front
of a moving trolley, the writer contends that he fails to consider the full consequences,
the immediacy of the danger and the severity of the consequences. The infant acts on
impulse. Seldom, if ever, does the infant stop to consider the full consequences of any act.
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said: "[A] child under seven years of age is conclusively presumed
to lack the capacity to manage his own affairs which includes,
among other things, the capacity to look out for his own safety."66
Child psychologists have studied children's capacity to engage
in self-regulation, which "involves flexible and adaptive control
processes that can meet quickly changing situational demands." 67
If young children have the capacity for self-regulation, then they
can control their impulses. Contrary to the view of courts
supporting a conclusive presumption rule, child psychologists
suggest that children, at a very young age, have the capacity to
regulate their behavior, understand rules about safety and friendly
interpersonal contact, and regulate their behavior in accord with
these rules. 8
Beginning at a very young age, children have the capacity to
control their behavior in response to a caregiver request, although
The possibility that he may be crippled for life or even killed is not appreciated. All that
concerns the infant is his present desire. Deliberation and a sensible choice of alternatives
in the light of future consequences are not the attributes of one of tender years.
Louis H. Wilderman, Presumptions Existing in Favor of the Infant Re: The Question of an Infant's
Ability to be Guilty of Contributory Negligence, 10 IND. LJ. 427, 435 (1935). Like Piaget,
Wilderman's model of child psychology assumes that capacity is an all-or-nothing phenomena.
Current theory and research, however, suggests capacity is context-bound and differs across tasks
depending upon the child's familiarity with the situation. See ANDERSON, supra note 43, at 421;.
APPRENTCESHip IN TIMNING, supra note 43, at 6. Moreover, we question whether this "rational
actor" standard of care is the appropriate one, since cognitive psychologists have shown that adults
cannot comply with it. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in Ju oMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel
Kalmeman et al. eds., 1982) (noting various cognitive errors that lead to errors in judgment). Even
assuming adults could meet this standard of care, Wilderman's argument was really comparing the
psychology of a child to that of an adult, not a 7 year, I day old. Thus, Wilderman's view of child
psychology merely reinforces the undisputed position that children should be held to a less stringent,
subjective standard of conduct. That Wilderman articulated an unrealistic standard is evidenced by
the fact that only two justices of a seven member court have adopted it in the fifty-seven years since
the article was published. See Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 835, 838 (Mich. 1938) (approvingly
citing Wilderman's article).
66. Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263, 267 (Mont. 1967).
67. Claire B. Kopp, The Growth of Self-Regulation: Caregivers and Children, in
CONTEMPORARY Topics IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 34, 38 (Nancy Eisenberg ed., 1987).
68. J. Heidi Gralinski & Claire B. Kopp, Everyday Rules for Behavior: Mothers' Requests to
Young Children, _ DEv. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming May 1993) (manuscript at 24-25, 26, 28-29, on
file with authors).
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voluntary regulation of action rarely occurs. 69 Over time, however,
children develop the capacity to control behavior on their own and
require "fewer externally mediated cues and reminders."7
Ultimately, the child develops the capacity to exercise self
regulation, which involves "recognition that an object has an
association with a prohibition, an instruction to the self about that
prohibition, and an action that is consonant with the instruction."71
The ability to engage in self-regulation has been shown to occur in
children as young as thirteen to fifteen months72 and thirty
months.73 This ability emerges no later than the third year of
life.74 Young children are more likely to have the capacity to
exercise self-regulation in situations they know require it.75 For
example, during peer interaction fifteen-month old children already
engage in a regulatory "act/watch" process in which they pause to
process feedback from their interaction.76
69. Kopp, supra note 67, at 38 (From birth to 12 months, "children are highly dependent upon
the caregiver for reminder signals about acceptable behaviors.").
70. Id.
71. Id. at44.
72. Id. ("Self-initiated compliance emerges at about 13-15 months of age to very specific
situations.") (emphasis added); Donelda J. Stayton et al., Infant Obedience and Maternal Behavior:
The Origins of Socialization Reconsidered, 42 C m DEv. 1057, 1068 (1971) ("It seems likely that
the conditions that foster simple compliance in the first year may also promote internalized controls
in the second year.").
73. Brian E. Vaughn et al., The Emergence and Consolidation of Self-Controlfrom Eighteen
to Thirty Months of Age: Normative Trends and Individual Differences, 55 CHLn DEV. 990, 999,
1001 (1984) ("The advance in the capacity to delay seen as children get older is related to changes
in cognitive and language abilities seen over the period from 18-30 months"; "The capacity to delay
or inhibit responsiveness to attractive stimuli can be readily, though fleetingly, observed in 18 month
old children.").
74. Kopp, supra note 67, at 45 (components of self-regulation "emerge no later than the third
year of life for normally developing children who are reared in supportive environments"); see also
Marjorie A. Reed et al., Inhibitory Self-Control in Preschool Children, 30 MERRIIL-PALMtER Q. 131,
143 (1984) ("Our data show that 3-year-olds exhibit reasonable levels of internal inhibition").
75. See generally The Planning Construct, supra note 53, at 18 ("self-regulation needs to be
coupled with the other component [of planning]: knowledge of when planning helps").
76. Edward Mueller & Thomas Lucas, A Developmental Analysis of Peer Interaction Among
Toddlers, in FRENDH sP AND PEER RELATIONS 223, 233 (Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum
eds., 1975) ("m1The [15 month old] infant is seldom continuously active in his exploration. Instead,
his actions are punctuated by pauses during which he appears to process the feedback deriving from
the actions.... [This "act/watch" rhythm is] a regulatory pattern that the infant imposes on his
interaction with various aspects of his environment.").
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Researchers have also found that, in the early years of a child's
life, caregivers devote much attention to ensuring the child's
survival through everyday requests for compliance with rules for
safety. 7 These findings are not surprising because, as a child's
locomotor skills develop, he is exposed to more danger without an
understanding of how to avoid such danger.78 A rule system
designed to protect the child from harm is therefore essential to the
child's survival.79
The theoretical picture describing the acquisition of the capacity
to engage in self-regulation predicts that young children do in fact
regulate their behavior in safety conscious ways. Unfortunately,
developmental psychologists have devoted little attention to the
empirical question of whether children comply with safety rules in
the absence of a caregiver request.80 This gap of scholarship could
explain the failure by litigants and courts to marshall evidence from
psychology to clarify the confusion in child negligence law.
Modem empirical research, however, indicates that young children
do have the capacity to avoid harming themselves and others. A
recent study demonstrated that upon mothers' demands that their
thirteen-month-old child not touch dangerous things, not climb on
furniture, and refrain from going into the street without holding
hands, the children complied with these safety demands.81 The
authors concluded that "[a]lthough we anticipated some emphasis
on safety rules because of mothers' anecdotal reports in previous
research, we were unprepared for the powerful role it played in
77. Gralinski & Kopp, supra note 68, at.26 (mothers demand compliance with safety rules
beginning at 13 months); Kopp, supra note 67, at 35, 41 (teaching of child about safety usually
occurs in the second and third years of life). See generally Leon Kuczynski et al., A Developmental
Interpretation of Young Children's Noncompliance, 23 DEV. PSYCHOL. 799, 805 (1987) ("after the
child's first year, parents begin to hold children responsible for their actions"); Thomas G. Power &
M. Lynn Chapieski, Childrearing and Impulse Control in Toddlers: A Naturalistic Investigation, 22
DEv. PsYCHOL. 271,274 (1986) ("during the second year of life, mothers place numerous demands
on their infants for impulse control and that these demands are strictly enforced").
78. Kopp, supra note 67, at 41.
79. See, e.g., Stayton et al., supra note 72, at 1066 ("As an infant moyes about to investigate
his world, his mother must be able to control his actions across an enlarged and often hazardous
environment.").
80. Gralinski & Kopp, supra note 68, at 26 (maternal concerns for safety "stand in marked
contrast to developmentalists' disregard for safety issues...").
81. Id. at 13.
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mothers' overall rule systems., 82 Moreover, early in life, children
are socialized about the rules governing interpersonal behavior and
are taught to control their aggressive behavior toward adults, other,
children, and animals.83 Maternal requests for compliance with
safety and interpersonal rules are increased and elaborated upon as
the child develops.84
The fact that thirteen-month-old children complied with their
mothers' demands for compliance with safety and interpersonal
rules is an insufficient reason to hold that young children can plan
to avoid harming themselves and others because the thirteen-
month-olds' compliance was motivated by the mother, not the child
himself.85 Theories of socialization, however, suggest that training
a child to care for his safety and refrain from harming others is a
long-term socialization goal that elicits caregiver-child interactions
aimed at ensuring self-initiated behavior control.8 6 This indicates
that rules about personal safety and friendly interpersonal contact
play a central role in caregiver-child interactions beginning early
in life. While the data on the circumstances surrounding the
transition from externally- to internally-motivated compliance with
safety and interpersonal rules is limited, current research suggests
that children between the ages of three and four "were in transition
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id. at 25-26.
85. Id. at 29.
86. See, e.g., Margaret K. Bacon & Richard D. Ashmore, A Consideration of the Cognitive
Activities of Parents and their Role in the Socialization Process, in T"nNKING ABOUT THE FAMImY:
ViEws Op PARENTS AND CHILDREN 3, 9 (Richard D. Ashmore & David M. Brodzinsky eds., 1986)
(motivation to socialize children regarding dangers such as falling, drowning, or burning "appears
to be universal"); Leon Kuczynski, Socialization Goals and Mother-Child Interaction: Strategies for
Long-Term and Short-Term Compliance, 20 D-v. PsYCHOL 1061,1062-63 (1984) (examples of long-
term socialization goals include "violations against the values or moral standards of society or
behaviors that are physically dangerous"); Robert A. LeVine, Parental Goals: A Cross-Cultural View,
76 TcIRS. C. R c. 226, 230-31 (1974) ("[t]he physical survival and health of the child" is a universal
child-rearing goal); cf. Joan E. Grusec & Leon Kuczynski, Direction of Effect in Socialization: A
Comparison of the Parent's Versus the Child's Behavior as Determinants of Disciplinary Techniques,
16 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1980) (among caregivers, running blindly into the street is considered a
universal prohibition).
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from partial compliance [with safety and interpersonal rules] to
compliance on one's own.
87
Young children, therefore, have the ability to plan, especially
when they are in an environment familiar to them."8 The young
child's knowledge must be specific because general knowledge or
general competence would not serve as an accurate measure of the
capacity for planning under the particular circumstances presented
to the child. 9 Stated differently, "changes in the adequacy of
planning are described as changes in expertise, growing awareness
of a domain, and practice in problem solving in it."9 Thus,
87. Gralinski & Kopp, supra note 68, at 28-29; Telephone interview with Lewis P. Lipsitt,
Professor of Psychology and Medical Science, Brown University (Sept. 22, 1992) (children engage
in self-regulatory defensive behavior "well before" the age of five).
88. Telephone interview with Ellin Kofsky Scholnick, Professor of Psychology, University of
Maryland, College Park (Aug. 13, 1992); see M. Beth Casey et al., Differentiating Preschoolers'
Sequential Planning Ability from their General Intelligence: A Study of Organization, Systematic
Responding, and Efficiency in Young Children, 12 J. APPLIED DEv. PSYCHOL. 19, 28 (1991)
("children as young as 4 can show evidence of an ability to implement sequential plans"); Cocking
& Copple, supra note 54, at 441 (children between the ages of 3 years, 5 months and 4 years, 10
months planned their drawings so that other children could understand them); Alison Gopnik, Words
and Plans: Early Language and the Development of Intelligent Action, 9 J. CHILD LANGUAO! 303,
318 (1981) ("Children between 15 and 24 months old are trying to understand the nature of
intelligent action - how plans succeed or fail, how to reject certain courses of action, and how to
ensure that a plan that succeeded once will succeed again"); Judith A. Hudson & Robyn Fivush,
Planning in the Preschool Years: The Emergence of Plans from General Event Knowledge, 6
CoNrrvE DEc. 393, 414 (1991) ("This research supports the notion that children's first planning
efforts emerge within the context of familiar event routines."); Linda B. Spungen & Joan F.
Goodman, Sequencing Strategies in Children 18-24 Months: Limitations Imposed by Task Complexity,
4 J. APPLmD Dav. PSYCHoL. 109, 119 (1983) (stating that children between 18 and 30 months of age
are "capable of imposing some degree of structure upon now problems"); Wellman et al., supra note
53, 147 ("a basic ability to plan an extended course of action emerges quite early, comes most
strongly and directly from our studies of planned searches in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. In these studies,
the first signs of planning appeared in 3-year-olds' performance. Suggestive evidence from younger
age groups in other studies.., raises the possibility that the origins of planning competence possibly
lie with I- and 2-year-olds."); see also The Planning Construct, supra note 53, at 8 ("As in any
domain of problem solving, the child will appear more expert when the plans to be generated deal
with familiar circumstances"); Planning in Context, supra note 57, at 20 ("Changes in the knowledge
base contribute to cognitive development. Planning uses past knowledge to guide future behavior.
Different planning tasks require different kinds of knowledge and pose different impediments or
supports in use of information. Planning may appear earliest in situations which call upon the use of
familiar scenarios in familiar contexts.").
89. See, e.g., APPRENTICEsHIP IN THNmG, supra note 43, at 6.
90. Sarah L. Friedman et al., Reflections on Reflections: What Planning is and how it
Develops, in BLUEPRINTS FOR THINKING: TaE RoLE Op PLANNING IN CoGNIvE DEvELOPMENT 515,
522 (Sarah L, Friedman et al. eds., 1987); see also id. at 526 (young children plan "when the tasks
are drawn from domains that are so familiar to children that they can give rise to anticipatory plans.
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contrary to Piaget's belief that children under the age of seven
cannot plan, modem research in child psychology suggests that
"children's behavior during play and during problem solving
suggests that children do engage in planning well before
adolescence."91 Once in a familiar environment, very young
children can decide to plan, know when to plan, choose a goal,
formulate a plan, and execute and monitor the plan.' For
instance, one researcher has argued that, as young as eighteen
months, a child "reflects on his own behavior and experience and
constructs a model of the world which includes his own actions.
This model allows him to consider hypothetical actions and to
predict the outcome of those actions." 93
The findings in child psychology also suggest that young
children have the capacity to control their impulses and regulate
their behavior. 94 Not only are children socialized to care for their
safety and the physical well-being of others beginning at a very
young age, they also have the ability to regulate their behavior in
accord with these demands.95
Research in child psychology therefore suggests that for young
children, mental capacity is context-bound so that a child of almost
Under such circumstances, the child can represent the situation and use the representation to map
strategies"); Ann L. Brown & Judy S. DeLoache, Skills, Plans, and Self-Regulation, in CHILDREN's
THNKmIN: WHAT DEvELops? 3, 13-14 (Robert S. Siegler ed., 1978) ('The child's initial 'passivity'
in many memory and problem-solving tasks, his failure to check and monitor ongoing activities, and
his failure to make his own task analysis could be the direct result of gross inexperience on such
tasks. This does not mean that young children are incapable of self-regulation, only that they tend
not to bring such procedures to bear immediately on new problems").
91. Friedman et al., supra note 90, at 525-26 (emphasis added).
92. See supra note 88 (listing studies showing young children have the capacity to plan).
93. Gopnik, supra note 88, at 314.
94. See supra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
95. The developmental picture of a child's capacity to regulate his behavior in interpersonal
situations is not complete. Telephone interview with Claire B. Kopp, Professor of Psychology,
University of California, Los Angeles (Oct. 13, 1992). Gralinski and Kopp's research represents the
only attempt to study a child's capacity to refrain from harming other children, adults, and animals.
Further research is therefore necessary. But see Mueller & Lucas, supra note 76, at 233 (15 month-
old children engage in 'actwatch" rhythm in interpersonal interaction).
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any age in a familiar situation is likely to have the capacity to
foresee the consequences of his actions and regulate behavior.96
4. Individual Differences
A presumption of incapacity based on chronological age
necessarily implies that age is a sufficient measure of a child's
mental capacity. Therefore, one assumes that young children do not
vary in their ability to foresee the consequences of their acts or in
their capacity to regulate their behavior. It is true that not all young
minors have the capacity to plan and avoid harming themselves and
others. The findings reported here do not pretend to support the
sweeping assertion that all young children are capable of negligent
conduct. However, psychologists uniformly agree that there are
wide individual differences between children.97 Factors such as
96. As with most research in psychology, the data from which the foregoing conclusions are
drawn are collected under laboratory conditions. However, requirements for planning in the laboratory
mirror those that children encounter in everyday situations. Telephone interview with Ellin Kofsky
Scholnick, Professor of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park (Oct. 14, 1992). The data,
therefore, are reliable indicators of what a child will do outside of the controlled setting. Most
importantly, however, laboratory experiments are likely to underestimate a child's capacity for
planning because the laboratory environment is restrictive and sometimes "bloodless." Planning in
Context, supra note 57, at 6. In contrast, "real life" situations contain more cues for action, more
opportunities to get motivated to plan, and more mentally appetizing stimuli. Id. This suggests that
"beliefs, attitudes, and motivations have a larger impact on the decision to plan in everyday tasks than
in many laboratory problem solving situations." Id. at 12. See also Hasen, supra note 21, at 403-04
(addressing criticism that findings in a laboratory are insufficient to support a change in the
assumptions embodied in a legal rule).
97. See, e.g., The Planning Construct, supra note 53, at 4 ("planning may be optional and the
decision whether or not to plan may be determined by individual differences on dimensions such as
cultural or personal norms about the desirability of plans, familiarity with the context in which
planning is called for, and the cognitive and motivational status of the individual"); see also Reed
et al., supra note 74, at 141 ("The results of this study [of 3- to 4-year-olds] strongly support the
existence of a characteristic level of inhibitory self-control that differs for each individual."); Vaughn
et al.,supra note 73, at 991 (in a study of the ability of 18- to 30-month-olds to exercise self-control,
the authors concluded that "at any given age there will be a wide range in the degree to which
individuals are able and/or motivated to exercise self-control"); cf. Rafael M. Diaz et al., The Social
Origins of Self-Regulation, in VYGOTSKY AND EDUCATION: INSTRUCTIONAL IMPICATIONS AND
APPuCATIONS OF SOCIOHISTORIcAL PSYCHOLOGY 127, 137 (Luis C. Moll ed., 1990) ("It is a well-
known fact... .that children vary in their capacity to regulate effectively different aspects of their
perception, attention, memory, and problem-solving activity") (emphasis added).
1348
1993 / The Standard Of Care Required Of Children
the child's age, 98  previous experiences, 99  family
environment,,' cultural background, 1 ' mother-infant
interaction, 0 2  peer influences," 3  television,' °4  situational
98. See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 90, at 527 ("there are expected quantitative, age-
related differences in planning").
99. See Planning in Context, supra note 57, at 20 ("The arenas in which this network [of goal
setting] is influential may change with development, but the nature of the network may be better
characterized as a product of individual experience than of age.").
100. See, e.g., Ann V. McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., Familial Influences on Planning, in
BLUEPRINTS FOR THINKING: Tim ROLE op PLANNING IN COoNrITVE DEVELOPMENT 395, 423 (Sarah
L. Friedman et al. eds., 1987) (in a study of children between the ages of 512 and 7'1/2, the authors
concluded "the family can be viewed as the crucible for the onset and development of planning
abilities. The family provides the most intensive milieu for an array of interpersonal experiences that
lay the groundwork for subsequent social and individual activity."). See generally Bacon & Ashmore,
supra note 86, at 13-26 (how a parent perceives a child's behavior influences how that parent
interacts with and socializes the child); Luis M. Laosa, Families as Facilitators of Children's
Intellectual Development at 3 Years of Age: A Causal Analysis, in FAMILIES AS LEARNING
ENVIRONMENTS FOR CHILDREN 1, 4-7 (Luis M. Laosa & Irving E. Sigel eds., 1982) (family
influences affecting a child's cognitive development).
101. See generally APPREncEsHI IN THINKING, supra note 43, at 13-18 ("the rapid
development of young children into skilled participants in society is accomplished through children's
routine, and often tacit, guided participation in ongoing cultural activities as they observe and
participate with others in culturally organized practices. [11 ... [Tihrough children's everyday
involvement in social life, 'lessons* regarding skilled and valued (or at least necessary) cultural
activities are available to them."); Brownwell & Kopp, supra note 64, at 301 (recent "emphasis on
the interface between social and cognitive development [among child psychologists], particularly that
social contexts of development influence cognitions in formative ways, is an exciting innovation in
discussion of the mechanisms underlying growth in the self system. It aptly reflects the recognition
in psychology more widely that social and cultural contexts shape cognition, learning, and
development.); cf. Ralph Barocas et al., Social and Interpersonal Determinants of Developmental
Risk, 27 DEy. PSYCHOL. 479, 484 (1991) (In a study of 4-year-olds, the authors concluded that a
"child's independent behavior is considered partly a product of the internalization of events that occur
in interpersonal exchange. Thus, the opportunities and limits for much of the child's cognitive growth
are defined by the world within which the child lives.").
102. See generally K. Alison Clarke-Stewart & Constance M. Hevey, Longitudinal Relations
in Repeated Observations of Mother-Child Interaction from I to 2 M Years, 17 DEv. PSYCHOL. 127,
143 (1981) ("the results of the study revealed differences in mother-child interaction related to the
child's increasing maturity"); K. Alison Clarke-Stewart et al., Analysis and Replication of Mother-
Child Relations at Two Years of Age, 50 CHImn DE. 777, 785 (1979) ("children's intelligence was
more closely correlated with the mother's behavior - descriptive speech, positive play,
nondirectiveness and nonrestrictiveness - than with her IQ or [socioeconomic status]"); Gralinski
& Kopp, supra note 68, at 24-30 (socialization of children between the ages of 13 and 30 months
is "directed toward ensuring child survival"); Laosa, supra note 100, at 33 (an "important discovery
in this study is the positive influence that maternal modeling - that is, the mother's use of physical
demonstration as a teaching strategy - appears to have on the child's intellectual development"
(original emphasis)); cf. Susan Crockenberg & Cindy Litman, Autonomy as Competence in 2-Year-
Olds: Maternal Correlates of Child Defiance, Compliance, and Self-Assertion, 26 DE. PSYCHOL.
961, 969-71 (1990) ("strategies [of mother-child interaction] that are intrusive and power-assertive
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demands,"0 5 and the frequency with which the child interacts with
older children and adults0 6 all play a role in the child's ability
are typically ineffective in achieving a resolution that most parents would consider satisfactory,
whereas strategies that combine a clear statement of what the parent wants with an acknowledgment
of the child's perspective ... are quite effective in both effecting compliance and avoiding
defiance"); Cheryl Minton et al., Maternal Control and Obedience in the Th'o-Year-Old, 42 CHILD
DEv. 1873, 1892 (1971) ("Lower-middle- and middle-class mothers in an urban setting are rather
intrusive with their 2-year-olds, interrupting them every 6-8 minutes to remind them of behavior they
should stop or a command they should heed").
103. See, e.g., Cocking & Copple, supra note 54, at 458 ("by provoking the child to stand back
from her drawing, peer critiques promote the tendency to take a reflective stance in relation to one's
drawing-).
Some courts have also recognized peer influences as important determinants of a child's
capacity for negligence. See Petroski v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 746 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976) ("There was evidence that at least two other children had touched the upper [electric]
wire prior to [plaintiffs] accident. There was evidence that several children had previously touched
the bottom [electric] wire and that one child 'swang off of the lower wire one day like Tarzan.'");
Simmons v. Beauregard Parish Sch. Bd., 315 So. 2d 883, 886, 889 (La. Ct. App. 1975) ("While
waiting for the school bus, [plaintiff] was apparently encouraged by other students to demonstrate
his [model] volcano. [Plaintiff] in turn gave one or two demonstrations and while pouring powder
for the second or third demonstrations, an explosion occurred and [plaintiff] was seriously injured".);
id (The court reasoned that this evidence probably led the jury to conclude that plaintiff did not
"intentionally and voluntarily expose himself" to danger.) (emphasis deleted); see Taylor v. Armiger,
358 A.2d 883, 886 (Md. 1976) (citing testimony of parent that "when [children] are playing with
another child, they may temporarily forget what they are constantly reminded of"); Guzman v.
Guajardo, 761 S.W.2d 506,510 ('rex. Ct. App. 1988) ("It thus appears that the jury's 'failure to find'
negligence could have been based on that fact that [the deceased plaintiff], a seven-year-old, was
following the lead of his older companions and yet was unable to react as quickly as they did when
[defendant's] truck began to approach.").
104. See generally GEORGE COMSTOCK & HAEUNG PARK, TELEviSION AND THE AMERICAN
CHILD 139-40 (1991) ("Television ... may contribute to what young persons believe in important
ways, when it brings them information not available from alternative sources."); JUDrrIH VAN EVRA,
TELESION AND CHM DEVEI.OPMENr 198-99 (1990) ("Because of... increased access to [adult
information], children are privy, at a very much younger age, to many adult behaviors that were
unknown to previous generations of children at that age. Their access to adult information, however,
does not bring with it, necessarily, a complete or 'adult' understanding of that information. Their
ability to process and react to what they see is still constrained ... by what they bring to the viewing
situation in terms of developmental level, gender, range of experiences, socioeconomic level,
perceived reality, and motivation for viewing.").
105. See William Gardner & Barbara Rogoff, Children s Deliberateness of Planning According
to Task Circumstances, 26 DEv. PSYCHOL. 480,486 (1990) (Four-year-old "[c]hildren adapted their
deliberation in planning to the circumstances of the problem, suggesting that an important aspect of
planning skills is adaptation of planning strategies to varying goals and tasks").
106. See generally APPREMNICESHIP IN THINKwo, supra note 43, at 7-8 (children are
"apprentices in thinking, active in their efforts to learn from observing and participating with peers
and more skilled members of their society"); id. at 17 ("The infants' strategies [for learning] ...
appear similar to those appropriate for anyone learning in an unfamiliar culture: stay near a trusted
guide, watch the guide's activities and get involved in the activities when possible and attend to any
instruction the guide provides."); cf. Planning in Context, supra note 57, at 14 ("In tasks where the
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to plan to avoid endangering themselves or others. However, no
single variable is decisive in any given circumstance. 7 In
particular, chronological age alone certainly cannot predict a child's
capacity to plan and avoid danger or avoid harming others." 8
5. Conclusions
The view among courts that young children are incapable of
caring for their own well-being probably emerged from the
influence of the developmental portrait painted by Piaget.'0 9 By
the 1970s, however, child psychologists were uncovering cognitive
strengths in young children and questioning the empirical and
theoretical validity of Piaget's age-based theory of
development."' Research in child psychology now suggests that
chronological age alone is an insufficient measure of a child's
society recognizes that advance preparation is needed, children are often taught to plan.").
107. Further research on the impact of each of these factors on a young child's ability to plan
and heed warnings about safety is still necessary. The authors also suspect that preschool education
has a significant impact on a child's ability to exercise due care, but were unable to locate research
that discusses the relationship between schooling, planning, and self-regulation. See, e.g., Honeycutt
ex rel. Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 558 (Kan. 1990) ("Safety habits are stressed in schools.");
Toetschinger v. nlmot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. 1977) ("the exposure of young children to the
hazards of daily living and to the opportunities for instruction has been increased by such
developments as preschool instruction and kindergarten"). For a general discussion of the role of
schools as "socializing agents," see, JoAN E. GRUSEc & HUGH LYTroN, SocIAL DEVELOPMENT:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RESEARCH 242-51 (1988).
108. Telephone interview with John Flavell, Professor of Psychology, Stanford University (May
6, 1992). See generally Brown & DeLoache, supra note 90, at 13, 14, 30-31 ("accumulation of
knowledge about how to think in an increasing array of problem situations is an outcome of
experience with more and more complex problems. Young children's insensitivity to their problem-
solving potential is the result of lack of exposure to such situations, rather than age per se.");
Friedman et al., supra note 90, at 522 ("Children's cognitive skills change considerably between
infancy and late adolescence owing to improvements in knowledge representation, increasing skill
in knowledge acquisition, perception, and reasoning. These changes reflect maturation of component
processes, exposure to schooling, and more experience with different domains."); il. at 533
("Planning has many components; its evocation and application are influenced by cognitive, affective,
and social factors and its content differs widely across domains"); Vaughn et al., supra note 73, at
999 ("Though self-control shows an age-related increase, simple age changes cannot explain these
changes.").
109. See, e.g., Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 832-33 & n.1 (Mich. 1938) (relying on Piaget
as support for a rule which declared children under 7 conclusively incapable of negligence). Tyler
was later followed by another Michigan court. Baker v. Alt, 132 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. 1965).
110. ELLIN KOFSKY SCHOLNICK, NEw TRENDs IN CONCEPTUALREPRESENTATION: CHALLENGES
To PiAoEr's THEORY? at xii (1983); Cnu.DREN's THuKING, supra note 40, at 51-58.
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capacity to foresee the consequences of action and to plan to avoid
danger or refrain from harming others."' Some young children
have the capacity to plan to avoid harming themselves in situations
which they know are dangerous and the ability to plan to refrain
from injuring others where they know that such behavior is not
acceptable. Others do not.
A complete developmental account of a child's ability to plan
and heed rules of safety and friendly interpersonal interaction has
not been articulated. For instance, developmental psychologists do
not yet know how frequently young children plan to avoid harming
themselves and others nor the full range of safety behaviors young
children are taught and follow." 2  Despite these limitations,
however, emerging developmental picture supports the view that
instruction on safety and friendly interpersonal contact plays a
critical role in caregiver-child interactions, that young children have
the capacity to follow these rules and foresee the consequences of
their acts in situations familiar to them, and that there are
individual differences in mental capacity among children of the
same age."3 For those unconvinced that these findings accurately
portray a child's capacity for negligence, this Article serves as an
111. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
112. Telephone interview with Claire B. Kopp, Professor of Psychology, University of
California, Los Angeles (Oct. 13, 1992). We question whether the frequency with which young
children plan to avoid harming themselves should impact the legal determination of the standard of
care required of minors. All that is required to charge a minor with negligence is the capacity for
negligent conduct and a finding of capacity is an implicit finding that young children do plan to
avoid harming themselves and others.
113. Gralinski & Kopp, supra note 68, at 28 (finding that children complied with mothers'
requests for compliance with safety and interpersonal rules); see also supra notes 97-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the various factors affecting a child's capacity to plan and regulate
behavior).
In light of recent discoveries of mental abilities once thought absent in a young child, it would
not be surprising if researchers discovered that children initiate safe behaviors at a younger age. See,
e.g., supra note 51. For example, a commentator has reasoned:
Self-initiated compliance emerges at about 13-15 months of age to very specific situations
[citations]. An example ... involved forcefully telling [a young girl] not to touch a
particular bush in the back yard (the berries from the bush are poisonous if eaten). At a
later date, the child took her teddy bear to the bush and said, 'No! No!' Indeed, responses
of children of this age to caregiver prohibitions often include reaching out and
withdrawing or saying 'no' to themselves when they are in the vicinity of a desired object.
Kopp, supra note 67, at 44.
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impetus for further research in this important area of child
psychology.114
In short, a legal rule which conclusively presumes that young
children are incapable of foreseeing the consequences of their acts
or of controlling their impulses is not supported by theory and
research in child psychology. Young children have the capacity to
exercise due care in familiar situations. The standard of care
required of children should, therefore, be determined on the basis
of, among other factors, the child's familiarity with the specific
injury-causing conduct. Consistent with the research in child
psychology, prior knowledge of and experience with avoiding harm
should be treated as critical indicia of a child's capacity to act with
due care in the circumstances presented to him.
B. The Potential Impact of Negligence Rules on the Conduct
of Caregivers and Young Children
Much has been written in recent years about the influence of
tort law on individual behavior." 5 The "law and economics"
theory of tort law posits that the tort system deters individuals from
114. Skeptics of the conclusions advanced here may point out that it is common knowledge that
adolescents frequently engage in risky behaviors and ignore warnings about safety. Thus, if
knowledgeable teenagers take many risks, then less knowledgeable young children must certainly do
so at an even higher rate. However, that adolescents take many risks does not necessarily imply that
young children take more risks. Moreover, cognitive psychologists have shown that risk taking does
not end with adolescence, but continues into adulthood. See Paul Slovic et al., Fact Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JuDMENT UNDER UNCERTATY: HEURsTIcS AND BtAsES 463,
468, 478 (Daniel Kabneman et al. eds., 1982) ("Accurate perception of misleading samples of
information might also be seen to underlie another apparent judgmental bias, people's predilection
to view themselves as personally immune to hazards"; "misleading personal experiences may promote
a false sense of security . . ."). Thus, the difference in risk taking across these three stages of life may
reflect differences in the type of risks taken, not the frequency of their occurrence. See, e.g., Lita
Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DaV.
Rv. 1, 17-19 (1992) (-the assertion that adolescents do not consider sufficiently possible
consequences in the distant future remains an interesting hypothesis for which there are yet no
convincing data one way or the other. However, there is good empirical evidence [citation] that adults
often display 'self-defeating' behavior by 'choosing immediate benefits, such as pleasure and relief,
despite long-term costs of increased harm, loss or risk' [citation].") (emphasis in original). In any
event, the fact that young children, like adolescents and adults, may ignore safety warnings is no
reason to hold that they should be absolved of all responsibility for their own behavior.
115. See, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 548 (1985).
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engaging in behaviors that increase the probability of liability
exposure." 6 This theory assumes that individuals are rational
utility maximizers who include liability rules in their cost-benefit
calculations before taking action. 7 From the law and economics
vantage point, parents may shape their childrearing practices so as
to reduce their child's liability exposure or maximize the potential
for a tort recovery.1 '
Under this economic theory, absent a bright line rule, caregivers
may not educate their child about avoiding danger so that, in the
event the child is injured in an accident, the child's chances of
recovering from the defendant are greater than if the child was
well-informed about the dangerousness of his conduct. Likewise,
a caregiver would not instruct a child to refrain from harming
others because the child's liability for injuries he may inflict is
greater if he knew of the rules governing safe interpersonal
contact."' If this model of behavior is accurate, children will
receive less guidance, will be injured in more preventable
accidents, and society will be exposed to more reckless acts by
more young children if a bright line age test is abandoned.
The behavioral assumption of the law and economics view of
tort law, however, has been characterized as embracing an
inaccurate depiction of adult psychology. 2 ' Critics have relied on
research in cognitive psychology to suggest that adults cannot
always make the optimal economic decision among available
alternatives; adults do not have the capacity to analyze every
available course of action and predict all consequences that may
116. WnLLAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
54-82 (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER]; see also Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic
Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE W. 799, 799-800 nn.2 & 3 (1983).
117. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAvi 139, 143 n.2 (2d ed. 1977).
118. See LANDEs & POsNER, supra note 116, at 126 ("Holding the child to the reasonable man
standard should induce his parents to prevent him from driving whereas holding him to an
individualized negligence standard might not."); see also id. at 129.
119. In the case of a child defendant, the caregiver also minimizes his exposure to liability
because parents are personally liable for the injuries that result from their child's willful misconduct.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1985) (parents liable up to $10,000).
120. Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L.
Rav. 677, 678-79 & nn.5 & 6 (1985).
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flow from each potential decision."2 People are inherently
constrained by "human comprehensional capacity, time, and
attention span."" Instead, adults are capable only of making
utility-maximizing choices in a limited number of settings because
thinking things through requires a broad array of analytical
skills.2 These skills can be brought to bear only on a limited
number of choices that are available. 24 As a result, adults
generally do not alter or mold their behavior in response to
economic rewards and punishments within the tort system.
1 25
The prediction that caregivers will place the liability interests
of their child before the child's survival interests is inconsistent
with research in child psychology. 26 Just as research in cognitive
psychology has challenged the behavioral assumptions of law and
121. Id. at 678 ("[P]eople cannot conceivably examine all possible ramifications of all possible
choices. Incomplete information is the most frequently cited extrinsic constraint, but inherent
limitations of human comprehensional capacity, time, and attention span also impose fundamental
constraints on decisionmaking capabilities.") (footnotes omitted); see also Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 65, at 4-18 (documenting certain heuristics individuals use that lead to errors in prediction
and estimation). Latin's methodology has not escaped criticism. See Richard A. Posner, Can Lawyers
Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CAL. L. REv. 747, 747-54 (1985); LANDES & PosNER,
supra note 116, at 9-14 (arguing the economic model does not require that individuals possess
"superhuman" mental abilities).
Research in cognitive psychology has been used to undermine predictions of the law and
economics model in other legal domains. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 21, at 404-24 (discussing the
effect of "framing" - the way a choice is phrased affects the choice made - on the construction of
fair and socially efficient legal rules); see also id. at 437-48 (discussing other areas of the law that
have been analyzed through the prism of cognitive psychology).
122. Latin, supra note 120, at 678.
123. kle at 679 (and studies cited therein) ("Thinking things through requires time, effort, and
diverse evaluative skills, which means people cannot employ effective problem-solving behavior for
more than a small subset of the choices they must make.").
124. Id.
125. Id. at 692-93; Hasen, supra note 21, at 423 ("Someone will not drive a car recklessly
because she knows her insurance company will compensate her for the loss of any limbs."); cf.
Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717, 1718,
1744(1982) ("[V]irtually all nonlawyers are ignorant of the doctrinal dispute between negligence and
strict liability and do not know to which system they refer when they appeal in everyday language
to 'fault' as a criterion of liability."). The leading proponents of the law and economics program have
conceded as much. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 116, at 12 ("We do not deny that people
frequently are inattentive, clumsy, ignorant about the law and about accident probabilities, and so
forth, and that these deficiencies blunt the effectiveness of tort law as a deterrent to careless
behavior.").
126. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (discussing research which demonstrates
caregivers teach children rules of safety beginning at an early age).
1355
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
economics, so too does the research in childrearing. Teaching
young children rules of safety and interpersonal interaction
dominate caregiver-child interactions in the early years of life to
such an extent that it is clear no parent would place the child's
liability interests, or the parents' economic interests, ahead of the
child's survival interests. 127 The incentive for parents to ensure
a child's survival and to minimize the amount of harm the child
may cause others would exist independent of any liability rule in
negligence law. 128
In addition, if it were certain that caregivers would forego
teaching safety and interpersonal rules because of the potentially
high liability costs faced by knowledgeable youngsters, parents of
older children who are not protected by a conclusive presumption
of incapacity would arguably do the same. Similarly, parents of
children in states applying the flexible standard of care to all
children would behave differently than parents in states applying
a conclusive presumption rule. However, the data do not
specifically support or refute either hypothesis. What we do know
is that parents universally teach their children the virtues of safety
and friendly interpersonal contact. For example, mothers are just as
likely to caution a four-year-old to refrain from running blindly
into the street as an eight-year-old. 129
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 120, at 688 ('The primary incentive for spectators to avoid
being hit by balls is their desire to escape injury, and that incentive would exist regardless of the
applicable liability role."); cf. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL ECON. 615,632 n.18 (1981) ("Many individuals who
claim 'all aspirin is alike' apparently pay the extra price for their children where the costs of lower
quality are greater and therefore quality assurance is considered more important.").
129. Grusec & Kuczynski, supra note 86, at 6-7. Even assuming the economic model is correct
and some caregivers may actually refrain from socializing their child to be safety conscious, the tort
of negligent supervision provides a defendant with a separate indemnification action against the
parent for any injuries caused by the child. See generally D'Amico v. Burns, 469 N.E.2d 1016, 1018-
19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (property owner maintained viable cause of action against parent of 7-year-
old who threw objects down owner's sewer drain and seriously damaged property); Annotation,
Parents' Liability for Injury or Damage Intentionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.2d 974
(1973) (and cases collected therein). Therefore, if a parent does shape his childrearing practices
around liability rules in negligence law, a caregiver's overall liability costs would not be lessened by
foregoing lessons on safety.
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A conclusive presumption rule arguably promotes the strong
public policy of ensuring that those young minors who are the most
knowledgeable about safety and interpersonal behavior are not
* penalized for their superior knowledge. This argument, however,
proves too much. If the most desirable legal rule is that which
minimizes liability exposure for acts society deems socially
responsible, then all children ought to be conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence. Otherwise, older minors with superior
knowledge and experience not protected by any conclusive
presumptions of incapacity are more likely to be held accountable
for their actions than those with inferior knowledge and
experience.13 Yet negligence law has always imposed liability in
accord with an older child's knowledge, capacity, age, and
experience."' There is nothing inequitable in having higher
expectations for a child who is more capable, and imposing a
higher standard of care on such a child.
In sum, rather than anchor a legal rule to a chiflt's age alone,
public policy is better served if all minors are responsible for their
actions in conjunction with their level of knowledge, experience,
capacity, and age.132
C. Judicial Economy
Some seek to justify an age-determined presumption of
incapacity on the ground such a presumption promotes judicial
economy. However, judicial economy alone is insufficient as a
reason to adopt a bright line age rule. In addition to judicial
130. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 32 (Mhe capacity of the particular child to
appreciate the risk and form a reasonable judgment must be taken into account. This means that more
will be required of a child of superior skill or intelligence for his age, and less of one who is
mentally backward ... .") (emphasis added & fns. omitted).
131. Id.; Shulman, supra note 12, at 621 ("The quality of [a child's] conduct must be
commensurate with his superiority.... An increase in the requirements on the ground of superiority
does not, however, negative the existence of a minimum standard to which children must conform.").
132. Landes and Posner suggest that "[t]he legal standard, which requires comparing the child
plaintiff or defendant with children of similar age and development, seems as efficient as any
alternatives that suggest themselves." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 116, at 129. However, Landes
and Posner do not provide an analysis for this assertion. The authors have found no other law and
economics proponent who has examined this question.
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economy, other important public policy issues are implicated.
Briefly, they are: Whether efficiency needs to be balanced with
fairness; whether each case should be evaluated on the basis of a
variety of factors, including chronological age; and whether the
determination to absolve children from liability for negligence is a
matter best left to the Legislature rather than the courts.
1. The Balance Between Efficiency and Fairness
Those who cite judicial economy as a sufficient justification for
presumptions of incapacity based on age have reasoned that such
rules are preferable because application of such an age-based rule
is easy to apply.1 33 While it is true that a rule which absolves a
class of children from liability for negligence on the basis of
chronological age expedites the judicial process, judicial economy
alone is no reason to adopt a bright line rule presuming children to
be incapable of exercising due care. "[iThe effect of a presumption
should be determined by the value of the reasons which justify its
existence"134 and judicial expedience must be balanced with
fairness.
The primary shortcoming of a bright line age rule is that it
creates an internally inconsistent system of determining fault when
analyzing the conduct of young children. Such a rule eliminates the
subjective standard of care for some children, but retains it for
others, depending upon whether the child has reached an arbitrary
age. As one commentator observed: "The striking feature of the
cases exempting an infant from liability merely because of his age
is that immunity is granted because of a chronological under-
development and not for any lack of individual capacity. In other
133. Wilderman, supra note 65, at 435; J. Douglas Mertz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se
in Pennsylvania, 51 DicK. L. Rnv. 79, 81 (1947); Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 835 (Mich. 1938);
Holbrock v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ohio 1967); Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782,
785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
134. Edmund M. Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RuTomEs L. REv. 512,518 (1956); see also Note,
Presumptions in Iowa, 44 IowA L. Rnv. 147, 150 (1958) (If... a presumption had no logical
background but was created purely as a rule of procedural convenience, its repudiation by rebutting
evidence would cause its disappearance as a presumption and there would be nothing left to sustain
the fact which had been presumed.").
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words[,] a strictly objective standard is applied." ' By judging
some children against a standard which takes into account more
than just age, while judging younger children on the basis of age
alone, the bright line rule unfairly promotes differential treatment
of children who may, in reality, have the same capacity for
negligence.136
Moreover, in a jurisdiction which recognizes a seven-year
bright line rule, "one just having passed his seventh birthday but
possessing little experience, intelligence or judgment, could be
found guilty of [contributory] negligence.' ' 137 The Michigan case
of DeCamp v. Fleckenstein131 is illustrative of this unfair result.
There, an eight-year-old child with the mental age of a five-year,
ten-month-old was hit by a car when he rode his bicycle into the
street. The question of whether the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent was submitted to the jury and the jury found for the
defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argued Michigan's seven year
bright line rule referred to mental rather than chronological age,
and that the trial court therefore erred in submitting the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury.139 A Michigan court of appeal
rejected this argument and affirmed, holding the seven year rule
referred only to chronological age.x41 The court explained that the
trial court was "correct in deciding that it was a jury question
which they would determine based on what a 'reasonably careful
minor of like age, mental capacity, and experience would do or
would not do under such circumstances."" 14' DeCamp poignantly
135. Bernard N. Katz, The Standard of Care Required ofInfants, 25 TEmPLE L.Q. 478, 481
(1952).
136. See, e.g., Burhans v. Witbeck, 134 N.W.2d 225,227 (Mich. 1965) (relying, inter alia, on
seven-year conclusive presumption rule and concluding that the question of whether a five-year-old
could be liable under guest passenger statute should not be submitted to jury whereas seven-year-
old's capacity to be guest passenger is a question for jury determination).
137. Dillman v. Mitchell, 99 A.2d 809, 811 (NJ. 1953); see also Patterson v. Cushman, 394
P.2d 657,659-60 (Alaska 1964); Hellstern v. Smelowitz, 86 A.2d 265,271 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1952).
138. 181 N.W.2d 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
139. Id. at 49; see Baker v. Alt, 132 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. 1965) (setting the age of seven
as the age below which minors would be deemed incapable of negligence).
140. DeCamp, 181 N.W.2d at 49.
141. Id.
1359
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
exemplifies the potential unfairness that can result from invoking
chronological age alone as the decisive determinant of the standard
of care required of minors. 42
In addition, a bright line rule contravenes basic principles of
comparative fault: A defendant partially at fault is held liable for
one hundred percent of damages even when a young child's
conduct contributes to the child's injury regardless of whether the
individual child actually had the capacity for exercising due
care.'43 As one court has noted: "[A] boy who is one day under
142. See also Golden v. Register, 274 S.E.2d 892,894 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (fourteen-year-81/ -
month-old not protected by 7-14 rebuttable presumption rule and therefore charged with adult
standard of care and held contributorily negligent as a matter of law).
143. The treatment of children in negligence law has been intimately tied to the doctrine of
contributory negligence, which completely barred a minor plaintiff's recovery if the child contributed
in any way to his injuries. See PRossmt & KELTON, supra note 11, § 32, at 181. In the days of
contributory fault, a bright line approach served as a precaution against a harsh forfeiture of a child's
negligence action. See, e.g., Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 834 (Mich. 1938) ("The burden is too
heavy for the small child, and in such an unequal contest the law does not permit a wrongdoer to
take advantage of the infant's difficulty and inadequacy."). Perhaps compassion induced courts to
protect the very young from shouldering the entire financial burden of injuries for which they were
only partly at fault. As one commentator asked: "The defendant is negligent. Why allow him to
escape liability on the grounds that an infant, who is notfiully aware of the consequences of any act,
was also negligent?" Wilderman, supra note 65, at 440 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 436 ("If
we agree that infants as a class are to be treated with leniency, why should we strive to relieve a
negligent defendant whose only claim to be absolved from liability is based on the alleged fault of
that group whom we seek to protect?") (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, an age-based
presumption of incapacity is an effective but imperfect means of barring a tortfeasor from escaping
liability because of the immaturity of the minor plaintiff. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy,
63 N.E. 997, 1005 (Ill. 1902) (a child's right to recovery "ought not to be taken away by childish
prattle indulged in by him when trying to explain the cause of the injury received by him"); Dunn
v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("a strong public policy exists to protect children
from losses due to their own immaturity despite their contributory negligence, especially against an
admitted negligent adult defendant"); see also T. Edward Icenogle, Comment, Capacity of Minors
to be Chargeable with Negligence and Their Standard of Care, 57 NEB. L. REv. 763, 769 (1978)
("Well into the development of the child's special status in negligence law, courts were confronted
with demands which conflicted with human sympathy for children and children's inherent failings
of prudence.").
However, the doctrine of contributory negligence has been discarded in an overwhelming
majority of American jurisdictions and has been replaced with principles of comparative negligence.
VICTOR E. ScHwARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1986). While no court has
considered the effect of comparative negligence on the question whether conclusive age-based
presumptions of incapacity still serve a useful public policy, such a presumption is inconsistent with
basic principles of comparative fault. See James J. DesVeaux & Daniel C. Shapiro, Negligence of
Minors: Comparative Principles Replace Outdated Presumptions, 34 FOR Tn DEF. 6 (1992). To the
extent courts immunized children from liability for negligence out of fear of barring a child's
recovery, principles of comparative negligence should assuage those concerns. In fact, principles of
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[the age at which he is presumed incapable of negligence] may be
guilty of the most flagrant contributory carelessness and yet
evidence of his exceptional precocity and breadth of judgment and
experience cannot be introduced to overcome the illusory
presumption of babylike puerility.'
' 4
I This is precisely what happened in Baker v. Alt. 145 There, a
six-year, ten-and-a-half month old boy was injured while he was
riding his bike on the wrong side of the street and collided with an
automobile. The plaintiff, who rode through a red light, "had been
instructed by his parents to get off and 'walk' his bike across
streets," and was "aware of the dangers attendant on what he was
doing.' 1 46 Despite this evidence of the child's knowledge of the
dangerousness of his conduct, the Michigan Supreme Court refused
to hold the minor responsible for his actions and held, "'an infant
under seven years of age is incapable of contributory
negligence.""147  The members of the Baker court ignored the
facts before them and based their decision entirely on "the illusory
presumption of babylike puerility" by stating that "[i]f an infant of
[plaintiff's] age (6 years, 101/2 months) can be guilty of
comparative fault coupled with the flexibility of the subjective standard of care should operate to
significantly reduce (if not eliminate) the possibility that a young child will be unjustly denied
recovery. See Holub, supra note 24, at 352 ("A formal change to comparative negligence would have
a positive effect on the area of children's contributory negligence. A child, only partly responsible
for his injury, would bear part but not all of the burden of the injury"). But see Toney v.
Marzariegos, 519 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Il. App. Ct. 1988) (rejecting defendant's contention that
comparative negligence obviated the need for a seven year "bright line" rule); Pino v. Szuch, 408
S.E.2d 55, 60 n.3 (W. Va. 1991) (holding the same age presumptions which immunized children from
contributory negligence also apply to defense of comparative negligence).
144. Hellstem v. Smelowitz, 86 A.2d 265, 271 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952). See also
Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Mattison, 52 So. 49,52 (Ala. 1909); White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d 234,
237 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Toetschinger v. Ilnot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Minn. 1977); Eckhardt v.
Hanson, 264 N.W. 776, 777 (Minn. 1936); Dillman v. Mitchell, 99 A.2d 809, 811 (NJ. 1953);
Quinby ex rel Camardo v. New York State Rys., 159 N.E. 879, 881 (N.Y. 1928); Yun Jeong Koo
v. St. Bernard, 392 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Doyen v. Lamb, 59 N.W.2d 550, 551
(S.D. 1953); James B. Wilkens, Contributory Negligence of Very Young Children, 20 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 65, 67 (1971); L.B.C., Note, Contributory Negligence of Children, 7 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 82
(1925).
145. 132 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. 1965).
146. IaL at 619.
147. Id at 620.
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contributory negligence, [plaintiff] is a classic case of one who was
so in fact."
148
. Thus, a conclusive presumption of incapacity based on
chronological age imposes a standard of care on children that is
indifferent to an individual child's knowledge and experience. Such
a rule allows children who have the capacity for negligence to
avoid responsibility for their actions because they have not attained
a minimum age. The rule also holds children potentially liable for
negligence who may not actually have the capacity for negligent
conduct but have the misfortune of having surpassed the cutoff age.
These results are manifestly unfair. The standard of care required
of children should instead turn on the particular child's capacity
for negligence, measured by the child's knowledge, experience, and
age.
2. The Need for a Case-By-Case Analysis
A fact-intensive inquiry into the child's capacity for negligence
has been labeled wasteful of judicial resources because few
children of "tender years" have the requisite knowledge,
experience, and capacity to understand and avoid danger and results
reached under an age-based rule therefore will often be no different
than those reached under a more flexible rule. 49 This view is not
supported by the research in child psychology. As we have shown,
148. Id. at 619; see also Johnson v. Kosld, 234 N.W.2d 184, 187-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (6-
year-old child who admitted that he Imew that he should look both ways before crossing a street but
forgot to do so and was bit by an automobile, not chargeable with contributory negligence because
he was under the age of 7); Hunter v. City of Cleveland, 346 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ohio 1976) (affimning
7-year bright line rule in case involving 6-year-old but held "[h]ad the plaintiff not been of such
tender years, this court would have been compelled to find that the injuries were the result of his own
conduct under the facts of this case").
149. Note, Contributory Negligence of Children: Miller v. Graff, 14 MD. L. REV. 167, 171
(1954) ("the result produced by [an age-based conclusive presumption] rule will in most cases be the
same as that under [the more flexible subjective standard of care]"); Holub, supra note 24, at 349
(supporting the flexible application of the subjective standard of care, but noting criticism voiced by
opponents that "since most people would agree that the majority of children below the age of seven
do not have the capacity to deal with the world in a responsible manner, it would be better to retain
the [conclusive] presumption than waste valuable court time attempting to use proof other than age
to show mental capacities of children below age seven"); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E.
997, 1002-03 (Ill. 1902).
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modem research suggests that children of almost any age have the
capacity to plan to avoid harm in situations familiar to them and
that children vary widely in this capacity.15 Contrary to the view
expressed by some courts and commentators who regard
chronological age as a sufficient measure of mental capacity, child
psychologists uniformly agree that age is only one of several
factors that determine a child's capacity to exercise due care.'51
Thus, a rule which sets down a definite minimum age requirement
for negligence seems to have "only its definiteness to commend
it,"' 52 and that is not enough.
Children should be held accountable for their actions
commensurate with the particular child's knowledge, capacity,
experience, and age. Courts should not ignore individual
differences in mental ability among children and opt for an
inflexible rule which absolves minors of a duty of due care just
because they have not reached a certain minimum age. If, however,
150. See supra notes 52-108 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text. Like child psychologists, some courts and
commentators have also recognized that children learn basic rules about personal safety at a young
age. See Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prod., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Mass. Ct. App. 1980)
("Toothpicks, like pencils, pens, needles, knives, razor blades, nails, tools of most kinds, bottles and
other objects made of glass, present obvious dangers to users, but they are not unreasonably
dangerous, in part because the very obviousness of the danger puts the user on notice. It is part of
normal upbringing that one learns in childhood to cope with the dangers posed by such useful
everyday items.') (emphasis added); Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 106 A. 682, 685 (Vt. 1919)
("It is a matter of common knowledge that many children under seven years of age have some
intelligence of situations and circumstances affecting personal safety."); accord Griggs v. Bic Corp.,
786 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549,558
(Kan. 1990); Capacity and Standard of Care, supra note 25, at 519 ('It is a matter of common
knowledge that many children under seven have some understanding of situations affecting their
personal safety."); Idzi v. Hobbs, 186 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 1966) ('[P]arents instruct their children
early in their lives about the danger of fire and other common dangers."); Holub, supra note 24, at
351 ('Though most young children may not have the capacity to recognize and deal with all dangers,
many children below the age of seven may be able to recognize and understand certain dangers. A
typical example would be the dangers inherent in a body of water."); cf. Corcoran v. Village of
Libertyville, 383 N.E2d 177, 180 (Ill. 1978) ('Even if an owner or occupier knows that children
frequent his premises, he is not required to protect against the ever-present possibility that children
will injure themselves on obvious or common conditions.... The responsibility for a child's safety
lies primarily with its parents, whose duty it is to see that his behavior does not involve danger to
himself.").
152. Doyen v. Lamb, 59 N.W.2d 550, 551 (S.D. 1953); see Engett v. Neff, 43 N.W.2d 644,
647 (N.D. 1950).
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such a rigid rule is deemed desirable, the decision is best left to the
legislature, not the courts.
3. A Question for the Legislature
If there is to be a bright line age rule which conclusively
declares some children incapable of negligence as a matter of law,
the rule should be determined by the legislature, which is the
proper body to define that class of individuals who should be
immune from exercising due care for their own or others'
safety. 53 Legislatures have fact finding capabilities not available
to courts.1 54 Moreover, legislatures, as representative bodies, are
best able to find a public consensus regarding conflicting issues of
public policy.155 Accordingly, legislatures are best able to
examine the competing arguments and changing circumstances
affecting an issue that has confused courts and commentators for
decades.
156
In sum, the argument that some children should be immune
from liability for negligence to promote judicial economy does not
withstand analysis. Fairness dictates that all minors be held
responsible for their actions in accord with their level of knowledge
and experience. The notion that few children of "tender years" can
appreciate danger and that society should bear the cost of acts
committed by precocious children is inconsistent with modem
theory and research in child psychology and sound public policy.
153. See, e.g., Walston v. Greene,'102 S.E.2d 124, 128 (N.C. 1958) (Rodman, 3., dissenting)
("If children of an age compelled to attend school are to be relieved of all responsibility for their acts,
I think it should be done by legislative action rather than by judicial decision."). See generally 1
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1.03, at 5 (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION] ("If there is an important difference [between the role of the Legislature and the
courts], it is perhaps only that society has placed progressively greater reliance on legislative bodies
and attempted to withdraw from the courts more of the function of determining... the principles
under which individuals must live."). For example, Wisconsin has codified a 7-year-old "bright line"
rule which insulates children seven years of age or younger from liability for negligence. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 891.44 (West 1966). In most states, however, the rule has developed through common
law evolution.
154. STATUTORY CoNsTRtucION, supra note 153, §§ 1.04-1.06.
155. Id.
156. See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion that has
permeated this area of negligence law).
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From a policy perspective, it seems far more important to strive for
equal treatment for those similarly situated than to adhere to a legal
rule with no basis in child psychology and development.157 Thus,
limits on liability ought not be "fixed by rules laid down in
advance without regard to the particular case.
' 158
II. JUDICIAL APPLICAnON OF THEORIES OF
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: THE ILLINOIS AND
MASSACHUSETrS RULES
Two theories of a child's capacity to act negligently have found
their expression in what have been termed the "Illinois" and
"Massachusetts" rules. 159
A. The Illinois Rule
Under the Illinois rule, the capacity of a child to appreciate
risks depends solely upon age.' 60 Courts which have adopted this
method have borrowed from the criminal law and established a
three-tiered system of presumptions based on chronological age:
Minors below the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence as a matter of law; those between the ages
of seven and fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable of
negligence; and minors above fourteen are presumed to be capable
of negligence.' 6' The theory of child psychology underlying this
157. See supra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
158. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 32; see also Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita,
796 P.2d 549, 554 (Kan. 1990) (rejecting minor plaintiff's contention that public policy is best served
by creating a conclusive presumption of incapacity for children under seven and concluding "public
policy is best served by submitting the claimed negligence of individual child plaintiffs for jury
determination"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283A, com. b (1965).
159. See, e.g., Holub, supra note 24, at 332-44 (referring to the two rules employed by states
as the Illinois and Massachusetts rules).
160. Holub, supra note 24, at 320-21; Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 551,
554 (Kan. 1990); Toetschingerv. Ihnot, 250 N.W.2d 204,208-11 (Minn. 1977); Eckhardt v. Hanson,
264 N.W. 776, 777-78 (Minn. 1936).
161. The following states have adopted this system of presumptions: Alabama, Illinois, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Appendix A (discussing
child negligence law in all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
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rule is that chronological age is a sufficient measure of a child's
capacity to refrain from impulsive behavior and an adequate gauge
of a child's ability to foresee the potentially dangerous
consequences of his actions. 62 Defenders of the Illinois rule also
point out that the age standard, while inflexible and arbitrary,
promotes judicial economy by making it easier for judges to
dispose of cases involving minors accused of negligent
conduct.'63
Not all courts have adopted a "pure" form of the Illinois rule.
Some courts have endorsed the policy rationale behind the Illinois
rule and recognized the three-tiered system of presumptions, but
have refused to adopt the analogy to the criminal law.
164
Moreover, the precise age at which children are deemed incapable
of negligence has varied among the courts.'65 Other courts have
set a different minimum cutoff age but rejected the "middle tier"
rebuttable presumption rule for minors above the minimum
age. 16
The Michigan case of Tyler v. Weed 67 epitomizes the
reasoning behind the presumption of incapacity for children under
the age of seven. There, a six year, eight month old boy was
injured after being hit by a car. The question of the child's
contributory negligence was presented to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed,
arguing that he was incapable of contributory negligence because
he was under the age of seven. The Supreme Court of Michigan
162. See supra note 24.
163. See supra notes 133-158 and accompanying text; see also Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827,
835 (Mich. 1938); Holbrock v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ohio 1967); Dunn v.
Teti, 421 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Wilderman, supra note 65, at 435; Mertz, supra note
133, at 81.
164. See, e.g., Walston v. Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. 1958).
165. New York has set the minimum age at 4; Texas and California at 5; Colorado, Florida,
and Washington at 6; Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Virginia at age 7; and
Mississippi at age 8. See Appendix A (discussing the negligence rules adopted by all fifty states and
the District of Columbia).
166. These states include: Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, and Washington. See Appendix A
(enumerating the minimum age requirements of all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
167. 280 N.W. 827 (Mich. 1938).
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agreed and reversed. 6 The court did not examine the particular
plaintiff's capacity for negligence when it concluded that "children
under the age of seven years are conclusively presumed to be
incapable of contributory negligence. 1 69 As a justification for
their holding, the Tyler court relied on prior Michigan case law, the
developmental theory advanced by Piaget and others which
suggests children under seven cannot command the requisite mental
capacity for negligence, and the public policy which favors the
protection of an infant's rights.17
The Tyler court declined to recognize the contrary
Massachusetts rule because the rule had no basis in "reason,
experience, observation or public policy," and it did not sufficiently
protect the rights of infants.17' In addition, the court rejected the
notion that increased exposure to the perils of modem life makes
children more capable of negligent conduct:
[I]t seems an essay of some intellectual temerity to assume to know the
mysterious and complex factors operating upon the mind of a changing
infant, which bring about increased intelligence, awareness, and change
of behavior, when such conclusions are arrived at without any evidence
whatever. We cannot assume that modem inventions advance the
growth of mind or increase the awareness, of the child of tender years.
There is as much basis for the belief that such development is directly
dependent upon age, in these early years of such swiftly marked
changes of physical growth." 2
Finally, the Tyler court found juries incapable of deciding the
question of the contributory negligence of a child because "jury
[members] ... [cannot] know how a prudent child of such tender
168. Only two members of the court held the judgment should be reversed on the ground the
plaintiff was too young to be contributorily negligent. Id. at 838. Four justices concurred in the result
but expressed serious reservations about the propriety of a seven year "bright line" rule. Id. at 838-39.
One justice dissented. Id. at 840.
169. Id. at 838.
170. Id. at 828-37; see also DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1975) (a rule must
be adopted "which holds that members of society must accept the damage done by very young
children to be no more subject to legal action than some force of nature or act of God").
171. Tyler, 280 N.W. at 836.
172. Id. at 837.
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years should conduct himself, aside from the reflection of the
prudent adult mind of what a child should do.,
173
Courts that have recognized some variant of the Illinois rule
and have declared children under a certain age incapable of
negligence as a matter of law, have relied on one or more of the
policy rationales articulated in Tyler without expressly relying on
that case.174
B. The Massachusetts Rule
The Massachusetts rule embraces a picture of -child
development that treats chronological age as only one of several
factors involved in the determination of whether a minor has the
capacity for negligent conduct.175 The particular child's
173. Id. at 834; see also id. at 838. This argument, however, proves too much. If an adult is
incapable of judging a 6 year, 11 month, 29 day old, why should that same adult be considered
capable of judging a 7 year, I day old?
174. The following courts ha ve relied on the system of presumptions in the criminal law as a
justification for absolving minors of any duty of due care. See Jones v. Strickland, 77 So. 562, 565
(Ala. 1917); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E. 997, 1003 (Ill. 1902); Swindell v. Hellkamp,
242 So. 2d 708,710 (Fla. 1970); Strong v. Allen, 768 P.2d 369,372 n.1 (Okla. 1989); Dunn v. Teti,
421 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. 1980).
Other courts have cited judicial economy as the primary justification for a bright line age rule.
See Holbrock v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ohio 1967); Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d
782, 785 (Pa. Super. 1980).
The vast majority of jurisdictions that have established age-based presumptions of incapacity
have relied on childrens' inability to command the requisite mental capacity necessary for negligent
conduct-i.e., the ability to foresee the consequences of their actions and inhibit their impulses. See
Gault v. Tablada, 400 F. Supp. 140 (S.D. Miss. 1976), aftid, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975); Kopem
v. Moschella, 400 F. Supp. 131, 135 (S.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975);
Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 652-53, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508-09 (1961); Untalan v.
Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d 474, 476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d
310,315-16,253 P.2d 675,677 (1953); Benallo v. Bare, 427 P.2d 323,324 (Colo. 1967); Tupman's
Adm'r v. Schmidt, 254 S.W. 199, 201 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923); Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263,
267 (Mont. 1967); Walston v. Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. 1958); Verni v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d
431,432 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1946); Holbrock v. Hamilton Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 629-30 (Ohio
1967); Taylor v. Bergeron, 449 P.2d 147, 150 (Or. 1969) (O'Connell, J., concurring); Kuhns v.
Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 405 (Pa. 1957); Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 1980);
Yarborough v. Bemer, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. 1971); Maeonnell v. Hill, 569 S.W.2d 524,527
(Tex. CL App. 1978); Endicott v. Rich, 348 S.E.2d 275,277 (Va. 1986); Cox v. Hugo, 329 P.2d 467,
469 (Wash. 1958).
175. Eckhardt v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776, 777-78 (Minn. 1936); Toetschinger v. nlmot, 250
N.W.2d 204, 208-11 (Minn. 1977); Honeycutt ex. reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 551, 554
(Kan. 1990); Holub, supra note 24, at 320-21.
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knowledge and experience are also considered crucial indicia of a
child's mental capacity. 76 Under this approach, whether a child
has been negligent is a question for the jury unless only one
inference regarding the child's capacity for negligence can be
reasonably drawn from the evidence. 77 The jury weighs a child's
conduct against that expected from a child of like age, knowledge,
experience and capacity under the same or similar
circumstances.17 In addition, the Massachusetts rule recognizes
that children vary widely in their capacity to act with sufficient
care for their own or others' safety.' 79 By acknowledging
individual differences between children and comparing a minor
with other children possessing virtually the same capacity for
negligence, the Massachusetts approach is inherently flexible and
176. Eckhardt v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776, 777-78 (Minn. 1936); Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 250
N.W.2d 204, 208-11 (Minn. 1977); Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 551, 554
(Kan. 1990); Holub, supra note 24, at 320-21.
177. See Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657,660 (Alaska 1964); Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d
872, 877 (Haw. 1963); Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 78 N.E. 382, 383 (Mass. 1906); Hamel
v. Crosietier, 256 A.2d 143, 145 (N.H. 1969); Bush v. New Jersey & N. Y. Transit Co., 153 A.2d
28, 33 (NJ. 1959); Thompson v. Anderman, 285 P.2d 507, 515 (N.M. 1955); Doyen v. Lamb, 59
N.W.2d 550, 551 (S.D. 1953); Mann v. Fairbourn, 366 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1961); Beaucage v.
Russell, 238 A.2d 631, 635 (Vt. 1968).
178. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
179. See Holcomb v. Galbraith, 513 S.W.2d 796,798 (Ark. 1974); Beggs v. Wilson, 272 A.2d
713, 714 (Del. 1970); Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 431 A.2d 597, 604 (D.C. Ct. App.
1981) (Ferren, dissenting); Crane v. Banner, 455 P.2d 313,317 (Idaho 1969); Davis v. Bushnell, 465
P.2d 652, 654 (Idaho 1970); Consol. City & C. P. Ry. Co. v. Carlson, 48 P. 635, 637 (Kan. 1897);
Biggs v. Consol. Barb-Wire, 56 P. 4, 6 (Kan. 1899); Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 95 N.E.
876, 878 (Mass. 1911); Enget v. Neff, 43 N.W.2d 644, 647 (N.D. 1950); Hamel v. Crosietier, 256
A.2d 143, 145 (N.H. 1969); Hellstem v. Smelowitz, 86 A.2d 265, 271 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1952); Thompson v. Anderman, 285 P.2d 507, 516 (N.M. 1955); Verni v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d 431,
432 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1946) (Conway, J., dissenting); DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 &
n.3 (Ohio 1975) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting); Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782,785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980);
Standard v. Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (S.C. 1982); Wells v. McNutt, 189 S.W. 365, 365 (Tenn.
1916); Garis v. Eberling, 71 S.W.2d 215, 226 (Tenn. CL App. 1934); Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland
R. Co., 106 A. 682, 685 (Vt. 1919).
Curiously, some courts in states that have endorsed the Illinois Rule have noted that children
vary in their capacity for negligence. See Woods v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. N.Y.
1961); Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Mattison, 52 So. 49,52 (Ala. 1909); Garcia v. Sooigan, 52 Cal.
2d 107, 112, 338 P.2d 433, 436 (1959); Williamson v. Garland, 402 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. Ct. App.
1966); Quinby ex reL Camardo v. New York State Rys., 159 N.E. 879, 881 (N.Y. 1928); Weidenfeld
ex reL Weidenfeld v. Surface Transp. Corp., 55 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945).
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does not impose unrealistic liability standards on young
children.' Accordingly, the Massachusetts rule has found
widespread support among legal commentators. 181
The Kansas case of Honeycutt ex rel. Phillips v. Wichita"2 is
illustrative. There, a six-year, four-month-old boy had his legs
severed by a moving train as he attempted to board it on the way
home from school. The plaintiff ignored warnings from his family
and school to stay away from moving trains and failed to heed the
instructions of the school safety patrol. At the beginning of trial,
the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment alleging he was
too young to be comparatively negligent. The trial court granted the
motion and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Kansas
unanimously reversed and held that "public policy is best served by
submitting the claimed negligence of individual child plaintiffs for
jury determination." ' The court reviewed the law in other
jurisdictions as well as the decisional law of Kansas and concluded
that "the adoption of specific ages at which a child is incapable of
negligence as a matter of law would not be beneficial or serve
180. See Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 658-60 (Alaska 1964); Brown v. Connolly, 62
Cal. 2d 391,394-95, 398 P.2d 596,598,42 Cal. Rptr. 324,326 (1965); Bush v. New Jersey & N.Y.
Transit Co., 153 A.2d 28, 33, 35-36 (NJ. 1959).
181. See Holub, supra note 24, at 351-52; Icenogle, supra note 143, at 789; Wilkens, supra
note 144, at 69, 73-74; Capacity and Standard of Care, supra note 25, at 519; DesVeaux & Shapiro,
supra note 143, at 7; L.B.C., supra note 144, at 82-83; Arthur H. McQueen, Jr., Note, Contributory
Negligence of Children, 18 S.C. L. REV. 648, .660 (1966); James H. Keet, Jr., Contributory
Negligence of Children, 12 CLEv.-MARSHAL L. REV. 395, 405 (1963); Gerald L. Walter, Jr.,
Significance of the Youthfiulness of a Party in Louisiana Automobile Accident Cases, 22 LA. L. REV.
487, 489 (1961); James W. Starnes, Contributory Negligence of a Minor as a Matter of Law in
Missouri, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q. 281,282 (1959); Note, Contributory Negligence of Children, 21 Col.
L. REV. 697, 699-700 (1921) [hereinafter Contributory Negligence of Children]. But see Wilderman,
supra note 65, at 440 ("To achieve [the] desire to protect the infant, it is necessary to establish a
definite rule of law whereby the consideration of the question of an infant's guilt of contributory
negligence should be determined by the Court, guided by certain definite presumptions. The problem
should not be left to the jury."); Mertz, supra note 133, at 81 ("Fictitious and arbitrary as they may
be, the presumptions are justified on the grounds of expediency and facility of administration.").
182. 796 P.2d 549 (Kan. 1990).
183. Id. at 554.
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justice in Kansas." '184 Contrary to Tyler which applied the Illinois
rule, 85 the Honeycutt court reasoned:
School age children, from kindergarten on, must on occasion cross
railroad tracks, busy streets, and highways, or pass by sites where heavy
equipment is in use. Some play and ride their tricyles [sic], bicycles,
skateboards, and roller skates on sidewalks along busy thoroughfares.
Some play ball and other sports on or near streets carrying from light
to heavy vehicular traffic. Safety habits are stressed in schools. 'Look
both ways before crossing the street' is a familiar teaching. Safety
patrols, on duty at busy intersections while children make their way to
and from school, are a familiar sight.186
The court also recognized the wide diversity in mental capacity
among children and credited jurors with the ability to bring this
fact to bear on their decision: "Jurors are familiar with children,
with their abilities, intelligence, and capacity at various ages, and
thus are well equipped to determine the comparative fault of
individual children of varying ages and under particular
circumstances, as well as that of all other parties."
8 7
In sum, the Massachusetts rule is flexible and imposes a
standard of care on children commensurate with the particular
child's knowledge, experience, capacity, and age. As such, the rule
recognizes a theory of child psychology that is directly at odds
with that endorsed by the Illinois rule. Only one of these rules can
be reconciled with the consensus of modem research in child
psychology.
184. Id. at 559.
185. 280 N.W. 827, 837 (Mich. 1938); see supra notes 160-174 and accompanying text
(discussing the Tyler decision and the Illinois rule).
186. Honeycurt, 796 P.2d at 558; see also Eckhardt v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776, 778 (Minn.
1936); Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d 872, 877 (Haw. 1963); Yun Jeong Koo v. St. Bernard, 392
N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. 1977). But see Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 837 (Mich. 1938) (rejecting
the view that modem society can enhance a child's mental capacity); Vemi v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d
431,432 (N.Y. CL App. 1946) (rule protecting children from denial of recovery from injuries caused
by minor's immaturity is a rule "which changing conditions [do not] make obsolete").
187. Honeycutt, 796 P.2d at 559.
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C. Analysis of Both Rules in Light of Modem Research in
Child Psychology
The Illinois rule is inconsistent with theory and research in
child psychology. The rule is contrary to the "well known fact"
among child psychologists that chronological age alone is
insufficient as a measure of a child's capacity to foresee the
consequences of action and regulate behavior in safety conscious
ways."' Moreover, the rule endorses the unsupportable
proposition that all children under seven in all circumstances are
incapable of negligence. Theory and research in cognitive
psychology show otherwise and suggest that children have the
mental capacity to engage in negligent conduct in situations
familiar to them."19 The Illinois rule endorses the view that
children under seven are not sufficiently socialized to care for their
own safety. Theories of socialization and recent empirical research
dispute this contention. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated: "[T]he implicit premise of the Illinois rule, i.e., that children
are unable to exercise due care for their own safety before reaching
the age of seven, simply does not square with the way responsible
people manage their affairs and those of their families in Minnesota
today."19
The Massachusetts rule, on the other hand, is consistent with
the view among cognitive child psychologists. The rule
acknowledges individual differences and recognizes that the
question whether a child has acted negligently depends upon the
circumstances of the case, the child's knowledge and experience
(i.e., familiarity) as they relate to those circumstances, and
chronological age.
The fact that the Illinois and Massachusetts rules endorse such
radically different theories of child development probably explains
188. Diaz et al., supra note 97, at 137; see also supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text
(listing the various factors that influence a child's ability to plan and regulate behavior).
189. See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
190. Toetschinger v. lhnot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. 1977).
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the great deal of confusion that marks this area of negligence
law. 91 At the heart of this confusion is the way in which courts
have interpreted decisions which declared a particular child
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law under the
particular facts of the case. Rather than recognize that the plaintiff
in the prior case was deemed incapable of negligence only because
there was no evidence to support the charge, some courts have
erroneously construed such precedent to hold that all children of
the plaintiff's age under any circumstances are incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.'92 For example, in
Schmidt v. Allen,'93 the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a new
trial order in favor of the four-year-old plaintiff and stated that
"[s]ince plaintiff was a four year old child, no issue of contributory
negligence was involved."' 94 The court did not discuss the
evidence of the plaintiff's capacity, but instead relied only on
Messer v. Gentry'9- and Reynolds v. Kinyon'96 as support for
this proposition. 97 However, in neither Messer nor Reynolds was
there evidence which would have supported a charge of
contributory negligence. The Messer court rejected the contention
that the four-year-old plaintiff could be guilty of contributory
negligence "under the facts in this case."'8 And in Reynolds, the
defendant admitted that the two-year, five-month-old was "so
191. See, e.g., Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263, 267 (Mont. 1967) ("The law [regarding
the standard of care required of minors] is in hopeless and irreconcilable conflict.").
192. See, e.g., White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d 234,236 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[W]e disagree with
plaintiff's assertion of an absolute jurisprudential rule that a seven-year old child is incapable of
contributory negligence. A more accurate statement is that no Louisiana court has ever found a seven-
year old child to be contributorily negligent.").
193. 303 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1957).
194. Id. at 658.
195. 290 S.W. 1014 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
196. 222 S.W. 476 (Mo. 1920).
197. Schmidt, 303 S.W.2d at 658.
198. Messer, 290 S.W. at 1016 (emphasis added).
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young as to be incapable of any act of negligence. "'99 Numerous
other courts have made the same mistake."'
In addition, courts have simply disregarded or narrowly applied
policy language that rejects fixing an arbitrary age below which
minors are considered incapable of negligence as a matter of law.
Rather than interpret such language as expressing a public policy
applicable in all cases, courts have distinguished these cases on the
basis of the minor plaintiff's age alone. The New York case of
Verni v. Johnson"' is an example. There, the question of the
contributory negligence of a three-year-old was submitted to the
jury. The New York Court of Appeal reversed, holding that "a
three-year-old child is conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence.",20 To reach this result, the Verni court declined to
apply language from its earlier decision in Qinby ex rel. Camardo
199. Reynolds, 222 S.W. at 479.
200. In Palms v. Shell Oil Co., 332 A.2d 300, 303 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), Le Febvre v.
United States, 178 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D. Md. 1959), and Mulligan v. Pruitt, 223 A.2d 574,579 (Md.
Ct. App. 1966), Maryland courts relied on Miller v. Graff, 78 A.2d 220 (Md. Ct. App. 1951) and
Mahan v. State, 191 A. 575 (Md. CL App. 1937), for the proposition that children under certain ages
are presumed incapable of negligence. Neither case supports the conclusive presumption rule. See
Miller, 78 A.2d at 224 ("The mere fact that a young child, when frightened or bewildered, turns
around in the street near one sidewalk and starts to come back to the other sidewalk when called by
the screams of a parent is not necessarily evidence of negligence.") (emphasis added). Under these
circumstances, the court refused to hold 4-year-old guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. Id. Mahan, 191 A. at 580-81 ("The prayer could have been refused on the ground that there was
... no evidence legally sufficient to show that the child was guilty of any negligence contributing
to the accident.") (emphasis added). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to submit
question of 3-year-old's contributory negligence to the jury where defendant sought to charge minor
plaintiff with an adult standard of care. Id
Similarly, in later cases, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on Macdonald v. O'Reilly, 78 P. 753,
757 (Or. 1904), for the proposition that children under the age of five are incapable of negligence
as a matter of law. Oviatt v. Camarra, 311 P.2d 746, 751 (Or. 1957); Kudrna v. Adamski, 216 P.2d
262, 263 (Or. 1950). Macdonald does not so hold. The Macdonald court confined its holding to the
particular facts before it, and it did not hold that all children under five in all circumstances are
incapable of negligence. See Macdonald, 78 P. at 757 ("[N]o one will... contend that a child of.
. . 41 years ... has reached such a degree of judgment, intelligence, or discretion as to be deemed
capable of negligence in playing on a pile of lumber or timber left in the public street near his
home.") (emphasis added). Nor could the minor in Kudrna have been contributorily negligent because
she was a passenger in a car when two automobiles collided. Kundra, 216 P.2d at 262; see also id.
("The sole question for decision is whether the plaintiff, at the time of the accident was being
transported by the defendant as his 'guest'.") (emphasis added).
For a more complete accounting of these types of interpretive errors, see, Appendix A.
201. 68 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1946).
202. Id. at 432.
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v. New York State Rys., 03 which expressly rejected any rule of
law which fixed an arbitrary age at which a duty to exercise due
care begins. 4 The Verni court noted that the child in Camardo
was older (four years, ten months) than the Verni child, thereby
rendering the policy language in Camardo inapplicable. °"
California case law is replete with similar errors of
interpretation. California courts of appeal now seem to have settled
on a variant of the inflexible Illinois rule and have declared
children under five incapable of negligence." 6 Yet a review of
the development of this area of California negligence law suggests
that the California Supreme Court has consistently endorsed the
more flexible Massachusetts rule and has rejected any rule which
reduces the standard of care required of children to chronological
age alone.2"7 The competing lines of cases in California on this
203. 159 N.E. 879 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
204. Id. at 880-81; see also Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 16 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673-74 (N.Y. App. Div.
1940) (ignoring policy language in Camardo and holding that "the submission of the question to the
jury [in Camardo] was proper with respect to a child of the age of four years and ten months. The
child here was more than a year younger. But there is an arbitrary period of time during which it
must be said, as a matter of law, that a child is non sui juris.") (emphasis added). No justice who
decided Camardo also decided Verni.
205. Verni, 68 N.E.2d at 432; see also Clark v. Circus-Circus, Inc., 525 F.2d 1328, 1329-31
(9th Cir. 1975) (holding that language in Quillian v. Mathews, 467 P.2d 111, 113 (Nev. 1970)
(involving a 6-year-old), which suggested that the law does not "establish a fixed and arbitrary rule"
for minors charged with negligence, did not apply to 41/i-year-old); Jones v. Strickland, 77 So. 562,
565 (Ala. 1917) (ignoring language from Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Mattison, 52 So. 49,52 (Ala.
1909), that "[t]here is no inflexible rule by which we can determine the capacity, of all children,
under all circumstances, for observing and avoiding danger"); Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d
188, 190 (Tex. 1971) (narrowly applying language in Sorrentino v. McNeill, 122 S.W.2d 723, 725
('ex. Ct. App. 1938) that 'the civil irresponsibility of a young child is not regarded as an invariable
concomitant of a certain age - except it be little if any beyond swaddling clothes - to be arbitrarily
fixed upon such age alone"); Gray, supra note 14, at 611 (citing case of Taylor v. Armiger, 358 A.2d
883, 889 (Md. 1976), as applying to children above the age of five even though the court expressly
rejected any rule which tlixes an age of discretion without regard to the circumstances of the case);
cf. Yun Jeong Koo v. St. Bernard, 392 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (court stated
that there is a conclusive presumption that children under the age of four are incapable of negligence
and that -'[n]o rule of law fixes an arbitrary age at which a particular degree of care may be expected
206. CAiJORNIA JuRy INSTRUCTIoNs: CwVu. No. 3.35, Use Note; People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App.
4th 778, 785, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 420 (1991).
207. See Brown v. Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 394, 395, 398 P.2d 596, 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326
(1965); Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 454-55, 334 P.2d 870, 873 (1959); Cahill v. E. B. &
A. L. Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139-40, 138 P. 712, 717 (1914); see also Cummings v. City of Los
Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 258, 263, 363 P.2d 900, 903, 14 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1961) (stating that the
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issue suggest that, in addition to errors in legal analysis, current
theory and research in child psychology ultimately casts doubt on
the California courts' view that all children under five are
incapable of negligence under all circumstances.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW REGARDING
YOUNG CHILDREN IN CALIFORNIA NEGLIGENCE LAW
A. The Early Rule: A Flexible Subjective Standard Applied to
Children of all Ages
Early decisions by the California Supreme Court and courts of
appeal endorsed the flexible Massachusetts rule. In Cahill v. E. B.
& A. L. Stone Co.,2 °8 a twelve-year-old child was severely injured
after he jumped on a moving push car positioned on a railroad
track. While playing on the car, the child's foot was crushed
beneath the wheel. The child sued the railroad company, and the
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to
amend. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the railroad company
was negligent in maintaining the push car because the company
knew children played on the car, but failed to take precautions to
prevent serious injury. The railroad company countered that the
plaintiff was twelve years old, chargeable with the same standard
of care required of an adult, and contributorily negligent as a
matter of law.
20
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the railroad
company and reversed the trial court, holding:
There is no precise age at which, as a matter of law, a child is to be
held accountable for all his actions to the same extent as one of full
age.... The question as to the capacity of a particular child at a
particular time to exercise care in avoiding a particular danger, is one
of fact, falling within the province of a jury to determine .... We
subjective standard of care provides children with sufficient protection against unjustified denials of
recovery).
208. 153 Cal. 571, 96 P. 84 (1908).
209. Id. at 576-77, 96 P. at 86-87.
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cannot say, as a matter of law, at what age a boy would be possessed
of such intelligence, foresight and judgment as to charge him with
contributory negligence in a case like the present.
210
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two early Kansas
cases, Consolidated City & C. P. Ry. Co. v. Carlson2t? and Biggs
v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co. z12 In Carlson (involving a ten
year old) and Biggs (involving a 14 year old), the defendant
claimed the minor plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. Both courts rejected this contention and
endorsed a rule that would preclude establishing an exact age at
which young children are presumed capable of contributory
negligence.213 One of the justifications for this rule was the
court's view that "there is great difference in the capacity of
different children at the same age, owing as well to differences in
education and surroundings as to natural capacity.
2 14
In Cahill, the California Supreme Court made a public policy
determination that differences in capacity among children counseled
against setting a maximum age at which, as a matter of law, a child
would no longer enjoy the protections of a subjective standard of
care which takes the child's age and experience into account. The
court explained: "It may be conceded that many boys of the age of
twelve years would have perceived the danger... which led to his
injury. There is, however, no conclusive presumption that a twelve-
year-old boy is able to foresee such danger, or that he has
sufficient wisdom to avoid it.
215
210. Id. at 577, 96 P. at 84 (emphasis added). This holding was later reiterated in an appeal
following the trial that resulted from this appeal. See Cahill v. E.B. & A.L Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126,
139, 138 P. 712, 717 (1914).
211. 48 P. 635 (Kan. 1897).
212. 56 P. 4 (Kan. 1899).
213. "We know of no precise age at which a child may be said, as a matter of law, to have
acquired such knowledge and discretion as to be fully accountable for all his acts." ConsoL City &
C. P. Ry. Co., 48 P. at 637.
214. Id.
215. Cahill, 153 Cal. at 577, 96 P. at 84; cf. David L. Shane, Case Notes, 26 S. CAL. L. Ray.
335,337 n.22 (1953) ("As to the maximum age, most decisions under the majority view conclude that
there is no precise age at which an infant becomes the equivalent of an adult, and in every case the
question is one of fact. This is the view in California.") (emphasis added).
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If, under Cahill, there was no precise age at which a young
child was presumed to possess the "intelligence, foresight and
judgment" of an adult, there could not logically be an exact age at
which a child is presumed to lack the capacity for negligence. In
both instances, the child's age alone would not, be the decisive
factor, nor would the question of capacity be one of law for the
court, unless only one inference could be reasonably drawn from
the evidence. Indeed, as the California Supreme Court said early
on: "Immunity from responsibility does not exist in the case of a
minor simply from the fact that he is a minor. His conduct by
reason of his immature years is only measured by a different
standard.
2 6
A number of California courts, faced with plaintiffs of various
ages, have endorsed the policy determination made in Cahill.21"
For example, in Opelt v. AL G. Barnes Co.,218 a ten-and-a-half
year old boy was scratched by a leopard after he walked under a
guard rope at a circus to get a closer look at the animal. The trial
court, sitting as the trier of fact, returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant circus, concluding that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence. He was "a bright, intelligent, and alert
216. Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 140, 138 P. 712, 717 (1914).
217. See also Mechi v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 674,685-86, 102 P.2d 422,
427 (1940), disapproved on other grounds, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958) (5-6 year old); Van
Der Most v. Workman, 107 Cal. App. 2d 274,278,236 P.2d 842, 844 (1951) (10 year old); Carrillo
v. Helms Bakers, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 299, 304, 44 P.2d 604, 606 (1935) (5 year old); McKay v.
Hedger, 139 Cal. App. 266, 272, 34 P.2d 221, 224 (1934) (5 years, 7 months; refusing to hold
plaintiff was incapable of negligence as a matter of law); Woodman v. Hemet Union High Sch. Dist.,
136 Cal. App. 544,548-49, 29 P.2d 257, 259-60 (1934) (12 year old); Barrett v. Harman, 115 Cal.
App. 283, 286, 1 P.2d 458, 459-60 (1931) (11 year old); Patania v. Yellow-Checker Cab. Co., 102
Cal. App. 600, 603, 283 P. 295, 297 (1929) (11 year old); Katz v. Helbing, 205 Cal. 629, 636, 271
P.2d 1062, 1065 (1928) (11 year old); Moeller v. Packard, 86 Cal. App. 459, 467-68, 261 P. 315,
318-19 (1927) (81/2 year old); Greeneich v. Knoll, 73 Cal. App. 1, 7, 238 P. 163, 165 (1925) (13
years, 11 months); Sanders v. Toberman, 192 Cal. 13, 15, 218 P. 394, 395 (1923) (8 year old);
Charves v. Terminal Rys., 44 Cal. App. 221, 224, 186 P. 154, 155 (1919) (5 year old); Todd v.
Orcutt, 42 Cal. App. 687,690-91, 183 P. 963,964-65 (1919) (9 year old); Mayne v. San Diego Elec.
Ry. Co., 179 Cal. 173, 177, 175 P. 690, 692 (1918) (7 year, 8 month old). See also Brown v.
Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 391, 394-95, 398 P.2d 596, 597-98, 42 Cal. Rptr. 324, 325-26 (1965); Daun
v. Truax, 56 Cal. 2d 647, 654-55, 365 P.2d 407, 411-12, 16 Cal. Rptr. 351, 355-56 (1961) (5 year,
8 month old); Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 454, 334 P.2d 870, 873 (1959) (5 year, 9 month
old); Jones v. Wray, 169 Cal. App. 2d 372, 375, 337 P.2d 226, 228 (1959) (5 year, 3 month old);
Baugh v. Beatty, 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 793, 205 P.2d 671, 675 (1949) (4 year old).
218. 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 P. 241 (1919).
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boy" who knew that the "leopard was dangerous and ferocious, and
that the guard rope was placed to keep people away from the
animals because they were dangerous."219
On appeal, the plaintiff argued the evidence was insufficient as
a matter of law to support a finding of contributory negligence. The
court of appeal rejected this contention. While recognizing that
"'[y]outh is ever the time of heedlessness, of impulsiveness, and of
forgetfulness,""'22 the court of appeal held, "the law imposes
upon minors the duty of giving such attention to their surroundings,
and care to avoid danger, as may fairly and reasonably be expected
from persons of their age and capacity.""22 The court concluded,
"[w]e cannot say, as [a] matter of law, that the plaintiff entered
into the forbidden space ...without a full appreciation of the
dangers and risk, and without sufficient judgment to know how to
avoid them. These matters, and the further question whether or not
he duly exercised such judgment as he possessed, were
considerations of fact." 22 0 pelt thus followed Cahill, and stands
for the proposition that the law does not set an age at which young
children are presumed capable or incapable of exercising due
care.
223
Similarly, in Todd v. Orcutt,224 a nine-year-old boy was
injured when he emerged from behind a parked vehicle to cross the
street and was hit by a car. At trial, the defendant raised the
defense of contributory negligence. The plaintiff did not introduce
any evidence suggesting he was incapable of negligence, but
merely asserted he could not be legally responsible for his actions
due to his "tender years." After a bench trial, the trial court found
the plaintiff was negligent and, therefore, entered judgment for the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed, arguing he was incapable of
219. Id. at 780, 183 P. at 242.





224. 42 Cal. App. 687, 183 P. 963 (1919).
1379
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
negligence as a matter of law because of his young age.2" The
court of appeal disagreed and affinrned, holding:
The ultimate question of fact is: Was [the plaintiff] guilty of
contributory negligence? And we must assume that, in solving that
question, the court applied the correct rule of law, which is that plaintiff
was required to exercise the same degree of care, no more and no less,
than would be expected from a child of his age, or which children of
his years ordinarily exercise under like circumstances, taking into
consideration not only the boy's age, but his capacity for
understanding.
226
In reaching this conclusion, the Todd court extensively analyzed
and rejected the "tender years" rule which immunizes children from
liability for negligence on the basis of the child's age alone.227
The court recognized that, upon a proper factual showing, "[an
infant may be so very young that, like an idiot or a lunatic, no
negligence may legally be imputed to him." 228 However, that the
child was very young was not sufficient to absolve the minor of
any duty of due care. The child's age was "only a probative fact,
as much so as if, had he been an adult, he were blind or deaf.
229
Thus, Todd rejected any rule that would excuse a child from
exercising due care on the basis of age alone:
The rule is that the defense of contributory negligence may be invoked
in actions by or on behalf of children who are of an age sufficient to
exercise discretion for the avoidance of injury to themselves. The law
does notfix this age of discretion. It may depend upon the character of
the injury, the circumstances under which it occurred, and the size,
intelligence, and capacity of the child.2s
225. Id. at 690, 183 P. at 964.
226. Id. at 691, 183 P. at 965 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 690, 183 P. at 964; see also id. (*Unless the child is exceedingly young it is usually
left to the jury to determine the measure of care required of the particular child in the actual
circumstances of the case.") (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 691, 183 P. at 965.
230. Id. at 690, 183 P. at 964; accord Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 361,369-70, 191 P.2d
25, 29-30 (1948); Graham v. Consol. Motor Transp. Co., 112 Cal. App. 648, 652, 297 P. 617, 618
(1931); Parra v. Cleaver, 110 Cal. App. 168, 171, 294 P. 6, 7-8 (1930); Patania v. Yellow-Checker
Cab. Co., 102 Cal. App. 600, 604, 283 P. 295, 297 (1929); Moeller v. Packard, 86 Cal. App. 459,
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Confirming the early rule that a child's capacity for negligence
is a question of fact, some courts found the evidence in certain
cases involving very young children was insufficient to support a
nonsuit based on contributory negligence.231 Consistent with these
cases, the California Supreme Court affirmed a verdict in favor of
a young plaintiff where the evidence was sufficient to support the
plaintiff's claim of incapacity for contributory negligence.232 On
the other hand, California courts have rejected attempts by minor
plaintiffs to avoid the consequences of their lack of due care where
there was sufficient evidence the plaintiff under the particular
467-68, 161 P.2d 315, 319 (1927); see also Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 781, 183
P. 241, 243 (1919) (10t/2-year-old).
231. See Parra, 110 Cal. App. at 171, 294 P. at 7 (court rejected defendant's contention that
16-month-old plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and affirmed trial court's denial
of defendant's motion for nonsuit). The court held "As Jose Parra was only sixteen months of age
at the time of his injury and as there was no evidence indicating that he had sufficient mind or
understanding to enable him to be guilty of contributory negligence, and as the record is barren of
any evidence pointing to contributory negligence on his part, we cannot charge him with it.") Id
(emphasis added). See also Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256,258,263,240 P. 16, 18 (1925) (5-year-
old; court reversed judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendant on ground there was enough evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was negligent and that his negligence
proximately caused plaintiff's injuries).
Other California courts faced with five year old plaintiffs have submitted the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury where there was sufficient evidence indicating the child had the
capacity to understand the dangerous nature of the injury-causing conduct or the facts surrounding
the cause of the accident were substantially in conflict. See Martinovic v. Ferry, 222 Cal. App. 2d
30, 34 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1963); Smith v. Wenmer, 217 Cal. App. 2d 226, 31 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1963);
Daun v. Truax, 56 Cal. 2d 647, 365 P.2d 407, 16 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1961); Courtell v. McEachen, 51
Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Jones v. Wray, 169 Cal. App. 2d 372, 337 P.2d 226 (1959);
Mecchi v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 674, 102 P.2d 422 (1940), disapproved on
other grounds, 50 Cal. 2d 617,327 P.2d 897 (1958); Smithv. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 361,191 P.2d
25 (1948); Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 299, 44 P.2d 604 (1935); McKay v.
Hedger, 139 Cal. App. 266, 34 P.2d 221 (1934); Charves v. Terminal Rys., 44 Cal. App. 221, 186
P. 154 (1919). Butsee Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756,777,478 P.2d 465,478,91 Cal. Rptr.
745, 758 (1970) (holding that a child five years and seven months old, who drowned by following
the direction of his parent, could not be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law).
232. See Crane v. C.S. Smith Metro Mkt. Co., 23 Cal. 2d 288, 292, 298, 301, 144 P.2d 356,
359, 362 (1943) (affirming trial court's refusal to submit issue of contributory negligence to the jury
where defendant did not rebut the assertion that 3-year-old plaintiff was "'wholly unable to appreciate
or to guard or to protect herself against the dangerous appliance").
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circumstances of the case had the mental capacity for
negligence.
233
Finally, while the foregoing cases reaffirmed the general rule
that a minor's negligence is a question of fact, some courts have
found, based on factors including, but not limited to, the age of the
child, that the defendant's claim of contributory negligence was
unsupported by the evidence and must fail as a matter of law.
2 34
These cases are consistent with the general principle that a minor
of virtually any age may be found negligent upon a sufficient
factual showing of capacity to exercise due care.
However, unanimity among the California courts began to
wane. While some courts continued to adhere to a flexible
standard, others adopted a new rule of negligence which absolved
minors of any duty of due care based solely on the minor's
chronological age.
233. See De Nardi v. Palanca, 120 Cal. App. 371, 376, 8 P.2d 220, 222 (1932) (7 year, 1I-
month-old; "there is nothing in the present case which enables us to say as a matter of law that the
child was wanting in capacity to use ordinary care for her own safety"); Richardson v. Ribosso, 120
Cal. App. 641, 643, 8 P.2d 226, 226-27 (1932) (7 year, 11-month-old; "The rule is that though
negligence will not be imputed to a child of tender years the question of the capacity of the particular
child to exercise care in avoiding a particular danger is one of fact to be left to the jury"; "we must
assume that the jury found the child capable and that his want of care under the circumstances was
negligence."); Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 299, 303-04, 44 P.2d 604, 606 (1935)
(rejecting 5-year-old plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales established
that child under 5 is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence; "It was long ago announced and
is still maintained by our appellate courts that there is no precise age at which, as a matter of law,
a child is to be held accountable for all his actions to the same extent as one of full age, and that
the question as to the capacity of a child at a particular time to exercise care to avoid a particular
danger is one of fact for the jury.") (emphasis added).
234. See Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Cal. App. 307, 310-11, 22 P.2d 545, 547 (1933) (court
implicitly recognized that 3-year-old plaintiff had the capacity for negligence but held that, under the
circumstances of the case, there was insufficient evidence to support the contention that plaintiff
proximately caused his injuries; "Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence? To this question
there can be but one answer, and that is in the negative. Even if it were negligence for a child of
three years of age to stand in or near the center of a city street and look down, apparently unaware
of the approach of an automobile, we are unable to see that such negligence contributed proximately
to the injury . . . ."); Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal. App. 2d 217, 225-26, 148 P.2d 680, 685 (1944)
(holding that the trial court properly granted plaintiffs motion for new trial on ground that there was
no evidence the 2 year, 8-month-old plaintiff had been negligent; "While there is no precise age at
which, as a matter of law, a child is to be held accountable for his actions, it is obvious that a child
of two years and eight months of age could not have sufficient capacity to be guilty of contributory
negligence" under the circumstances of the case.) (emphasis added).
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B. The Conflict in the Later Decisions
Over time, the California Supreme Court and courts of appeal
continued to apply the flexible standard of care articulated by the
early courts equally to all children.235 Other courts of appeal,
however, did not.236 This back-and-forth between the lower
appellate courts and the supreme court is attributable to a failure on
the part of some lower courts to recognize statements of public
policy in earlier cases which either expressly rejected any rule
which set an arbitrary age of discretion or which held chronological
age alone is an insufficient determinant of the standard of care
required of children. Finding cases which rejected a bright line age
rule distinguishable because of the plaintiff's age, these lower
courts ruled that no child below the age of five, regardless of the
circumstances or the child's knowledge and experience, could
exercise any degree of due care for their own or others' safety.
1. The Continued Application of the Flexible Standard of
Care
Following the rule established in the first few decades of this
century, some California courts continued to hold that the question
of contributory negligence was for the jury where sufficient
evidence indicated the child had the capacity for negligent conduct
under the circumstances of the case. In Smith v. Harger,237 a five-
year, nine-month-old boy was injured on school grounds when he
was hit by a truck. On the day of the accident, the superintendent
of buildings arranged to have dirt filled into low areas in the
schoolyard. The teachers warned all the children about the danger
posed by the work on the school yard. When it appeared the work
would not be finished by the end of the school day, the teachers
cautioned the children to go directly home after school and not stay
235. See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text; see infra notes 237-249,275-292, 309,
315-26 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 250-274, 293-314, 327-337 and accompanying text.
237. 84 Cal. App. 2d 361, 191 P.2d 25 (1948).
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near the schoolyard." 8 After returning home from school, the
plaintiff's mother told him he could not return to the
schoolyard.3 Without heeding any of these warnings, the
plaintiff returned to the schoolyard, ran behind one of the trucks,
and was hit and injured. The plaintiff sued the truck driver and his
employer, charging them with negligence. The defendants
responded with a defense of contributory negligence. The matter
was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury's finding of contributory negligence and that the
"minor could not be found guilty of contributory negligence [as a
matter of law] because of his age.
240
The court of appeal rejected both contentions. The court found
the facts sufficient to support a finding that the child, after being
repeatedly warned by his teachers, knew the dangerousness of
playing in the school yard and, therefore, had the capacity to
foresee the potentially harmful consequences of his actions.24 t
With regard to the plaintiff's second contention that his age
insulated him from any finding of fault, the Smith court cited
various California cases that rejected fixing an arbitrary age below
which a child would be presumed incapable of negligence, and,
thus, concluded that the trial court properly submitted the question
of the minor's contributory negligence to the jury.
242
238. Id. at 365-66, 191 P.2d at 27.
239. It was never conclusively determined at trial whether the plaintiff later received permission
to go to the schoolyard or went to the school without his mother's permission. Id. at 366, 191 P.2d
at 27.
240. Id. at 369, 191 P.2d at 29. The plaintiff relied on Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal. App. 2d 217,
148 P.2d 680 (1944) and Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256, 240 P.2d 16 (1925) for this proposition.
Neither case supports plaintiff's position. See supra notes 231 & 234.
241. Smith, 84 Cal. App. 2d at 369-70, 191 P.2d at 29.
242. Id. at 370, 191 P.2d at 29. The court relied on five central cases: Todd v. Orcutt, 42 Cal.
App. 687, 690-91, 183 P. 963, 964 (1919) (9 year old; the law does not set a precise age of
discretion; child's negligence a question of fact); Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d
299, 303-04,44 P.2d 604, 606 (1935) (5 year old; no precise age at which a minor is to held capable
gr incapable of negligence; contributory negligence a question of fact); Mecehi v. Lyon Van &
Storage Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 674, 685-86, 102 P.2d 422, 427-28 (1940), disapproved on other
grounds, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958) (5-6 year old; same); Walsh v. Van Tuyle, 21 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 304, 69 P.2d 189, 190 (1937) (6-year-old); and Charves v. Terminal Rys., 44 Cal. App.
221, 224, 186 P. 154, 155 (1919) (5 year old; same).
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The Smith decision was clear in suggesting that statements of
public policy which rejected setting a precise age at which children
would be charged with an adult standard of care applied equally to
attempts by younger plaintiffs to avoid a duty of due care because
of their "tender years."
This view of California case law was reaffirmed one year later
in Baugh v. Beatty,243 where it was held that the question whether
a four-year-old "'knowingly and voluntarily"' invited injury was
for the jury to determine.2" In Baugh, a four-year-old boy was
bitten by a chimpanzee while near a circus wagon cage. The boy
sued the circus under a theory of negligence, and the jury was
instructed that the plaintiff could not recover damages if he
"knowingly or consciously" '245 placed himself in danger and his
conduct "was the sole factor which produced the injury."246 There
was no evidence suggesting the plaintiff was incapable of
appreciating the danger of venturing near the circus cage.247 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant circus and the
plaintiff appealed, arguing that the instruction on contributory
negligence incorrectly stated the law. The court of appeal agreed,
reversed the defense verdict and remanded for retrial. Relying on
Opelt,248 the court concluded: "Whether a minor of tender years
has conducted himself with the care and prudence due from on of
In La Fleur v. Hernandez, the court of appeal rejected a 10-year-old plaintiff's contention that
he was incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law because of his age. 84 Cal. App. 2d
569, 573, 191 P.2d 95, 97 (1948). In dicta, the court commented that "[u]nless a child is of
exceedingly tender years the measure of care required of it is usually left to the jury for
determination." Id. The La Fleur court, however, was not presented with a plaintiff who, because of
his age, was incapable of negligent conduct. Nor did the court define an age which could be
considered "exceedingly tender."
243. 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 205 P.2d 671 (1949).
244. Id. at 793, 205 P.2d at 675.
245. The instruction read: "You are instructed that while the keeper of a wild animal is liable
to the public for injuries occassioned [sic] by such animal, unless the injured party knowingly or
consciously conducts himself so as to make the injury possible." Id. at 792, 205 P.2d at 675. The
Baugh court found this instruction "grammatically erroneous, incomplete and meaningless." Id. at
792-93, 205 P.2d at 675.
246. Id. at 792-93, 205 P.2d at 675.
247. Id. at 788-89, 205 P.2d at 673.
248. 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 P. 241 (1919). See supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text
(discussing the Massachusetts rule).
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his years and experience is strictly a question of fact for the jury.
Thus, the sole question for the jury to have determined was
whether plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily invited the injury., 249
Thus, the four-year-old was not relieved of the duty of due care
but, because of instructional error, his conduct was to be re-
weighed by the jury on retrial.
2. The Introduction of a Four Year "Bright Line" Test
Despite prior courts' flexible application of a subjective
standard of care, some California courts apparently found existing
law insufficient to protect children from unjust denials of recovery.
As a result, some courts of appeal endorsed the model of child
development underlying the Illinois rule and carved out an
exception in actions involving very young children.25 In other
words, a child under the age of five, or in some cases four, would
be presumed incapable of negligence as a matter of law.
This "bright line" age test was first introduced in Ellis v.
D'Angelo.5 ' There, a four-year-old boy was sued for injuries
sustained when the minor "negligently shov[ed] and push[ed] the
plaintiff violently to the floor. '' 1 2 The plaintiff charged the minor
defendant with negligence and battery. The trial court sustained the
defendant's demurrer to both counts without leave to amend. The
court of appeal reversed the judgment as to the battery cause of
249. Baugh, 91 Cal. App. 2d at 793, 205 P.2d at 675.
250. People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App. 4th 778,785,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416,420 (1991) (children under
five); Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 258 Cal. App. 2d 692, 700-01, 66 Cal. Rptr. 44,49-50 (1968)
(children under five); Bauman v. Beaujean, 244 Cal. App. 2d 384, 389-90, 53 Cal. Rptr. 55, 59
(1966) (children under five; dicta); Walker v. Fresno Distrib. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 840,848,44 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 73 (1965) (children under four); Morningred v. Golden State Ltd. Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d
130, 137, 16 Cal. Rptr. 219, 224 (1961) (children under five); Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d
474, 476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961) (children under five); Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d
650, 652-53, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508-09 (1961) (children under 5 are presumed incapable of
negligence); Morales v. Thompson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 405, 407-08, 340 P.2d 700, 702 (1959)
(application of Ellis rule to minor plaintiff); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310,316,253 P.2d
675, 678 (1953) (children under the age of 4 are incapable of personal negligence as a matter of law);
see also Greene v. Watts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106, 26 Cal. Rptr. 334, 336-37 (1962) (extending
bright line age rule to assumption of risk cases).
251. 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
252. Id. at 312, 253 P.2d at 676.
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action, but affirmed the judgment on the negligence count. 2 3 The
court framed the question whether the defendant minor was
negligent in the following manner: "[T]he question presented to the
court is whether as a matter of common knowledge we can say that
a child 4 years of age lacks the mental capacity to realize that his
conduct which is not intended to bring harm to another may
nevertheless be reasonably expected to bring about that result.",
2 4
Without discussing the particular child's capacity, knowledge, or
experience, the Ellis court answered this query in the negative and
concluded:
In the absence of compelling judicial authority to the contrary in the
courts of this state we are satisfied that a 4-year-old child does not
possess this mental capacity .... [%] We are satisfied from our own
common knowledge of the mental development of 4-year-old children
that it is proper to hold that they have not at that age developed the
mental capacity for foreseeing the possibilities of their inadvertent
conduct which would rationally support a finding that they were
negligent."
In so holding, the Ellis court added a new rule to California
negligence law, namely that all children under four, regardless of
differences in age, knowledge, experience, and capacity, are
absolved of any duty of due care for the safety of others.
The Ellis decision, however, contains several flaws. As a
justification for the holding, the Ellis court distinguished the mental
capacity for committing an intentional tort from that necessary for
negligence. 6 The court made a distinction between forming the
intent to harm another and foreseeing harmful consequences of
253. Id. at 315-17, 320, 253 P.2d at 677-78, 680.
254. Id. at 315-16, 253 P.2d at 678.
255. Id. at 316, 253 P.2d at 678; see also People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App. 4th 778, 785, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 416,420 (1991) (same); Greene v. Watts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106-07,26 Cal. Rptr. 334,
336-37 (1962) (extending this reasoning to assumption of risk eases); Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App.
2d 474,476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961) (same); Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650,652-53,
10 Cal. Rptr. 507,508-09 (1961) (same); Morales v. Thompson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 405,407-08, 340
P.2d 700, 701-02 (1959) (same).
256. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 313-16, 253 P.2d at 676-78.
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actions which were not intended to bring about harm. 7 In
contrast, California Civil Code section 41 makes such a distinction,
and provides that "[a] minor... is civilly liable for a wrong dotie
by him. ,,258 The Ellis court believed that when the
Legislature enacted this section, it "intended that a minor . . .
should be liable in compensatory damages for his tortious conduct
even though he was not capable of knowing the wrongful character
of his act at the time he committed it."259 Nonetheless, the court
held the four-year-old minor defendant could be liable for tort
damages arising only out of an alleged battery, but not out of
negligence. 2' This distinction, approving a non-age-specific
standard of care for children sued on an intentional tort theory
while creating a bright line test for children sued on a negligence
theory, advanced a distinction without a difference. If four-year-old
children are capable of, and held to account for, committing an
intentional tort, they certainly have the capacity to act
negligently.261
257. Id. at 315, 253 P.2d at 677.
258. CAl. CIV. CODE § 41 (West 1982).
259. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 313, 253 P.2d at 676.
260. Id. at 317, 253 P.2d at 378. The court explained: "We certainly cannot say that a 4-year-
old child is incapable of intending the violent or harmful striking of another. Whether a 4-year-old
child [intentionally harmed someone] presents a fact question." Id The Ellis court commented that
the idea that a young child could be liable for his torts was "startling." Id. at 313, 253 P.2d at 676.
See generally Donald J. Duffala, Annotation, Modern Trends as to Tort Liability of Child of Tender
Years, 27 A.LR.4th 15 (1984).
261. See DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1975) (holding the seven year "bright
line" rule insulating children from liability for negligence also applied to minors charged with
committing intentional torts; "[t]he acts which constitute negligence are the same, whether that
negligence is primary or contributory, and so too is the level of capacity and understanding necessary
to a finding of negligence"); Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (7-
year conclusive presumption rule in negligence law applies to child's capacity for committing
intentional torts); Robert E. Jones, Case Notes, Infants - Torts - Wilfd Injuries - Four Year Old
Liable for Battery, 27 S. CAl. L. REv. 214, 216 (1954) ("The [Ellis] court found, as a matter of law,
that the infant defendant was incapable of foreseeing a risk of harm from his conduct, yet overruled
the demurrer to the battery count. It would seem more logical and consistent to hold the infant liable
in either both situations or neither. The same lack of mental development which makes it impossible
for the infant to foresee the consequences of his act makes it equally impossible for him to refrain
from the act") (emphasis added); Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons,
23 MIcH. L. REv. 9, 32-33 (1924) ("Immaturity or deficiency which makes it impossible for the
infant... to realize the consequences of his acts and to provide against their effects, makes it equally
impossible for him to realize the necessity of refraining from acts of aggression. [ ] ... Therefore,
an infant... should either be liable for harm caused by conduct which falls short of the standard
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Further, the legal authorities relied upon in Ellis do not support
the court's holding. Without examining the facts or the reasoning
in either Crane v. C.S. Smith Metro Mkt. Co.2 62 or Gonzales v.
Davis,263 the court primarily relied on the fact that those courts
held children of three and five, respectively, not guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.264  A closer
examination of these cases would have revealed that neither
decision endorsed a bright line rule. The plaintiffs in Gonzales and
Crane were found not guilty of contributory negligence because
there was no evidence of contributory negligence, not because of
their age alone.
265
The Ellis court's attempt to distinguish contrary California
authority is equally flawed. The court reasoned that Baugh v.
Beatty,266 involving a four-year-old, was distinguishable because
the plaintiff's conduct was "more than negligence since it
involve[d] the intentional taking of a risk and the opinion on its
face indicates the court was making no clear distinction between
mere negligent conduct and deliberate and premeditated
conduct."267 Yet, the very fact that the Baugh court made no such
distinction proves the distinction was immaterial to that court's
holding that whether a four year old child acts with due care for
his safety is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of
each case. 68
The Ellis court also distinguished Opelt v. AL G. Barnes
Co.269 on the basis the plaintiff was ten years old.Y This
contention fundamentally misconstrues and improperly limits the
holding in Opelt. The Ellis court flatly ignored Opelt's policy
required of normal persons as well as for harm caused by an act done with the actual, but not
culpable, intention of producing it, or he should not be liable for either.").
262. 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1943).
263. 197 Cal. 256, 240 P.2d 16 (1925).
264. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 316, 253 P.2d at 678.
265. See supra notes 231 & 234 and accompanying text.
266. 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 205 P.2d 671 (1949).
267. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 316, 253 P.2d at 678.
268. See supra notes 243-249 and accompanying text.
269. 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 P. 241 (1919).
270. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 316, 253 P.2d at 678.
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argument that the law does not fix an arbitrary age at which minors
are deemed capable or incapable of negligent conduct.271 And
even assuming Opelt is distinguishable on the basis of the
plaintiff's age, the Ellis court's conclusion--that a four year old is
presumptively incapable of negligence as a matter of law--does not
logically follow. That the plaintiff in Opelt had the mental capacity
to behave negligently does not mean that a child, by virtue of being
younger, could therefore be declared presumptively incapable of
negligence as a matter of law. The flexible Massachusetts rule
endorsed by the early California decisions could not be so easily
discarded.
Finally, the Ellis court inexplicably distinguished Smith v.
Harger,272 which affirmed a defense verdict in an action brought
by a five-year-old, on the ground that "[t]he mental development
of children from [age 5 and] forward is so rapid that cases such as
Smith . . . , dealing with a 5-year-old child are not helpful to
us."273 The court cited no authority for this blanket statement
which finds no support in the research on child psychology.274
The court of appeal in Ellis declined to follow a long line of
California decisions which rejected age-based presumptions of
incapacity. In so doing, the court offered an analysis of California
law that is seriously flawed. Ellis therefore has the dubious
distinction of being the first court to add confusion to the standard
of care required of children in California. Such confusion could
have been cleared up only by a clear statement from the supreme
court.
271. Opelt, 41 Cal. App. at 781, 183 P. at 243.
272. 84 Cal. App. 2d 361, 191 P.2d 25 (1948).
273. Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 316-17, 253 P.2d at 678. Three of the five authorities relied
upon by the Smith court contain language similar to that in Opelt, namely that there is no precise age
at which, as a matter of law, a child is considered capable or incapable ofnegligence. See supra notes
218-223, 242 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
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3. Affirmation of the Massachusetts Rule by the California
Supreme Court
Six years after Ellis was decided, the California Supreme Court
revisited the question of the standard of care required of children,
and in Courtell v. McEachen,275 the court reaffirmed California's
allegiance to the flexible "Massachusetts Rule., 276 In Courtell, a
girl five years and nine months old was walking home from school
with friends and stopped to play in a lot that contained some
smoldering timbers. While playing, the girl's dress caught fire and
she was severely burned. The trial court, on its own motion,
instructed the jury that the girl could not have been contributorily
negligent. The supreme court relied on Cahil127 7 and reversed,
holding that the question whether a child is capable of exercising
due care under the circumstances is for the jury to decide. 278 The
Courtell court declined to absolve the plaintiff of any duty of due
care on the basis of age alone.279 Relying on Smith280 and
Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd, 281 the court found that "courts
have rejected the theory that a child of plaintiff's age, namely,
between five and six, is incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
2 2
While the supreme court applied this rule to a child who was
five years, nine months old, its reasoning was not limited to
children over the age of five. The Courtell court established that,
275. 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
276. Id. at 454-55, 334 P.2d at 873.
277. Cahill v. E.B. & A. L. Stone, 167 Cal. 126, 138 P. 712 (1914); see supra notes 208-216
and accompanying text (discussing the Cahill decision).
278. Courtell, 51 Cal. 2d at 454, 334 P.2d at 873; accord Martinovic v. Ferry, 222 Cal. App.
2d 30, 35, 34 Cal. Rptr. 692, 694-95 (1963); Smith v. Wenmier, 217 Cal. App. 2d 226, 229-30, 31
Cal. Rptr. 565,566-67 (1963); Daun v. Truax, 56 Cal. 2d 647,659,365 P.2d 407,414, 16 Cal. Rptr.
351,358 (1961).
279. See Courtell, 51 Cal. 2d at 454-55, 334 P.2d at 873.
280. Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 361,370, 191 P.2d 25,29-30 (1948) (affirming defense
verdict in action brought by 5 year, 9 month old); see supra notes 237-242 and accompanying text.
281. 6 Cal. App. 2d 299,304,44 P.2d 604,606 (1935) (ruling that it was a reversible error for
trial court to instruct jury that 5-year-old was presumed incapable of negligence; "It was long ago
announced ... that there is no precise age at which, as a matter of law, a child is to be held
accountable for all his actions...").
282. Courtell, 51 Cal. 2d at 454, 334 P.2d at 873.
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as a matter of public policy, the question of contributory negligence
should be submitted to the jury if disputed issues of fact exist
concerning the extent of a young child's capacity for negligent
conduct.283 In Courtell, there was a disputed issue of fact
"whether plaintiff's dress caught fire because she played near
flames or because she squatted down on embers, and a
determination of this conflict was obviously essential in order to
resolve the questions of plaintiff's capacity to exercise care for her
safety and of her contributory negligence."284 Under these
circumstances, the supreme court was unequivocal:
Contributory negligence is a matter bearing directly upon the outcome
of a suit, and, where, as in the present case, the facts are in dispute,
there is no rational basisforpermitting the judge, rather than the jury,
to resolve that matter. So far has been called to our attention, the
existence of such an exceptional power is not recognized anywhere. [%]
The instruction that there was no contributory negligence on the part of
plaintiff erroneously deprived defendants of a defense upon which they
relied.
285
This language was subsequently applied where a minor
plaintiff, in the face of disputed issues of fact, sought to prevent
the trial court from instructing the jury on contributory negligence.
In Jones v. Wray,28 a five-year, three-month-old boy was hit by
a car and injured. There were no witnesses to the accident and
there was no direct testimony as to how the plaintiff got into the
street or whether the plaintiff was even in the street when the
accident occurred.2 87 The jury was instructed on the standard of
care required of children, and they returned a verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed and argued that it was reversible
283. Id. at 455, 334 P.2d at 873.
284. Id. at 454-55, 334 P.2d at 873.
285. Id. at 455, 334 P.2d at 873 (emphasis added). Courtell is therefore squarely in line with
the Massachusetts rule. Other courts and commentators have interpreted Courtell in this way. See,
e.g., Ashbaugh v. Trotter, 226 S.E.2d 736,737 (Ga. 1976); Mundy v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 755,759-60
(Idaho 1962); Quillian v. Mathews, 467 P.2d 111, 113 (Nev. 1970); Annotation, supra note 23, at
923.
286. 169 Cal. App. 2d 372, 337 P.2d 226 (1959).
287. Id. at 374, 337 P.2d at 227.
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error for the court to refuse to "instruct the jury that a child of the
age of 5 years and 3 months was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."' 88 The appellate court rejected
this contention.289 The Jones court, finding a disputed issue of
fact regarding contributory negligence, applied Courtell and held
the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury to decide.290
Courtell seemed to send a clear signal to lower California
courts that chronological age alone is insufficient as a determinant
of the standard of care required of children, especially if there is a
disputed question of fact whether the child had the capacity for or
engaged in negligent conduct.291 Unfortunately, the court's
statement that children "between five and six"292 are capable of
negligence created the possibility that courts faced with children
under five would ignore the public policy determination made by
the court.
4. Extension of the "Bright Line" Test
Two years after the supreme court handed down Courtell, the
court of appeal in Christian v. Goodwin293 declined to apply
Courtell in a case involving a four year, seven month old
plaintiff.2 4 Christian followed the "bright line" rule announced
in Ellis and held that children under the age of five would be
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of
law.295 In Christian, a boy four years and seven months old was
struck by an automobile while crossing the street in response to a
call from his mother. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
288. Id.
289. The judgment was nevertheless reversed on the ground that the giving of some instructions
and the refusal to give clarifying instructions on negligence constituted reversible error. Id. at 376-83,
337 P.2d at 228-32.
290. Id. at 375,337 P.2d at 227 (quoting Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448,455,334 P.2d
870, 873 (1959)).
291. Courtell, 51 Cal. 2d at 454-55, 334 P.2d at 873.
292. Id. at 454, 334 P.2d at 873.
293. 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1961).
294. Id. at 652-55, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
295. Id. at 655, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
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of the defendant. The trial judge granted the plaintiff's motion for
a new trial on the ground that the jury should have been instructed
that a child under five is incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury should
decide whether a child under five is capable of contributory
negligence. The court of appeal disagreed, holding:
[W]e conclude that a child of the age of the minor plaintiff does not
have sufficient capacity to be guilty of contributory negligence.., and
... the trial court properly granted a new trial on the ground it had
erred in refusing plaintiffs' proferred [sic] instruction that a child of the
age of the plaintiff is, as a matter of law, incapable of contributory
negligence."296
Like Ellis, the Christian court did not examine the particular
plaintiff's knowledge, capacity, or experience and did not indicate
whether the defense introduced evidence which would support a
finding that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge and experience
to exercise care for his own safety. Instead, the court began its
analysis by quoting the flexible rule which held that the question
of a particular child's capacity for negligence under the particular
circumstances of each case is normally a question of fact.297 The
court then qualified that early rule and stated: "[T]here is the
exceptional case in which the negligence of the infant becomes a
matter of law for the court because of his 'exceedingly tender
years.' ... 'An infant may be so very young that no negligence
may legally be imputed to him'.... 2 98
The Christian court relied on dicta in La Fleur v.
Hernande 99  and Todd v. Orcut?' as authority for this
296. Id.
297. Id. at 652, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
298. Id. at 652-53, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (citations omitted).
299. 84 Cal. App. 2d 569, 573, 191 P.2d 95, 97 (1948) (The Court was faced with a 10-year-
old and stated that: "Unless a child is of exceedingly tender years the measure of care required of
it is usually left to the jury for determination.-; however, the court did not indicate what age
constituted "tender years").
300. 42 Cal. App. 687, 690, 183 P. 963, 964 (1919). The Christian court left out a portion of
the language quoted from Todd without so indicating. The quote should have read: "An infant may
be so very young that, like an idiot or a lunatic, no negligence may legally be imputed to him." Id.
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passage.301 Neither case supports the proposition that, by virtue
of the child's age alone, the question of contributory negligence
can be decided as a matter of law 0.3 2 Todd expressly rejected any
such rule.30 3 Moreover, by endorsing the rule that all children of
"very early years" (defined as children under five) do not have the
capacity for negligence, the Christian court repeated the same
mistake made in Ellis. The court ignored the weight of authority in
California which held that whether a child had been negligent
depended upon the particular child's mental ability, taking into
account his age, knowledge, capacity, and experience to avoid
harm under the particular circumstances of the case.
The Christian court looked to other California precedent to find
support for an arbitrary age below which children would be
declared incapable of negligence. 3' Aside from the flawed
decision in Ellis, however, the decisions relied upon by Christian
did not support a "bright line" age rule .30 The court relied
primarily on Gonzales v. Davis for the proposition that a five-
year-old is presumptively incapable of negligence.0 7 However,
at 690, 183 P. at 964 (emphasis added). Obviously, the phrase "like an idiot or a lunatic" indicates
the Todd court was highlighting the importance of the mental development of a person, and not only,
as the Christian court concluded, a person's age.
301. 6 BERNARD E. WrrKIN, SumrMARY oF CAUFORNA LAW § 806, at 161 (9th ed. 1988) ("In
Christian v. Goodwin ... the court, dealing with the period between 4 and 5 years, followed...
prior California dicta in holding the child not capable and therefore not barred by contributory
negligence.").
302. See supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text (discussing Todd); note 242 (discussing
La Fleur).
303. As the Todd court explained, "[t]he law does not fix [an] age of discretion" and therefore
the plaintiff's age is "only a probative fact, as much so as if, had he been an adult, he were blind or
deaf.... [P]laintiff was required to exereis the same degree of care, no more and no less, than
would be expected from a child of his age ... taking into consideration not only the boy's age, but
his capacity for understanding." Todd, 42 Cal. App. at 691, 183 P. at 964-65 (emphasis added).
304. Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653-55, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509-10.
305. Neither Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256,240 P.2d 16 (1925), Crane v. C.S. Smith Metro
Market Co., 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1943), nor Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal. App. 2d 217, 148
P.2d 680 (1944) support a "bright line" rule. All of these cases are consistent with the flexible
"Massachusetts Rule." See supra notes 231,232 & 234. In particular, the Conroy court unequivocally
rejected any "bright line" rule when it stated: "there is no precise age at which, as a matter of law,
a child is to be held accountable for his actions.... " Conroy, 64 Cal. App. 2d at 226, 148 P.2d
at 685 (emphasis added).
306. 197 Cal. 256, 240 P.2d 16 (1925).
307. Christian, 188 Cal. App. 2d at 653-55, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
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Gonzales was consistent with the flexible Massachusetts rule and
did not support the five year "bright line" rule.
308
Most importantly, the Christian court flatly ignored the policy
language contained in several of the cases it cited which rejected
any rule fixing an arbitrary age of discretion.3" The court
circumvented this language by distinguishing those cases on the
ground they involved children five years or older.3 ° However,
this perceived gap in the precedent is insufficient as a reason to
establish a five year "bright line test". The clear weight of authority
in analogous cases expressly rejected any "bright line" rule.
311
Prior to Ellis and Christian, California courts took seriously the
possibility that a young child may be denied recovery or held liable
in tort under contributory or primary negligence theory.312 Courts
which applied the flexible Massachusetts rule nonetheless
acknowledged that children are impulsive, heedless, and sometimes
fail to protect themselves from danger. 3  Such considerations
prevented courts from submitting the question of contributory
308. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
309. Mecchi v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 674, 684-86, 102 P.2d 422,427-28
(1940), disapproved on other grounds, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); Van, Der Most v.
Workman, 107 Cal. App. 2d 274,278,236 P.2d 842, 844-45 (1951); Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal. App,
2d 217,226, 148 P.2d 680,685 (1944); Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 299,303-04,
44 P.2d 604, 606-07 (1935); Me Kay v. Hedger, 139 Cal. App. 266, 272, 34 P.2d 221, 224 (1934);
Todd v. Orcutt, 41 Cal. App. 687, 690-91, 183 P. 963, 964-65 (1919); Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone
Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139, 138 P. 712, 717-18 (1914).
310. Christian, 188 Cal. App. 2d at 653, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 509. As the court explained: "We
have found no authority in this state relative to the contributory negligence of children over 4 and
under 5.- Id, The court did not cite Baugh v. Beatty, 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 205 P.2d 671 (1949),
which the Ellis court distinguished on the ground the Baugh court was discussing something more
than contributory negligence. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text. As previously
demonstrated, the Ellis court's reasoning was unpersuasive. See supra notes 266-268 and
accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 208-234, 237-249, 275-290 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 782, 183 P. 241, 243 (1919)
('Just how far to apply the rule of accountability to a bright, ten year old boy at a circus, with the
allurement and excitement attendant thereto, and keeping in mind the propensity to curiosity every
normal boy possesses, was, no doubt, a matter of grave concern to the trial court, as it has been to
us.").
313. See Brown v. Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 391,394-95 & n.2, 398 P.2d 596, 597-98 & n.2, 42
Cal. Rptr. 324, 325-26 & n.2 (1965); Todd v. Orcutt, 42 Cal. App. 687, 690-91, 183 P. 963, 964-65
(1919); Opelt v. A]. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 781-82, 183 P. 241,242-43 (1919); Cahill v.
E. B. & A. L Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 138-41 (1914) 138 P. 712, 717-18 (1914).
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negligence to the jury in the absence of sufficient evidence that the
child had the capacity for negligent conduct under the particular
circumstances of the case."' If such were the state of the record
in Christian, the court could have reached the same result without
adopting a "bright line" test.
After the "bright line" decisions, however, children have been
presumed to have acted with sufficient care for their safety, no
matter how egregious the conduct or how knowledgeable the child,
simply because he or she is under the age of five. Accordingly, the
Ellis and Christian decisions signalled a significant change in
negligence law in California: The standard of care required of
children had changed, so that some minors would be absolved of
any duty of due care for their own or others' safety while other
children, by virtue of attaining their fifth birthday, would be held
fully accountable for all of their actions.
5. The Flexible Standard of Care Provides Children with
Sufficient Protection from Unreasonable Liability
Standards
Four years after Christian was decided, the question of whether
the subjective standard of care provided children with sufficient
protection against an unjustified charge of contributory negligence
was again addressed by the California Supreme Court in Brown v.
Connolly."5 There, a six-year-old boy was seriously injured when
he was struck by an automobile while riding his bicycle. The first
trial resulted in a judgment for the defendant, but the judgment was
subsequently reversed by the court of appeal due to instructional
error.3 16 On retrial, the trial court refused an instruction requested
by the plaintiff that would have insulated the plaintiff from liability
with a presumption of due care based solely on the plaintiff's
1397
314. See supra notes 175-179, 218-223, 231-232, 234 and accompanying text.
315. 62 Cal. 2d 391, 398 P.2d 596, 42 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1965).
316. Brown v. Connolly, 206 Cal. App. 2d 582, 586-89, 24 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59-61 (1962).
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age.317 The jury was instead instructed on the standard of care
required of children generally. The jury returned a defense verdict
and the plaintiff appealed, arguing it was prejudicial error for the
trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that the plaintiff, because of
his young age, was entitled to a presumption of due care.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Mosk,
disagreed: "There is no convincing authority in California ...
holding that a minor is entitled to a presumption of due care solely
by virtue of age."318 Next, the court described a bifurcated test as
a guide for trial judges in determining whether to submit the
question of a child's contributory negligence to the jury.3t9 The
Brown court reasoned that there must first be sufficient evidence
"the particular child had the capacity to act negligently.
320
Assuming capacity exists, the issue is submitted to the jury, which
"tests the child's conduct by the standards of children of like age
and maturity., 32 1 The supreme court found this test "reasonable
and workable" because it "protects children from unreasonably
317. Brown, 62 Cal. 2d at 400 n.2, 398 P.2d at 601 n.2, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 329 n.2 (McComb,
J., dissenting). The proposed instruction read:
The law presumes that [plaintiff] in his conduct at the time of and immediately
preceding the accident was exercising ordinary care and was obeying the law.
This presumption is a form of evidence. It will support a finding in accord with the
presumption where there is no proof to the contrary; and it will support such a finding in
the face of contrary evidence if your judgment so directs after weighing conflicting
evidence.
When such a conflict exists, it is the jury's duty to weigh the presumption and any
evidence that may support it against the contrary evidence and to determine which, if
either, preponderates. Such deliberations, of course, shall be related to and be in
accordance with my instructions on the burden of proof.
Id.
318. Id. at 394, 398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (emphasis added); see also id. at 395,
398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The court, however, reversed the judgment because the trial
judge erroneously prevented the child's psychiatrist from testifying on the child's behalf about the
accident in which the child suffered from amnesia and therefore could not competently testify. Id.
at 395-98, 398 P.2d at 598-600, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326-28.
319. Id. at 395, 398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
320. Id. at 395,398 P.2d at 598,42 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The supreme court did not explicitly say
who bore the burden of introducing such evidence. It appears that the plaintiff should bear the burden
of demonstrating the child does not have the capacity for negligent conduct under the particular
circumstances of the case. Upon such a showing, the burden would then shift to the defendant who
must show the child was capable. See infra notes 338-365 and accompanying text (providing n more
elaborate discussion of the evidentiary requirements for the fist prong of the bifurcated test).
321. Brown, 62 Cal. 2d at 395, 398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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lofty liability standards while holding them liable when the facts
justify it, and avoids the unsupportable conclusion that young
children generally act with due regard for their own safety." '22
The Brown court then described the way in which the
bifurcated test should be applied.323 In doing so, the supreme
court expressly rejected the "bright line" test established by Ellis
and Christian. Without citing either case, the court stated: "The
California rule... avoid[s] the arbitrary chronological age limits
used in many states. In California the age of capacity is a factual
question to be determined by the mentality and maturity of the
particular child.3 24  Thus, Brown represents an unequivocal
affirmation of the flexible Massachusetts rule by categorically
rejecting any rule that would determine a child's capacity for
negligence on the basis of chronological age alone.3"
Since the Brown court did not explicitly refer to either
Christian or Ellis, California courts have faced the difficult task of
resolving the analytical inconsistencies between Brown and the
"bright line" decisions. Unfortunately, rather than analyze the
reasoning behind both lines of cases, the courts of appeal merely
confused the issue further by erroneously interpreting the supreme
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 395, 398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (emphasis added).
325. Cf. Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d 681, 394 P.2d 697,39 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1964). In Fowler,
the supreme court held that a 3 year, 10 month old could not be contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. Id. at 687, 394 P.2d at 701, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 885. Fowler, however, is readily distinguishable.
There, the court was faced with determining whether the plaintiff could invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff went to school and returned home with a large bruise on her forehead and
crossed eyes. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit. The supreme court reversed,
holding "the jury could find that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies under the facts here
involved." Id at 686, 394 P.2d at 700, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (emphasis added). The issue of the child's
negligence was discussed only in the context of satisfying one of the requirements for invoking res
ipsa loquitur, namely, that the plaintiff 'show that the actions of the plaintiff did not contribute to
the injuries." Id. at 690, 394 P.2d at 702, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The court concluded, without citing
authority, that the plaintiff, because of her age, could not be guilty of negligence. Id. This is not
inconsistent with the holding in Courtell or Brown because the defense of contributory negligence
was never raised. The defendant in Fowler attempted to defeat the invocation of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur by arguing the defendant did not owe a duty of protection to the child. Id. at 687-88,
394 P.2d at 700-01, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85. The defendant never introduced evidence that the
plaintiff was capable of or did in fact engage in negligent conduct that proximately caused her
injuries. See id. at 686-90, 394 P.2d at 699-702, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 883-86.
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court's position in Brown--which was expressed without limitation
or qualification--as applying only to children over the age of
five.
32 6
C. Modem Treatment of the Question of Children and
Negligence in California
Without looking to the reasons behind the "bright line" rule,
modem authorities seem to have accepted the Christian and Ellis
approach, thus ignoring Courtell and Brown in cases involving
children under five.3 27 Christian was recently followed in People
v. Berry.328 In Berry, a two-year, eight-month-old boy was killed
by a pit bull. The defendant was charged with involuntary
manslaughter.329 In his defense, the defendant claimed the child's
death was an accident and that it was not reasonably foreseeable
that the dog had violent propensities or would harm another person.
The jury was instructed: "'A minor under the age of five years is,
as a matter of law, not required to take any precautions which the
circumstances permitted, nor which a reasonable person would
326. See Walker v. Fresno Distrib. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 840, 848,44 Cal. Rptr. 68,73 (1965)
(Brown "d[id] not purport to do away with the firmly established rule... that a child under four
years of age is incapable of contributory negligence."); Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 258 Cal. App.
2d 692, 701, 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (1968) (Brown does not "impair the well settled rule that 4-year-
olds are incapable of negligence.-); see also HARPER, Err AL., supra note 15, § 16.8, at 441-42 n.19
(stating that Brown applied to children above the age of five); Gray, supra note 14, at 605 (same).
327. See Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d 474, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1961) (31/2 year old);
Moringred v. Golden State Co., Ltd., 196 Cal. App. 2d 130, 16 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1961) (4 years, 1
month, 1 day old); Greene v. Watts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 103, 26 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1962) (3'/2 year old;
extending the four year "bright line" to assumption of risk cases); Walker v. Fresno Distrib. Co., 233
Cal. App. 2d 840,44 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1965) (approximately three years old); Bauman v. Beaujean, 244
Cal. App. 2d 384, 53 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1966) (31h year old; plaintiff waived error by requesting an
instruction on contributory negligence); Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 258 Cal. App. 2d 692, 66
Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968) (4 year old); People v. Berry, I Cal. App. 4th 778, 2 Cal. Rptr 2d 416 (1991)
(2 year, 8 month old).
Moreover, the Use Note for BAI 3.35 (the subjective standard of care instruction) instructs the
courts to not give the standard of care instruction to children under five. Interestingly, Brown is
absent from the list of authorities in the Use Note and Comment of BAli 3.35.
328. 1 Cal. App. 4th 778, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416 (1991).
329. Id. at 781, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988). The
defendant was also charged with keeping a mischievous animal (CAL. PENAL CODE § 399), keeping
a fighting dog (CAL. PENAL CODE § 597.5(a)(1)), and cultivating marijuana (CAL. HEALMI & SAFPrY
CODE § 11358 (West (1991)).
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ordinarily take in the same situation., 330 The jury convicted the
defendant of involuntary manslaughter and the defendant appealed,
arguing that the instruction amounted to a directed verdict and
relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof.
The court of appeal disagreed with the defendant and affirmed
the trial court. The court reasoned that the prosecution had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the "victim lacked the capacity to
take the precautions reasonably available." 331 Without examining
the reasoning behind Christian, the Berry court looked no further
than the plaintiff's age and held that the "sole" issue in the case
was whether plaintiff was under the age of five and therefore
relieved of any duty of exercising due care 2.33  Finding the child
under the age of five, the court rejected the defendant's contention
that the prosecution failed to prove the child lacked the capacity for
due care.33
The fact that the five year "bright line" age rule articulated in
Christian has recently been applied is no reason to regard the
matter as settled. No California appellate court has resolved the
analytical inconsistency between the holdings in Ellis, Christian
and their progeny on the one hand, and the supreme court's
opinions in Courtell and Brown on the other.334 The California
Supreme Court has clearly endorsed the more flexible
Massachusetts rule whereas some courts of appeal have explicitly
followed a variant of the inflexible Illinois rule. Courts that have
opted for the Illinois rule have either erroneously interpreted prior
case law, mistakenly distinguished contrary authority, or ignored
330. Berry, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 783, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419.
331. Id. at 784, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419 (original emphasis).
332. Id. at 785, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420.
333. Id.
334. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970), the
California Supreme Court cited Courtell, Christian, and Brown for the proposition that "plaintiffs do
not suggest that they were entitled to the requested instruction [precluding a jury finding of
contributory negligence] simply by virtue of [plaintiff's] tender age..." Id. at 776, 478 P.2d at 478,
91 Cal. Rptr. at 758. The Haft court, however, was not faced with the issue whether the child,
because of his or her "tender years," should or should not have been charged with contributory
negligence. It is likely that the court was merely illuminating the various approaches California courts
have taken on the subject. See also Welch v. Gardner, 187 Cal. App. 2d 104, 112, 9 Cal. Rptr. 453,
457 (1960) (citing Ellis, Morales, Courtell and Baugh as expressing conflicting rules in California).
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policy language which rejected any rule setting an arbitrary age
below which children would be considered incapable of negligence
as a matter of law.335
Most importantly, however, theory and research in child
psychology casts doubt on the view that children under the age of
five are incapable of foreseeing the consequences of their acts.336
Research shows that children well below the age of five have the
capacity to exercise due care in situations familiar to them.337
Thus, the position most consistent with the theory of child
development presented here is that articulated by the supreme court
in Brown, namely that whether a child has the capacity for
negligence depends not only on a child's chronological age, but
also upon the child's familiarity with the injury-causing conduct.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE COURTS: REAFFIRM THE
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CARE AND APPLY
IT EQUALLY To CHILDREN OF ALL AGES
"In the field of tort law, reexamination of principles and
overruling of older cases is probably more necessary and common
than in any other." '338 This maxim is especially applicable to the
335. See supra notes 251-274, 293-314, 326 and accompanying text.
336. See Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d 474, 476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961); Christian v.
Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 652-54, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508-10 (1961); Ellis v. D*Angelo, 116
Cal. App. 2d 310, 315-16, 253 P.2d 675, 677-78 (1953).
337. See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
338. 9 BmNARD E. WrmCN, CALFORNA PRocEEtuR § 797, at 770 (3d ed. 1985); see, e.g.,
Warren A. Seavey, The Waterworks Cases and Stare Decisis, 66 HARv. L. REV. 84, 85, 86 (1952)
("Stare decisis is a principle rather than a rule. It looks toward certainty and continuity in te law;
and, other things being equal, prior decisions should be followed. But stare decisis has never been
a rule which demanded rigid adherence to precedent; the common law has not developed by a slavish
adherence to prior decisions.... [1] [P]recedent is a useful tool but a bad master."). Compare Verni
v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d 431,432 (N.Y. CL App. 1946) ("The rule which refuses to allow such young
children to be penalized for supposed faults has been followed in this court at least since 1868.
[Citation.] It is not an unjust rule or one which changing conditions make obsolete.") with Beard v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 139, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449,456 (1970) ("We
think the dangers connected with moving trains, like those connected with runaway horses and wild
animals, may be less generally understood by juveniles today than they were 70 years ago when the
railroad was king of transportation and dominated youthful imaginations .... In view of the
substantial role which awareness of the surroundings plays in determining what conduct is negligent,
an awareness which is dynamic and not static, and which over the years gradually changes its aim,
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analysis here because courts which have followed the Illinois rule
have embraced an unsupportable theory of child development.
Current theory and research in child psychology suggests that
young children have the capacity for negligence in situations with
which they are familiar.339 Accordingly, courts should submit the
question of comparative negligence to the jury if there is sufficient
evidence indicating that the child was familiar with the circum-
stances presented to him.340 Prior knowledge of and experience
with the danger should be admissible to show the extent to which
the child was familiar with the dangerous situation. A child's
history of heeding or failing to heed warnings from parents and
school should also be admissible to demonstrate capacity.
341
In so doing, trial courts should apply a bifurcated test which
first tests whether the child had the requisite knowledge of and
experience with the injury-causing conduct, and then assesses the
child's actions against what a child of similar age, capacity,
knowledge, and experience would have done under the same or
focus, and intensity, we think conduct which would be negligent as a matter of law in the railroad
age may no longer be so in the space age - and vice versa - and precedents formulated in earlier
times under different social conditions may no longer be persuasive or controlling."). Cf. Toetschinger
v. Ilmot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 223 (Minn. 1977) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (arguing that older Minnesota
decisions endorsing the "Massachusetts Rule" should be abandoned in favor of the "Illinois Rule"
because "the doctrine of stare decisis... cannot ask that we make the same mistake twice. The law
is a living thing. It must be stable, but it cannot stand still.").
339. See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869, 872 n.1 & 873 (Iowa 1982) (abandoning
all presumptions of incapacity in favor of the more flexible "Massachusetts Rule"); T.Z. Standard v.
Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (S.C. 1982) (same).
341. See, e.g., Mundy v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 755, 757 (Idaho 1962) (affirmed submission of
question of contributory negligence to jury where there was evidence the child "had been observed
exercising caution" when crossing the street where child was killed); Bush v. N.Y. Transit Co., 153
A.2d 28, 36 (NJ. 1959) ("experience in caring for himself in traffic" is relevant to show capacity for
negligence); Dillman v. Mitchell, 99 A.2d 809, 811 (NJ. 1953) (51h-year-old who had previously
safely crossed busy street where he was killed, held to have sufficient knowledge of danger to allow
question of contributory negligence to go to the jury). See generally LaNoux v. Hagar, 308 N.E.2d
873, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) ("Schools and parents physically occupy most of a child's time and
almost entirely share his early instruction. It was proper for counsel to make inquiry as to the extent
of the child's instruction, knowledge and experience from one of the persons most qualified to
answer, in this case his mother.").
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similar circumstances.342 To be excused from exercising due care,
the minor plaintiff should have the burden of providing substantial
evidence that the minor was incapable of negligent conduct. Upon
a showing of incapacity, the burden should then shift to the
defendant who must present substantial evidence indicating that the
child had the capacity for negligent conduct. If the evidence
regarding the child's familiarity with the danger is sharply
conflicting, the jury should decide whether the preponderance of
the evidence showed that the minor was chargeable with exercising
some degree of caution and/or self-restraint.
3 43
While a child's age is easy to determine, the nature of the
child's knowledge and experience is not so readily quantifiable.
The difficulty is in determining what type of knowledge and
experience is sufficient to support a finding that the minor
understood the dangerous nature of his conduct. Critics of the
flexible standard of care have suggested that allowing a jury to
decide this question unnecessarily promotes confusion and
inconsistency in jury decisions.3" This argument, however, is
342. See Brown v. Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 391,395, 398 P.2d 596, 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326
(1965); see also Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 659-60 (Alaska 1964); Beggs v. Wilson, 272
A.2d 713, 714-15 (Del. 1970); Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d 872, 877 (Haw. 1963); Peterson v.
Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1982); GRYC v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743
(Minn. 1980); Toetschinger v. Thnot, 250 N.W.2d 204,210 (Minn. 1977); Quillian v. Mathews, 467
P.2d 111, 113 (Nev. 1970); Bush v. New Jersey & N. Y. Transit Co., 153 A.2d 28,33 (NJ. 1959);
Yun Jeong Koo v. St. Bernard, 392 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Mann v. Fairboum,
366 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1961); Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 106 A. 682, 685 (Vt. 1919).
The approach outlined in Brown is more efficient than that advocated in New Jersey and Iowa,
which allow the jury to decide whether the child had the capacity for negligence and if so, whether
the child practiced below the standard of care. See Bush, 153 A.2d at 33; Peterson, 316 N.W.2d at
873. Judicial resources are better conserved if the trial judge is granted the discretion to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the contention the child had the capacity for negligent
conduct.
343. See, e.g., Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 454-55, 458, 334 P.2d 870, 873, 875
(1959); Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d 872, 877 (Haw. Sup. Ct. 1963); Hoff v. Natural Ref. Prods., 118
A.2d 714, 722 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1955); see also Shaw v. Perfetti, 125 S.E.2d 778, 785 (W. Va. 1962).
344. See Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827, 838 (Mich. 1938) (stating that the question of the
contributory negligence of children should not be left to the "dubious speculation of juries");
Galloway v. McDonalds Restaurants of Nevada, 728 P.2d 826, 832 (Nov. 1986) (Steffen, J.,
dissenting) ("A jury should not be permitted to speculate on an issue that reason and experience place
outside the realm of speculation."); Wilderman, supra note 65, at 435-46 ("The juror is impressed
with the immediate facts and the infant's conduct in relation thereto and may not, unless clearly
instructed by the court, go beyond those facts which are brought to his attention. The juror fails to
1404
1993 / The Standard Of Care Required Of Children
unpersuasive because permitting a jury to decide whether a child
has been negligent can produce no more confusion and incon-
sistency than that which exists in any trial involving older children.
Members of juries are familiar with the propensities of
children.345 The question of whether a child has been contri-
butorily negligent is therefore well within the capacity of jurors to
determine. Furthermore, "[t]he natural sympathy and concern of
jurors for children of tender years will make it unlikely in the
ordinary case that a jury--advised of the impact of its determination
of comparative fault--will return a verdict precluding any recovery
by the injured child. 34 6 Thus, children (and their guardians and
attorneys) need not expect to lose all hope of recovery merely
because a court is applying the Massachusetts rule rather than the
Illinois rule.
Moreover, courts have not been silent on the standards
governing review of a child's conduct. Courts have uniformly held
that the plaintiff must have specific knowledge of the danger in
order to submit the question of contributory negligence to the jury,
and general knowledge or general competency has been deemed
insufficient as a matter of law. 47 This view is consistent with the
consider whether or not the infant plaintiff would have done what he did in this case had he the
ability to temper his impulsive action with the judgment and discretion which comes with age and
experience.").
345. See Holcomb v. Gilbraith, 513 S.W.2d 796,798 (Ark. 1974); Green v. DiFazio, 171 A.2d
411,414 (Conn. 1961); Me Cain v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 110 So. 2d 718, 722 (Fla. 1959);
Davis v. Bushnell, 465 P.2d 652, 654-55 (Idaho 1970); Mundy v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 755, 760 (Idaho
1962); Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 559 (Kan. 1990); Eckhardt v. Hanson,
264 N.W. 776, 778 (Minn. 1936); Jackson v. Butler, 155 S.W. 1071, 1081 (Mo. 1913); Quinby ex
reL Camardo v. New York States Rys., 159 N.E. 879, 881 (N.Y. 1928); PRossER & KEETON, supra
note 11, § 32, at 179; Contributory Negligence of Children, supra note 181, at 698 n.9; Keet, supra
note 181, at 399-400, 409.
346. Toetschinger v. Thnot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. 1977) (footnote omitted).
347. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 306 So. 2d 236, 250 (Ala. 1975); Jones v.
Strickland, 77 So. 562, 565 (Ala. 1917) ("The fact that an infant is shown to be bright, smart, and
industrious is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of want of discretion."); Idzi v. Hobbs, 186
So. 2d 20, 22, 23 (Fla. 1966); Hollowell v. Greenfield, 216 N.E.2d 537, 540, 542-43 (End. Ct. App.
1966); Cathey v. De Weese, 289 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Mo. 1956); Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs
St. Ry. Co., 37 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Neb. 1949); Bailey v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tern. Ct.
App. 1960); Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55, 59 (W. Va. 1991). But see Sullivan v. Boston Elevated
Ry. Co., 78 N.E. 382, 383 (Mass. 1906) (finding facts that 4 year, 3 month old was "'lively,...
active and energetic'" and "walked at a 'pretty lively' gait" before running into defendant's car were
sufficient to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury).
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research in child psychology. 348 So, for example, a child who has
been warned about staying away from a swimming pool may not
be chargeable with knowledge of the dangers of playing on an
ocean pier.
In addition, courts have held certain dangers are inherently
obvious to children of any age.3 49 Thus, even in jurisdictions
which recognize age-based presumptions of incapacity, courts have
applied other doctrines to deny recovery to young children whose
injuries were caused by obvious or common dangers. For example,
The same rule applies where a child has specific knowledge of a danger but is considered
generally incompetent. See, e.g., Capo v. L.A. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (La.
Ct. App. 1977) ("Plaintiff, to prove that [he] was a boy of less than average intelligence, adduced
evidence that [he] had been held back in school twice. His parents said they considered him to be
a slow learner. This falls far short of proving he was incapable of contributory negligence. The
evidence shows that he had considerable experience in driving a tractor;, he had been warned of tie
probable consequences of pulling over trees with a tractor and was aware that what he was doing was
dangerous.").
348. See supra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
349. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (M.D. Pa, 1992) (defendant not liable
for failing to make lighter childproof because "[it is part of normal upbringing that one learns in
childhood to cope with the danger posed by such useful everyday items [as a BIC lighter]");
Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 934, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484 (1976)
("Slingshots have been used as toys and weapons since Old Testament times.... [1] Is the potential
danger of a slingshot generally known? Ever since David slew Goliath young and old alike have
known that slingshots can be dangerous and deadly."); Holland v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 431 A.2d
597, 603 & n.9 (D.C. 1981) ("There are certain obvious conditions that trespassing children can be
expected to understand as a matter of law."); Dillman v. Mitchell, 99 A.2d 809, 811 (N.J. 1953)
("Most children of tender years have some grasp of any situation; the lurking dangers in some
situations are obvious to them. To say that there is a conclusive presumption on their part is to
enforce an iron-clad rule, which is contrary to fact."); Brannon v. Harmon, 355 P.2d 792, 794 (Wash.
1960) ("The inherent danger of fire cannot be doubted."); Stillwell v. Nation, 363 P.2d 916, 918
(Wyo. 1961) ("A child old enough to ride a bicycle knows the danger of riding against fences or
other objects. Not seeing such an object is a matter not related to age."); RESTATEmENT (SEcOND)
OF TORTS § 339 cmt.j (1965) ("There are many dangers, such as those of fire and water, or of falling
from a height, which under ordinary conditions may reasonably be expected to be fully understood
and appreciated by any child of an age to be allowed at large."); cf. Lones v. Detroit, Toledo and
Ironton R.R. Co., 398 F.2d 914, 925 (6th Cir. 1968) (Weick, C. J., dissenting) ("Generally spealng,
it may be assumed that a person of whatever age is able to appreciate the obvious risks incident to
any sport or activity in which he may able to engage with intelligence and proficiency and must act
accordingly. If a child is able to play baseball capably, he must know that there is danger of being
hit with ball or bat; if he is able to engage proficiently in the game of football, he must know that
in playing the game there will occur violent physical contacts which may result in injury to him; if
he is a proficient swimmer and diver, he must know of the danger of drowning and the danger of
harm incidental to the use of diving apparatus."). See generally Annotation, Comment Note-Age and
Mentality of Child as Affecting Application ofA ttractive Nuisance Doctrine, 16 A.L.R.3d 25 (1967);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 339 (1965).
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in Davis v. Goodrich,350 a California court of appeal held that
"the danger of falling is something that is deemed known and
realized by children from an early age."351 In Davis, a two-and-a-
half year old boy climbed on a thirty-foot-high roller coaster not in
use and was injured when he fell. The minor sued the owners of
the land under the attractive nuisance doctrine. On appeal, the court
commented that the risk of falling is sufficiently clear to a two-
and-a-half year old that ordinarily a jury should decide whether the
child actually appreciated the danger under the circumstances of the
case so as to bar recovery. 5 2 However, the court of appeal
affirmed a nonsuit in favor of the defendant landowner on the
ground there was no evidence the landowner knew or should have
known young children played upon or near the roller coaster.353
The analysis in Davis comports well with the view among child
psychologists who have found that children are socialized to avoid
dangers such as falling beginning in the early years of life.
354
That a particular danger is open and obvious may also absolve
a defendant of any duty of care toward a child. In Corcoran v.
Village of Libertyville,35 a two-year-old boy fell into a ditch and
suffered severe brain damage. The plaintiff brought suit against the
owner of the ditch and those who managed, maintained and
controlled the ditch under the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. The
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff had no right to
recovery and held that an owner of land who is aware that children
frequent his property has no duty to protect children against
obvious or common dangers.356
350. 171 Cal. App. 2d 92, 340 P.2d 48 (1959).
351. Id. at 97, 340 P.2d at 51.
352. Id.; see Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232, 237, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1960) ("the
danger of falling [is] something that is known and realized to all children from earliest infancy-).
353. Id.
354. See supra note 86.
355. 383 N.E.2d 177 (IL 1978).
356. Id. at 180 (holding that the duty to protect children from danger lies with parents, not with
those who own and control property). But see Garcia v. Sooigan, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 111-12, 338 P.2d
433, 435-36 (1959) (in dicta, the California Supreme Court suggests that a finding that a danger is
common is insufficient to defeat a minor plaintiff's recovery).
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More recently, in Mathews v. City of Cerritos,357 a California
court of appeal held summary judgment was proper where the child
plaintiff understood the dangerous nature of his conduct." 8 In
Mathews, an eight-year-old boy rode down a wet, grassy hill on his
bicycle, ran into a drainage ditch, and was thrown from his bicycle
into a wall. The minor sued the city, alleging that the park was in
an unreasonably dangerous condition. In his deposition, however,
the plaintiff admitted that he knew that riding down the hill was
dangerous.359 On this evidence, the trial court granted the city's
motion for summary judgment and the court of appeal affirmed.
The Mathews court held that "the danger of riding a bicycle down
a very steep, wet, grassy hill is obvious from the appearance of the
property itself, even to children exercising a lower standard of due
care.... Even children instinctively recognize steepness of a hill
and slipperiness of wet grass."3"
Davis, Corcoran, and Mathews suggest that young children may
be denied recovery in situations where the minor plaintiff's injuries
are caused by obvious or common dangers. The reasoning is that
young children understand very basic rules of safety beginning at
an early age.3 6' This view squares well with modem theory and
research in child psychology.362 In appropriate cases, plaintiffs
and defendants may also appeal to these decisions to persuade a
court to submit the question of a child's primary or comparative
negligence to the jury.
Ultimately, if the trial court is satisfied that the defendant has
presented substantial evidence from which a reasonable person
could infer the child appreciated the injury-causing danger or that
the evidence regarding the child's capacity for negligence is
conflicting, the case should be submitted to a jury, which will then
357. 2 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1992).
358. Id. at 1383, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
359. Id. ("Q. Did you know that [riding down the hill] was dangerous or that it was a pretty
dangerous thing to do? ... A. Yeah. By looking at it, it looked dangerous. But I thought I could
make it. But I didn't.").
360. Id. at 1385, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
361. Davis, 171 Cal. App. 2d at 97, 340 P.2d at 51; Corcoran, 383 N.E.2d at 180; Mathews,
2 Cal. App. 4th at 1385, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
362. See supra note 86.
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apply the subjective standard of care. The jury should reduce the
plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the percentage fault attributed
to the minor. Conversely, if the trial court determines that the only
inference that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence is that
the child was wholly incapable of appreciating the risk of injury,
the child should be declared incapable of comparative negligence
as a matter of law.3 63 Absent a showing of incapacity on the part
of the plaintiff, the case should be submitted to the jury.3" All
of the factors relevant to the determination of comparative
negligence should apply with equal force to children charged with
primary negligence and with assumption of the risk.365
363. See, e.g., Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d 872, 877 (Haw. 1963) (absent a conflict in the
evidence regarding a child's capacity for negligence, question of contributory negligence should be
determined as a matter of law); GRYC v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727,743 (Minn. 1980)
(holding 4 year, 101/2 month old not guilty of comparative negligence as a matter of law because the
minor "was incapable of appreciating the risk[ ] ... that her pajamas would ignite immediately and
burn rapidly when they came into contact with the electric burner"); Toetschinger v. Thnot, 250
N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. 1977) ("The trial judge, who has the opportunity of observing the situation
firsthand, can direct that the child involved, because of tender years, inexperience, or the subtleties
of the danger to be apprehended, cannot be held to be contributorily negligent under the
circumstances of the given case.-).
364. See Welch v. Gardner, 187 Cal. App. 2d 104, 112-13, 9 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457-58 (1960);
Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637,643,301 P.2d 440,443 (1956); Baugh v. Beatty, 91 Cal. App.
2d 786,792-93, 205 P.2d 671, 675-76 (1949); Galloway v. McDonalds Restaurants of Nevada, 728
P.2d 826,828-29 & n.2 (Nev. 1986); Quillian v. Mathews, 467 P.2d 111, 113 (Nev. 1970); Shulman,
supra note 12, at 622; see also White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d 234, 237 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(absent testimony regarding the child's capacity or incapacity for negligent conduct, court assumed
7 year, 11 month, 13 day old child "was one of normal intelligence and experience for his age").
365. See Greene v. Watts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106-07, 26 Cal. Rptr. 334, 336-37 (1962)
(extending rationale in contributory negligence cases involving minors to assumption of the risk);
Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 652, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508 (1961); Ellis v. D'Angelo,
116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 314-15, 253 P.2d 675, 677-78 (1953); Bennett v. Gitzen, 484 P.2d 811, 812-
13 (Colo. Ct. App. 197.) (extending rationale in contributory negligence cases involving minors to
assumption ofthe risk); Smith v. Sapienza, 496 N.Y.S.2d 538,540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (extending
rationale in contributory negligence cases involving minors to assumption of the risk); Dunn v. Teti,
421 A.2d 782, 78.,-85 (Pa. 1980) (rejecting contention that minor defendants should be treated
differently from minor plaintiffs; upholding presumption of incapacity applies to minor defendants);
Bohlen, supra note 261, at 31 ("If our law recognizes infants... as incapable of exercising that care
for their own protection which is required of normal persons as a condition to their right to redress
for injuries caused by the wrongful act of others. ... it would be inconsistent and arbitrary to
penalize them by requiring them to compensate others whom they injure by conduct which, . . . is,
by reason of their incapacity, innocent in them."); Note, A Proposal for a Modified Standard of Care
for the Infant Engaged in an Adult Activity, 42 IND. LJ. 405, 406 n.3 (1966) (cases and
commentaries cited therein).
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CONCLUSION
Modem theory and research in child psychology sheds new
light on the appropriate standard of care that the law should require
of children charged with negligence. At minimum, the findings
question the central reason behind immunizing a class of young
children from taking responsibility for their actions. Child
psychologists suggest that the capacity to foresee the consequences
of action and to regulate behavior depends upon the child's
familiarity with the situation. Children also vary widely in this
capacity. The position advanced by the Massachusetts rule is
consistent with the research in child psychology and is the rule that
should be followed. The findings in child psychology also
undermine the law and economics prediction that caregivers will
refrain from socializing their child about safety and friendly
interpersonal contact in order to reduce the child's liability
exposure. The judicial economy argument is also severely
weakened because modem research in child psychology suggests
that children of almost any age can foresee the consequences of
their actions and regulate their behavior in safety-conscious ways.
Children of tender years should be protected from unreasonable
liability standards. A "bright line" age rule, however, is not
necessary to achieve this objective. The inherent flexibility of a
subjective standard of care dictates that a minor cannot be liable
for negligence absent sufficient evidence to support the charge.
3 66
Thus, the subjective standard of care offers young children
adequate protection against legal standards based on unrealistic
expectations.367
366. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 12, at 622-25.
367. See, e.g., Ballard v. Polly, 387 F. Supp. 895, 901 (D. D. C. 1975) (endorsing the
Massachusetts rule and holding "[w]hile it is undisputed that the deceased child ran impulsively into
the street, the evidence also shows that the child had never before negotiated traffic by himself. In
the past he had always been escorted to and from school by his mother or his 3 eldest siblings, and
had never been allowed to play in the street. It was apparent that, at the time of the accident, he
became bewildered and frightened and, in an attempt to hurry back to school, had dashed into traffic.
Such conduct was not unusual for a 5-year-old child suddenly alone and confronted for the first time
with the task of crossing a busy street."; affirmed jury's conclusion that a 5-year, 10-month-old was
not contributorily negligent); Cummings v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 258, 263, 363 P.2d
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So, should a jury be allowed to decide if Kathy and Allison are
responsible for their actions? Research in child psychology dictates
that a jury should. Courts that endorse the inflexible Illinois rule
must eventually re-examine the reasoning behind establishing an
age below which children are deemed incapable of negligence.
They should reject "any Procrustean rule that, merely because a
child has not reached some specified age, he or she is incapable of
contributory negligence no matter what the situation, and no matter
what the experience or capabilities of the child.'3 68 The model of
child development presented here provides courts with sufficient
authority to challenge an age-based conclusive presumption rule for
young children. Contrary to the inflexible rule followed today in
almost half of the states, the alternative approach proposed here
would produce results more closely tied to the facts of each case
rather than the child's attaining a "magical" minimum age.
900, 903, 14 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1961) ('Children are judged by a special subjective standard and
not by the objective standard [imposed on adults].... The presumption of negligence or negligence
per se ... takes that protection away from the child. The per se negligence instruction ... when
applied to children, is totally inconsistent with the body of law that has grown up to protect
children.'); Fratzke v. Meyer, 398 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) ("Nothing in [the
decision to abandon all presumptions of incapacity based on age] changes the fact that a child...
may suddenly and without care move into a place of danger... .'); White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d
234, 236-37 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting Illinois rule for the more flexible Massachusetts rule and
holding that "it was not unreasonable for a normal [7-year, 11-month old] child ... to fail to
anticipate the possibility that a motorcycle operator would maneuver his vehicle in such a reckless
and careless manner in an area where he had no right to be... ."; reversed judgment in favor of
defendant and entered judgment in favor of minor plaintiff).
368. Galloway v. McDonalds Restaurants of Nevada, 728 P.2d 826, 829 (Nev. 1986).
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APPENDIX A
THE VIEW AMONG AMERICAN JURISDICnONS
ALABAMA
Alabama courts have applied a three-tiered system of presumptions
and consider children under the age of seven incapable of
exercising due care for their own safety.36 9 Minors between the
ages of seven and fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable of
negligence.37 In order to rebut this presumption of incapacity, a
defendant must present a "scintilla of evidence" that the child
"possesses that discretion, intelligence, and sensitivity to danger
which the ordinary child, who he is 14 years of age,
possesses."
3 7 '
369. See Jones v. Strickland, 77 So. 562, 565 (Ala. 1917) (dicta; affirmed judgment for I 1-
year-old and rejected defendant's assertion that minor's violation of ordinance barred recovery);
accord Proctor v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (22 month old not capable
of negligence; no evidence of contributory negligence; court affirmed judgment for defendant on
ground evidence insufficient to support a charge of negligence).
370. See Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So. 2d 135, 138 (Ala. 1989) (10-year-old; reversible error for
trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant; fact that plaintiffwas excellent swimmer
did not establish minor understood risk as a matter of law; plaintiff's "mental ability did not seem
to match her athletic ability").
371. King v. South, 352 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Ala. 1977) (10-year-old; reversible error for trial
court to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury where only evidence of capacity
consisted of statements by plaintiff's sister that she "'imagined' [plaintiff] did the 'things that a
normal ten year old did'" and plaintiffs father that "his son was a 'normal boy'"); accord Smith v.
Bradford, 475 So. 2d 526, 529 (Ala. 1985) (13 year, 71h month old; evidence that minor had "built
his bicycle from scratch, collecting the parts and assembling them himself" and "rode his bike to
school on the four-lane highway" on which he was killed constituted a "scintilla of evidence that
[plaintiff] possessed the discretion, intelligence, and sensitivity to danger of an ordinary 14-year-old");
Senn v. Craig, 474 So. 2d 698, 699-700 (Ala. 1985) (10-year-old; judgment for defendant affirmed
where "[tihere was some evidence in the record establishing the inference that [plaintiff's] capacity
was that of an average or typical 14-year-old child"); McWhorter v. Clark, 342 So. 2d 903,905 (Ala.
1977) (8-year-old; trial court erred in submitting question of contributory negligence to jury where
the "evidence completely failed to address the maturity and sensibility of the deceased child");
Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 306 So. 2d 236, 250 (Ala. 1975) (10-year-old; proper for trial court
to refuse to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury on ground that defendant did not
present sufficient evidence to rebut presumption of incapacity; only evidence proffered by defendant
was that plaintiff was "'well above average' or in the 'bright average range' on an 'IQ' test"; "'[t]ho
fact that an infant is shown to be bright, smart, and industrious is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of want of discretion.").
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ALASKA
There is a rebuttable presumption that children under the age of
seven are incapable of negligence.372
ARIZONA
Children of various ages have been held conclusively incapable of
negligence.373 However, the defense of contributory negligence
was not raised in any of these cases, therefore precluding those
courts from instructing the jury on a theory with no evidentiary
support.3 4 The state supreme court has held that the evidence
was insufficient to support a charge of contributory negligence
against a six-year-old boy.3 75 The court explained that "not only
the age of the child but his individual capacity and experience are
to be considered by the jury. 376
372. See Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657,659-60,665 (Alaska 1964) (6-year-old; in cases
involving minors charged with negligence, "there are two issues to be decided: (1) Whether the child
has the capacity to be contributorily negligent, and (2) whether he was in fact contributorily
negligent"; evidence sufficient to support the inference that child had the capacity for negligence
where plaintiff "knew the danger from automobiles and had been warned by his parents to watch out
for vehicles and not to play in streets.").
373. See Vigue v. Noyes, 550 P.2d 234, 236 n.l (Ariz. 1976) (4th-year-old); Esquivel v.
Nancarrow, 450 P.2d 399, 401, 402 (Ariz. 1969) (31h-year-old); Beliak v. Plants, 326 P.2d 36, 39
(Ariz. 1958) (51t-year-old); Womack v. Preach, 165 P.2d 657, 658-60 (Ariz. 1946) (4t/2-year-old);
Nagle v. Conger, 456 P.2d 411, 414 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (41 -year-old).
374. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Quinet, 369 P.2d 267,270 (Ariz. 1962) ("prejudicial error to give an
instruction where there was no evidence to support the instruction").
375. Id. at 270.
376. Id. (emphasis added); accord Ruiz v. Falkner, 470 P.2d 500, 503 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970)
(8 h-year-old). Similarly, in Luedtke v. Arizona Family Restaurants of Tucson, a court of appeal
rejected the plaintiff's contention that, by virtue of his young age (6-year-old), he was absolved of
all responsibility to act with due care. 763 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). The court found
sufficient evidence to support a charge of contributory negligence: "there is evidence he looked both
ways prior to going out into the street. The fact remains that there was an automobile to be seen if
he had exercised a proper lookout." Id. The Luedtke court reasoned:
The fact that the deceased was only six years old at the time of the accident does not, as
a matter of law, foreclose the possibility that he was contributorily negligent. The
decedent's young age only means that his conduct is to be judged according to that of a
reasonable child of similar age, intelligence and experience under the circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ARIK-ANSAS
Courts have held some young children incapable of negligence.3"
Other courts have held that the question of a child's negligence is
for jury determination.378
CALIFOiRN
Some courts of appeal have held that children under the age of five
are conclusively presumed incapable of negligence.379 However,
377. See Wadsworth v. Gathright, 330 S.W.2d 94,97 & n.2 (Ark. 1960) (21'-year-old); Smith
v. Wittman, 300 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Ark. 1957) (child less than 4 years of age). However, in neither
case was the defense of contributory negligence raised. And in Wadsworth, the court relied on Miles
v. St. Louis L M. & S. R. Co., 119 S.W. 837 (Ark. 1909), for the proposition that a 21h-year-old is
conclusively presumed incapable of negligence. Wadsworth, 330 S.W.2d at 97 n.2. But, in Miles, the
child's contributory negligence was not an issue in the case because the defendant asserted the
plaintiff's mother was contributorily negligent. Miles, 119 S.W. at 839.
378. See Sams v. Pacific Indem. Co., 170 F. Supp. 909, 914-15, 917 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (10-
year-old; "It is true that the infancy of a minor plaintiff does not preclude the defense of contributory
negligence if the injured child failed to exercise that care ordinarily exercised by children of the same
age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances");
Holcomb v. Galbraith, 513 S.W.2d 796,797-98 (Ark. 1974) (14-year-old; "We need not here decide
at what age the issue becomes one of law for we are dealing with a girl between the ages of 14 and
15 .... It is also true... that some children develop faster than others, but we know of no reason
why jurors would be any less capable in determining those facts than a court."); Williams v. Gilbert,
395 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Ark. 1965) (7-year-old); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 242 S.W.2d 714, 716-
17 (Ark. 1951) (5 year, 4 month old; "'Even though a child of tender years may be warned of the
danger, it is still a question for the jury as to whether the child, considering its age and intelligence,
had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the danger after such warning.'"); Brotherton v. Walden,
161 S.W.2d 391,392 (Ark. 1942) (14-year-old); Garrison v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. Co., 123 S.W.
657, 660-61 (Ark. 1909) (16-year-old); cf Sherman v. Mountaire Poultry Co., 419 S.W.2d 619, 621
(Ark. 1967) (5-year-old; trial court properly refused plaintiff's request for a res ipsa loquitur
instruction and held: "While a claim for injuries to a small child arising from the use of a vehicle is
always complicated by the rule that a child of tender years can not be guilty of negligence, we can
not say that every accident such as that involved here is one which experience teaches us will arise
from a want of care on the part of the driver.")
379. See People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App. 4th 778, 785, 2 Cal. Rplr. 2d 416, 420 (1991) (2 year,
8 month old); Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 258 Cal. App. 2d 692,700-01, 66 Cal. Rptr. 44,49-50
(1968) (4-year-old); Bauman v. Beaujean, 244 Cal. App. 2d 384, 390, 55 Cal. Rptr. 55, 59 (1966)
(3'/2-year-old); Walker v. Fresno Distrib. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 840, 847-48, 44 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73
(1965) (approximately 3 years of age); Greene v. Watts,210 Cal. App. 2d 103, 105-07,26 Cal. Rptr.
334, 336-37 (1962) (3'12-year-old; extending 5-year "bright line" rule to assumption of risk cases);
Momingred v. Golden States Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 130, 137, 16 Cal. Rptr. 219,224 (1961) (4 year,
1 month, I day old); Untalan v. Glass, 190 Cal. App. 2d 474, 476, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1961) (3Il-
year-old); Christian v. Goodwin, 188 Cal. App. 2d 650, 655, 10 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (1961) (4 year,
7 month old); Morales v. Thompson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 405, 407-08, 340 P.2d 700, 701-02 (1959)
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the California Supreme Court and other courts of appeal have held
that the law does not fix a precise age below which children are
deemed incapable of negligence.38 The supreme court has also
held that, where the evidence regarding a child's capacity for




Children under the age of six are conclusively presumed incapable
of negligence. 382 The same rule applies to a child's capacity to
assume risks.83 The law regarding a child's capacity to commit
an intentional tort is not clear.384
(3 year, 11 months, 30 day old); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 316, 253 P.2d 675, 678
(1953) (4-year-old); see also CALIFoNA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CiviL No. 3.35, Use Note (7th ed.
1986).
380. See Brown v. Connolly, 62 Cal. 2d 391,394-95,398 P.2d 596,597-98,42 Cal. Rptr. 324,
325-26 (1965) (6-year-old); Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 361, 370, 191 P.2d 25, 29-30 (1949)
(5 year, 9 month old); Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal. App. 2d 217, 226, 148 P.2d 680, 685 (1944) (2 year,
8 month old); Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 299, 303-04, 44 P.2d 604, 606-07
(1935) (5-year-old); Charves v. Terminal Railways, 44 Cal. App. 221, 224, 186 P. 154, 155 (1919)
(5-year-old); Todd v. Orcutt, 42 Cal. App. 687, 690-91, 183 P. 963, 964-65 (1919) (9-year-old); Opelt
v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776,781, 183 P. 241,243 (1919) (101h-year-old). The California
Supreme Court has held:
The California rule is similar to the general pattern [of holding children liable where
there is evidence the child had the capacity for negligence] while avoiding the arbitrary
chronological age limits used in many states. In California the age of capacity is a factual
question to be determined by the mentality and maturity of the particular child."
Brown, 62 Cal. 2d at 395, 398 P.2d at 598, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (Mosk, J.) (emphasis added).
381. See Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 455, 334 P.2d 870, 873 (1959) (5 year, 9
month old); Jones v. Wray, 169 Cal. App. 2d 372, 375, 337 P.2d 226, 228 (1959) (5 year, 3 month
old).
382. Benallo v. Bare, 427 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Colo. 1967) (6-year-old; proper for trial court to
remove question of contributory negligence from jury).
383. See Bennett v. Gitzen, 484 P.2d 811, 812-13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (reversible error for
trial court to submit question whether 5 year, 9-month-old assumed risk to the jury).
384. Compare LeCoq v. Klemme, 476 P.2d 280, 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (reversible error
for trial court to hold 7-year-old child not liable for his intentional torts as a matter of law) with
Horton v. Reves, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (Colo. 1974) (in a case involving the alleged intentional tort by
a 4- and 3-year-old, the Colorado Supreme Court held: "we believe that the law of this state should
require, in the commission by the infant of the intentional act, an intent to make a harmful contact.
T.. Ihe infant need not intend the consequences which actually follow, but it must appreciate the
fact that the contact may be harmful"); see also id. (Kelley, J., concurring) ("In Benallo . . .we
adopted a rule that a child six years of age or younger is incapable of being contributorily negligent
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CONNECTICUT
Connecticut has no established age under which a child may be
absolved of liability for negligence." 5
DELAWARE




There is no precise age below which a child is considered
incapable of negligent conduct as a matter of law.3" 7
as a matter of law. If this is a reasonable presumption, then it seems to me that, at least, in the case
of infants three and four years of age, we should hold, as a matter of law, that they are incapable of
appreciating that their intentionally tortious contacts may be harmful.").
385. Colligan v. Reilly, 26" A.2d 231, 233 (Conn. 1942) (4 year, 4 month old; rejected
plaintiff's contention she was too young to be contributorily negligent); Marfyak v. New England
Transp. Co., 179 A. 9, 10-11 (Conn. 1935) (5'12-year-old; rejected defendant's contention that minor
should be judged on the basis of the minor's knowledge, capacity, and experience alone; court held
standard of care that compares child to other children of similar age, knowledge, capacity, and
experience under the same or similar circumstances was proper); Milledge v. Standard Mattress Co.,
238 A.2d 602, 603 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1968) (3 year, 10 month old; rejected plaintiffs contention that
she could not be charged with negligence because of her age; "In Connecticut there seems to be no
fixed cutoff age below which the court holds a child incapable of contributory negligence"; the court
endorsed a flexible rule that would require the trial judge "to determine whether to charge on the
issue, as a matter of law, or leave it to the jury as an issue of fact.").
In Simon v. Nelson, 170 A. 796 (Conn. 1934), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a 2-
year-old boy owed "no duty of due care." Id. at 797. Simon is not inconsistent with the rule
announced in Colligan and Milledge because in Simon the minor plaintiff could not possibly have
been contributorily negligent; he was a passenger in his father's car. Id. at 796.
386. See Beggs v. Wilson, 272 A.2d 713,714-15 (Del. 1970) (4'h-year-old; reversible error for
trial court to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury in the absence of evidence
suggesting the minor had the capacity for negligent conduct; "In order to submit to the jury the
question ofcontributory negligence, defendant must introduce sufficient evidence from which the jury
could conclude that the child possessed perceptive abilities, development and judgment far greater
than most children of his age"; under this rule, child cannot be held negligent per se).
387. National City Dev. v. McFerran, 55 A.2d 342,344-45 (D.C. 1947) (5-year-old; reversible
error for trial court to instruct jury that 5-year-olds are conclusively presumed incapable of
negligence); see also D.C. Transit Sys. v. Bates, 262 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (6-year-old);
United States v. Benson, 185 F.2d 995, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (5 year, 7 month old); Capital Transit
Co. v. Gamble, 160 F.2d 283, 284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (5-ycar-old).
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FLORIDA
Minors under the age of six are deemed incapable of negligence as
a matter of law.388
GEORGIA
The statutory standard of care required of minors is "such care as
the child's mental and physical capacities enable him to exercise
in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under
investigation."38 9 The statute does not specify an exact age of
discretion. In Ashbaugh v. Trotter,39" the supreme court squarely
addressed the question whether a minor six years and three months
of age was "'too young to be guilty of contributory
negligence.' ' 391 The supreme court rejected any bright line age
rule and disapproved of Red Top Cab Co. v. Cochran,392 wherein
it was held that a child under the age of six is conclusively
388. Swindell v. Hellkamp, 242 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1970) ("any ... child under six years
of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing contributory negligence. This holding
is compatible with the common law rule that a child under seven is conclusively presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime inasmuch as a child must learn individual safety at an early age but
social consciousness comes at a somewhat later age"; harmless error for trial court to instruct jury
that 4 year, 7 month old could be charged with contributory negligence where evidence is insufficient
to support finding of negligence on part of defendant driver); accord Metropolitan Dade County v.
Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36, 39-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (6 year, 3 month old; affirmed six year
"bright line" rule; evidence showed "'IThere wasn't anything the little girl was doing wrong[;]..
• she was where she was supposed to be.'")
The scope of Swindell was subsequently limited in Reed ex reL Lawrence v. Bowen, 503 So.
2d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), approved 512 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987), where a Florida court of
appeal held that a statute providing a dog owner immunity from liability if a plaintiff "mischievously
or carelessly provoke[s] or aggravate[s] [a] dog" was not subject to the common law rule that
children under six are presumptively incapable of negligence. Bowen, 503 So. 2d at 1267-69. The
court affirmed a judgment in favor of the dog owners and held there was sufficient evidence from
which a-jury could have concluded the child provoked or aggravated the dog. Id. at 1269. Interpreting
the statute, the court reasoned that "[a]lthough age is a factor to be considered, 'no definite number
of years has been set when the age of discretion begins.' Rather, each case is individually evaluated
considering 'the child's mental development, maturity, and extent to which the child exhibits
intelligent discretion.' Id. The court declined, however, to address the question whether their holding
effectively undermined the decision in Swindell. Id. at 1268 n.4.
389. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-5 (1982).
390. 226 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 1976).
391. Id. at 737.
392. 112 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. App. 1959).
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presumed incapable of contributory negligence.393 Instead, the
court relied on a series of decisions in other American jurisdictions
which endorsed the flexible Massachusetts rule:
We are of the opinion that the plain language of the Code section must
be applied and that the question of the infant's alleged negligence is one
for the jury in this case under the appropriate instructions from the trial
court. We think this is the correct rule in Georgia and also is the
widely-held view throughout the country.
3 94
Since Ashbaugh has been decided, three decisions have declared
young children incapable of negligence as a matter of law.395
However, none of these cases conflict with the rule in Ashbaugh
because the defense of contributory negligence was not raised in
either of the three cases. 396 Georgia courts have also rejected any
393. Id at 230-31.
394. Id.; accord Blackwell v. Cantrell, 315 S.E.2d 29, 31-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (6-year-old;
trial court properly refused plaintiff's proffered instruction that would have declared plaintiff
incapable of negligence because of his age); Davis v. Webb, 253 S.E.2d 820, 821-22 (Ga. Ct. App,
1979) (5 year, 10 month old; "Until the decision in ... Ashbaugh ... a child of the age of the
plaintiff was conclusively presumed to be too young to be guilty of contributory negligence.
However, in the Ashbaugh case the Supreme Court took into consideration code § 105-204 as to the
due care of a child of tender years and held that the principle language of the statute must be
applied"; trial court did not err in instructing jury on comparative negligence; under circumstances
of case, the "jury was authorized to consider that the child may have been negligent in some
manner").
395. See English v. 1st Augusta Ltd., 614 F. Supp. 1406, 1407 (D.C. Ga. 1985) (3-year-old);
Valdosta Hous. Auth. v. Finnessee, 287 S.E.2d 569, 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (21 -year-old); Reed
v. Dixon, 266 S.E.2d 286, 288, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (1-year-old).
396. Moreover, the reasoning in Ashbaugh casts doubt on the soundness of a line of cases
which held that children, because of their age alone, are conclusively presumed incapable of
negligence. See Crosby v. Yawn, 227 S.E.2d 93, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (2-year-old; reversible error
for trial court to instruct jury that "there [is] no presumption of law that the plaintiff did or did not
exercise due care, or that plaintiff did or did not have sufficient capacity to know the danger and to
observe due care for his own protection"; rule announced in Crawford, that 41h-year-olds are
presumed incapable of negligence, "must be applied to a child of two years."); Guthrie v. Boose, 213
S.E.2d 924, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (4-year-old; affirned judgment for defendant; defense of
contributory negligence not raised); Harris v. Hardman, 212 S.E.2d 883, 885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (2-
year-old; affirmed judgment for plaintiff; defense of contributory negligence not raised); Teppenpaw
v. Blaylock, 191 S.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (4-year-old; imputed negligence of
babysitter to child therefore barring recovery); Mitchell v. Cox, 190 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972) (less than 3 years old; trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment;
defense of contributory negligence not raised); Harris v. Combs, 101 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Ga. Ct. App.
1957) (7-year-old; proper for trial court to refuse defendant's motion for directed verdict; affirmed
judgment for plaintiff); Christian v. Smith, 51 S.E.2d 857, 859-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (5-year-old;
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rule which establishes a rebuttable presumption that children
between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
negligence. 97 Each case is to be decided on the particular child's
knowledge, experience, and capacity as well as the circumstances
of the case. 98
HAWAII
If the facts regarding a child's capacity for negligence are in
conflict, the issue of contributory negligence should be submitted
to the jury.3 99
affirmed judgment for plaintiffs; plaintiff could not have been negligent because he was "ignorant
of the approach of the truck" which killed him); Riggs v. Watson, 47 S.E.2d 900, 904-06 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1948) (5 year, 2 month, 25 day old; reversible error for trial court to submit question of child's
contributory negligence to the jury); Anthony v. Dutton, 36 S.E.2d 836, 837-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946)
(4 year, 3 month, 2 day old; affirmed judgment for plaintiff); Locke v. Ford, 187 S.E. 715, 716 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1936) (4'h-year-old; affirmed judgment for plaintiffs; defense of contributory negligence
not raised); City Ice Delivery Co. v. Turley, 160 S.E. 517, 520 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931) (4 year, 20 day
old; affirmed judgment for plaintiff); Williams v. Jones, 106 S.E. 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921) (4-year-
old; affined judgment for plaintiff; defense of contributory negligence not raised); City of Atlanta
v. Whitley, 101 S.E. 2, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1919) (2h2-year-old; affirmed judgment for plaintiff; plaintiff
could not possibly have been contributorily negligent where sewer pipes "all of a sudden, and without
warning" fell over on plaintiff and struck his right hip); Crawford v. Southern Ry. Co., 33 S.E. 826,
828-29 (Ga. 1899) (41h-year-old; reversible error to sustain defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
complaint on ground evidence showed defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries).
397. See Cummings v. Grubb, 363 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Anderson v. Happ,
222 S.E.2d 607, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Brewer v. Gittings, 116 S.E.2d 500, 505-06 (Ga. Ct. App.
1960).
398. See Cummings, 363 S.E.2d at 170 (12-year-old; dicta); Anderson, 222 S.E.2d at 609 (11-
year-old; affirmed judgment for plaintiff and holding question of contributory negligence is for the
jury in cases involving minors under the age of 14); Brewer, 116 S.E.2d at 505-06 (7 year, 4 month
old; "there is no presumption that the child did or did not exercise due care or does or does not have
sufficient capacity to recognize danger or to observe due care').
399. See Grace v. Kumalaa, 386 P.2d 872, 877 (Haw. 1963) (6-year-old; rejected plaintiff's
contention that Hawaii should recognize the Illinois rule that children under seven are incapable of
negligence). The Grace court refused to extend their previous holding in Ellis v. Mutual Tel. Co.,
29 Haw. 604 (1927), that children between the ages of 5 and 6 are presumed incapable of negligence,
to cases involving children between the ages of 6 and 7. Id. at 623-24. However, Ellis is poor
authority for a conclusive presumption rule. There, a 5-year-old boy was injured when the car driven
by his mother collided with a truck. Id. at 605. The minor could not have been negligent under those
circumstances. Thus, the general rule announced in Grace should apply to children under the age of
six in the appropriate case. Cf. Sherry v. Asing, 531 P.2d 648, 661 (Haw. 1975) (noting that children
of the same age vary in their capacity for negligence).
1419
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
IDAHO
The question whether a child has been negligent is one of fact to
be determined by the jury.
400
ILLINOIS
Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.4"1 There is a rebuttable presumption that
minors between seven and fourteen are incapable of committing
negligent acts.40 2  In Diederich v. Walters,0 3  the Illinois
400. See Mundy v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 755,757-60 (Idaho 1962) (4 year, 11 month, 13 day old;
trial court properly submitted question of contributory negligence to the jury where the evidence
showed child "had been warned by her parents of the danger involved in crossing streets; and had
been observed exercising caution in so doing; that she with her sister and brother had walked to and
from school ... several times prior to the accident; and that she had been warned by her teacher at
Bible school, the morning of the accident, not to go into the street"). Age alone is not the decisive
factor in the determination whether a child has been negligent. Id.; accord Davis v. Bushnell, 465
P.2d 652, 654-55 (Idaho 1970) (8 year, 10 month old; trial court properly refused to hold plaintiff
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating a statute; question was properly left to the
jury); Crane v. Banner, 455 P.2d 313, 317 (Idaho,1969) (8-year-old; reversible error for trial court
to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant; "Because [knowledge, experience, and discretion]
vary so greatly among children and because children are naturally unpredictable and impulsive, it is
especially difficult to judge their conduct as a matter of law. Instead, it is preferable to submit the
issue of their conduct to a jury.").
401. See Mort v. Walter, 457 N.E.2d 18, 20-21 (Ill. 1983) (4-year-old; defendant did not
dispute plaintiff's assertion of incapacity); Duffy v. Cortesi, 119 N.E.2d 241,244 (IIl. 1954) (5-year-
old; issue of whether child was contributorily negligent was not in the case; reversible error for trial
court to give instruction that negligence of grandmother could be imputed to child to bar recovery);
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E. 997, 1003 (11. 1902) (between 5 and 6; proper for trial court
to instruct jury that minor was incapable of negligence; "there was no evidence tending to show that
the [plaintiff] was a boy of sufficient intelligence or capacity to exercise any care for his own
safety"); Turner v. Seyfert, 194 N.E.2d 529,533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (6-year-old; defendant presented
no evidence suggesting the minor was contributorily negligent; reversed judgment in favor of
defendant on ground that evidence was insufficient to support verdict).
402. See Diederich v. Walters, 357 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (01. 1976); Strasma v. Lemke, 250
N.E.2d 305, 308 (1l. App. Ct. 1969) (7 year, 10 month old; "failure of a child of such years to look
before crossing a street will not bar recovery as a matter of law"); Kronenberger v. Husky, 231
N.E.2d 385, 386-87 (Il. 1967) (10-year-old; reversible error for court of appeal to apply 13 year
bright line in criminal law to civil suit for damages; jury was properly instructed as to standard of
care required of 10-year-olds; affirmed jury verdict in favor of defendant); Piechalak v. Liberty
Trucking Co., 208 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (9-year-old; questioning of plaintiff, her
mother, and sister to rebut presumption of incapacity not improper because questions elicited
testimony regarding plaintiff's mental capacity and experience in crossing streets); see also Toney
v. Marzariegos, 519 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (5-year-old; rejecting defendants
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Supreme Court exhaustively discussed the operation of the
rebuttable presumption rule for minors between the ages of seven
and fourteen.4 4 The court held that, where sufficient evidence is
presented to rebut the presumption of incapacity, the jury is not
instructed that a rebuttable presumption exists. 415 "[I]n the case
of a child above the age of 14 years the same rule shall be applied
to him... as is applied to adults, his intelligence and experience
being considered.,
416
contention that principles of comparative fault obviate the need for a seven year bright line age rule;
"we will not disturb a rule that our Supreme Court has so recently affirmed [in Mort]").
403. 357 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 1976).
404. Id at 1130-32.
405. Id. The court reasoned:
[A] rebuttable presumption may create a prima facie case as to the particular issue in
question and thus has the practical effect of requiring the party against whom it operates
to come forward with evidence to meet the presumption. However, once evidence
opposing the presumption comes into the case, the presumption ceases to operate, and the
issue is determined on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial as if no presumption had
ever existed.... [1] However, where there is an absence of evidence to the contrary, the
prima facie case created under the presumption will support a finding.
Id. at 1130-32 (original emphasis); see, e.g., Friedman v. Park Dist. of Highland Park, 502 N.E.2d
826, 832-34, 836-37 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (8-year-old denied recovery for injuries caused from crash
on sled; presumption of incapacity ceased to operate because the defendant introduced evidence the
"plaintiff was familiar with the hill, having sledded on it on previous occasions and several times on
the day of the injury prior to striking the post. Plaintiff testified she knew the fence, that it was
clearly visible, and she made no attempt to avoid it"); Sramek v. Logan, 344 N.E.2d 47, 49-50 (II.
App. CL 1976) (8-year-old; affirmed judgment for defendant; rejected plaintiff's assertion that
defendant failed to rebut presumption of incapacity where plaintiff testified she knew to look both
ways before crossing the street where she was injured; "it is difficult to believe that [plaintiff] could
have looked before crossing and not have seen the [defendant's] vehicle approaching"); see also
Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 383 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ill. 1978) (2-year-old denied recovery on
the ground land owners are "not required to protect against the ever-present possibility that children
will injure themselves on obvious or common conditions").
406. Maskaliunas v. Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 149 N.E. 23, 26 (Ill. 1925) (dicta); see Dickeson
v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Term R.R. Co., 245 N.E.2d 762, 764-65 (Ill. 1969) (14 year, 4 day old;
rejected defendant's contention the minor should be charged with an adult standard of care and held
contributorily negligent as a matter of law; question of minor's contributory negligence properly
submitted to jury where evidence showed minor was "less than average intelligence.").
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INDIANA
Minors under the age of seven cannot be negligent." 7 In Bottorff
v. South Const. Co., 408 the Indiana Supreme Court, in dicta,
established the three-tiered system of presumptions characteristic
of the "Illinois Rule., 40 9 However, no Indiana court has ever
applied the rule announced in Bottorff.41
IOWA
The Supreme Court of Iowa abandoned all presumptions of
incapacity based on chronological age for the more flexible
Massachusetts rule.4 n
407. Mann v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 533,535-36 (7th Cir. 1971) (6-year-old; rejected defendant's
argument that the seven year rule should be abandoned; "Defendant makes several plausible, even
persuasive, arguments for a more flexible rule on the contributory negligence of minors. But such
arguments should be addressed to the Indiana courts; the federal district court had no choice but to
apply the well-established Indiana law"); Eschevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F.2d 885, 887,
888-89, 892 (7th Cir. 1968) (8-year-old with mental age of 51/2 held non suijuris-"[l]acking legal
capacity to act for oneself-and therefore recovery not barred); Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172,
1176 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (dicta); Clayton v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 376 N.E.2d 524, 526 &
n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (4-year-old); Wozniczka v. McKean, 247 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. Ct. App.
1969) ("It is undisputed in this case that the plaintiff was a five year old child, non sui juris.").
408. 110 N.E. 977 (Ind. 1916).
409. Id. at 978.
410. Smith,421 N.E.2d at 1177 n.5; see also Kurowsky v. Deutsch, 533 N.E.2d 1210,1213-14
(Ind. 1989) (refusing to apply Bottorff to 9-year-old defendant); Plotzld v. Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana, 92 N.E.2d 632, 64 4-45 (Ind. 1950) (Enmnert, J., dissenting) (Bottorff not applicable to 1 -
year-old); Baller By Bailer v. Corle, 490 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (did not apply
rebuttable presumption rule to 7-year-old); Niegos v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 116 N.E.2d 550,
554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1954) (not applying Bottorff to 10-year-old); cf. Dibortolo v. Metro Sch. Dist. of
Washington, 440 N.E.2d 506,511-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (reversible error for trial court to hold 11-
year-old minor contributorily negligent as a matter of law where plaintiff had no experience with
injury-causing conduct).
411. See Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869, 872 n.1 & 873 (Iowa 1982) (7-year-old; "In
applying the standard of care ... the jury's first inquiry is a subjective one: What was the capacity
of this particular child-given what the evidence shows about his age, intelligence and experience--to
perceive and avoid the particular risk involved in this case? Once this has been determined, the focus
becomes objective: How would a reasonable child of like capacity have acted under similar
circumstances? The particular child in question can be found negligent only if his actions fall short
of what may reasonably be expected of children of similar capacity."); accord Goetzman v. Wichem,
327 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 1982); Fratzke v. Meyer, 398 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Iowa Ct. App.
1986).
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KANSAS
There is no precise age below which a child is deemed incapable
of negligence.4"2
KENTUCKY
Children under the age of seven are considered incapable of
negligent conduct as a matter of law.4 13 In Williamson v.
Garland,414 a Kentucky court of appeal refused to follow a line
of cases which established a rebuttable presumption that children
between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
negligence.41 5 Arguably, Williamson's view that presumptions of
incapacity are fictitious because children between the ages of seven
412. Honeycutt ex reL Phillips v. Wichita, 796 P.2d 549,559 (Kan. 1990) (6 year, 4 month old;
reversible error for lower court to hold that child was incapable of negligence as a matter of law
because of child's age).
413. Tupman's Adm'r v. Schmidt, 254 N.W. 199, 201 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923) (6 year, I month,
10 day old; reversed judgment of directed verdict in favor of defendants); accord Dowell v. Bivens,
586 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (in dicta, court states that 5-year-old plaintiff was
incapable of negligence; defense of contributory negligence not asserted; affirmed judgment for
defendant); Goff v. Horsley, 439 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) ("7-plus years of age"; affirmed
judgment for defendant because "child had past his seventh birthday" and therefore was not protected
by the presumption of incapacity); Brown v. Wilson, 401 S.W.2d 77,79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (4-year-
old incapable of negligence; no evidence of contributory negligence; reversed judgment for
defendant); Frederick v. Hall, 375 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (21/2-year-old incapable of
contributory negligence; no evidence of contributory negligence; reversed judgment in favor of
defendant); Ward v. Music, 257 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Ky. CL App. 1953) (dicta); Lehman v. Patterson,
182 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (6-year-old; court correctly refused to instruct jury that
plaintiff could be negligent); Dixon v. Stringer, 126 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) (dicta).
414. 402 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966).
415. Id. at 81-82; see Ward, 257 S.W.2d at 518; Dixon, 126 S.W.2d at 450; Tupman's Adm'r,
254 S.W. at 201; Sutton Const. Co. v. Lemaster's Adm'r, 3 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928).
The court reasoned that "[i]t is quite obvious that the normal seven year old child should not be
charged with the same degree of care to be expected of the normal 14 year old child, so the blanket
rule of rebuttable presumption as to all children encompassed within these age limits lacks basis in
reason." Williamson, 402 S.W.2d at 82. Thus, "when an issue is presented respecting the contributory
negligence of a minor plaintiff seven or more years of age.., the jury shall be instructed that the
minor is charged with the duty to exercise care for his own safety, commensurate with that degree
of care usually exercised by an ordinarily prudent minor of the same age, intelligence and experience
of the plaintiff." Id. The court noted Prosser's criticism of the "multiples of seven" system of
presumptions: "the great majority of courts have rejected such fixed and arbitrary rules of
delimitation." Id. at 82 n.1.
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and fourteen differ in knowledge, capacity, and experience should
also apply to children below the age of seven.416
LOUISIANA
In White v. Nicosia,417 a Louisiana appellate court held:
An absolute rule setting minimum (or maximum) ages for being capable
of negligence has largely been discarded.. . because it is illogical that
a child, such as the one in this case whose age is seven years, eleven
months and thirteen days, cannot be contributorily negligent under any
circumstances, but could be if the accident had occurred 17 days
later.
418
Other courts have held children of various ages incapable 'of
negligence.419 These decisions, however, can be harmonized with
White on the ground that no Louisiana court has been faced with
a case in which there was evidence suggesting the child had the
capacity to exercise due care.420
416. No Kentucky court has ever been faced with a case where there was substantial evidence
indicating a child under 7 had the capacity for and engaged in negligent conduct. This suggests that
the 7-year rule is vulnerable to attack in an appropriate case. Cf. Johnson v. Brey, 438 S.W.2d 535,
538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (erroneously relying on Williarmson in dicta for the proposition that a 6-year-
old is conclusively deemed incapable of negligence); Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Raines, 416
S.W.2d 719, 723 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (citing Williamson for the proposition that children under 7
cannot be negligent).
417. 351 So. 2d 234 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
418. Id. at 237 (court held that "it was not unreasonable for a normal child of [plaintiff's] age
to fail to anticipate the possibility that a motorcycle operator would maneuver his vehicle in such a
reckless and careless manner in an area where he had no right to be and in disregard of the rights
and expectations of pedestrians and other motorists.").
419. Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 507 So. 2d 809, 818, 820 (La. 1987) (3-year-old);
accord McFarland v. Indust. Helicopters, Inc., 502 So. 2d 593,598 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (2-year-old);
Babin v. Zurich Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 900, 902 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (3 h-year-old); Hernandez v.
Toney, 289 So. 2d 318, 320-21 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (between 5 and 6 years of age); Garner v.
Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 860, 862-63 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (almost 6 years
of age); Schexnayder v. Zurich Ins., 257 So. 2d 764, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (3-year-old); Pea v.
Smith, 224 So. 2d 37, 38 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (5-year-old); Cheramie v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 198 So.
2d 726, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (6-year-old); Jackson v. Jones, 69 So. 2d 729, 732-33 (La. 1953)
(7-year-old).
420. See, e.g., White, 351 So. 2d at 236 (rejecting plaintiffs contention Louisiana recognized
a 7-year bright line age rule and commenting that "[a] more accurate statement is that no Louisiana
court has ever found a seven-year old child to be contributorily negligent").
1424
1993 / The Standard Of Care Required Of Children
MAEM
The standard of care required of children is that care which a child
of similar age and intelligence would ordinarily exercise under the
same or similar circumstances.421 There can be no hard and fast
rule which sets the standard of care in every case.422 There are
two cases in which children have been held incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.2 3 In neither of these
cases, however, was the defense of contributory negligence
raised.424
MARYLAND
In Taylor v. Arminger,425 the Maryland Supreme Court explained
that children vary in their capacity for negligent conduct and
therefore, a rule which fixes a precise age at which a child is
deemed incapable of negligence as a matter of law should not be
adopted.426 This policy determination in Taylor may not be
421. Ross v. Russell, 48 A.2d 403,404,405 (Me. 1946) (8-year-old); accord Tenney v. Taylor,
392 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Me. 1978) ('nearly six'; rejected plaintiff's contention that because of her age
her damages should not be reduced in proportion to her fault; affirmed trial court's determination that
minor plaintiff was 30% at fault).
422. Id.
423. See Martin v. Atherton, 116 A.2d 629, 630-31 (Me. 1955) (2-year-old; mother and child
hit and injured when minor plaintiff was in mother's arms as mother crossed the street); Morgan v.
Aroostook Valley R. Co., 98 A. 628, 629 (Me. 1916) (less than 2 years old; "It seems to be conceded
that this child less than two years old, was not of sufficient age to exercise any care under any
circumstances. And we think it should be so declared as a matter of law.') (emphasis added). See
also Harrison v. Wells, 116 A.2d 134, 137 (Me. 1955) (3-year-old; affirmed directed verdict for
defendant where "[there was no evidence... to show what the child was doing when he was struck
by the truck, if in fact he came in contact with the truck, and nothing to show the actions of the
operator, from which a jury could decide whether there was care or negligence').
424. Martin, 116 A.2d at 630-31; Morgan, 98 A. at 629.
425. 358 A.2d 883 (Md. 1976).
426. Id at 888 (5 year, 8 day old; trial court erred in holding minor contributorily negligent
as a matter of law; issue should have been submitted to the jury); see also State v. Barly, 140 A.2d
173, 176-77 (Md. 1958) (5 year, 10-month-old; rejected Illinois rule and held children over the age
of five are capable of negligence).
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applied to all children, however.427 In addition, prior to Taylor,
Maryland courts held some children under five incapable of
negligence in the absence of sufficient evidence to support the
charge.428  Other courts have submitted the question of
contributory negligence to the jury in cases involving children
under the age of five.429
MASSACHUSEITrS
The question whether a child has been contributorily negligent is
one of fact where the evidence is sufficient to support the
charge.43 °  In Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.,43' the
427. At one point, the opinion suggests that the policy language only applies to children above
the age of five. Taylor, 358 A.2d at 889. However, in light of the court's extensive discussion of the
undesirability of fixing arbitrary ages of discretion, see id. at 887-89, it is not clear whether Taylor
should be applied only to cases involving children above the age of five.
428. See Miller v. Graff, 78 A.2d 220,224 (Md. 1951) (4-year-old; "The mere fact that a young
child, when frightened or bewildered, turns around in the street near one sidewalk and starts to come
back to the other sidewalk when called by the screams of a parent is not necessarily evidence of
negligence."); Mahan v. State, 191 A. 575, 580-81 (Md. 1937) (no evidence of contributory
negligence where 3-year-old child was walking with mother on the dirt shoulder of a road; there was
"no evidence legally sufficient to show that the child was guilty of any negligence contributing to
the accident"). These decisions have been erroneously interpreted to hold that all children under the
age of five are incapable of negligence. See Le Febvre v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 176, 178 & n.
3 (D. Md. 1959) (4'2-year-old who ran after ball and into the middle of a street "acted as a normal
41/2 year old boy would act"; "A prudent 4 year old boy would be an unattractive anomaly");
Mulligan v. Pruitt, 223 A.2d 574, 576, 579 (Md. 1966) (2 year, 9 month old; even though the
evidence regarding what the plaintiff was doing at the time of the accident was in conflict, court held
"there is no need to consider contributory negligence" because of the plaintiff's age); Palms v. Shell
Oil Co., 332 A.2d 300, 302-03, 304 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (18-month-old; no need to consider
the question of contributory negligence because of the plaintiff's age); cf. Richardson v. Scott, 194
A.2d 288, 290 (Md. 1963) (citing Miller for the proposition that "[b]oth parties agree [ ] that
contributory negligence [is] not involved in [the] case").
'thus, courts may hold that Taylor and Miller and Mahan represent two lines of authority that
are not inconsistent.
429. See State v. Washington B. & A. Elec. FL R. Co., 131 A. 822, 828-29 (Md. 1926)
(reversible error for trial court to hold 4 year, 2 month old contributorily negligent as a matter of law;
issue should have been submitted to jury); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. Carneal, 72 A. 771,775 (Md.
1909) (less than 3 years of age).
430. See Dennehy v. Jordan Marsh Co., 71 N.E.2d 758,760 (Mass. 1947) (4 year, 5 month old;
"While the plaintiff was 'too young to have much prudence,' [citations] he might 'have the capacity
to exercise care for his own safety in the familiar and lesser dangers of his own yard.'"); Minsk v.
Pitaro, 187 N.E. 224, 225 (Mass. 1933) (3 year, 8 month old; defendant requested instruction child
was too young to exercise due care); Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 78 N.E. 382, 383 (Mass.
1906) (4 year, month old); cf. Sughrue v. Bay State Ry., 119 N.E. 660, 661 (Mass. 1918) (21h-year-
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Massachusetts Supreme Court commented, in dicta, that "[t]here
doubtless is an age where the court can say as a matter of law that
a child cannot exercise any care under any circumstances."432
However, a rule which sets an arbitrary age of discretion without
regard to the child's age, knowledge, experience, and the
circumstances confronting the child has been rejected.433
old too young "to be capable of caring for herself"; defendant did not assert a defense of contributory
negligence, however).
431. 78 N.E. 382 (Mass. 1906).
432. Id. at 383.
433. Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 95 N.E. 876 (Mass. 1911). There, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that children under the age of fourteen ought to be
presumed incapable of negligence. The court reasoned:
There is some point in every life where these conditions are present in such degree as to
deprive the child of capacity to assume risk intelligently, or to be guilty of negligence
consciously. That point varies in different children for divers[e] reasons. There is no hard
and fast rule that at any particular age a minor is presumed to be able to comprehend
risks or to be capable of negligence.... [Tihe sounder doctrine seems to be that age is
an important though not decisive factor in determining capacity, and that the decision of
that question is not helped or hampered by any legal presumption.
Id. at 878 (emphasis added). The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, finding the minor did not have sufficient knowledge of
the injury-causing danger to bar his recovery. Id. The Berdos court reversed the trial court's granting
of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant and held that the question of contributory negligence
should have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 878-80. Cf. Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prod., Inc., 413
N.E.2d 767,770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) ("Toothpicks, like pencils, pins, needles, knives, razor blades,
nails, tools of most kinds, bottles and other objects made of glass, present obvious dangers to users,
but they are not unreasonably dangerous, in part because the very obviousness of the danger puts the
user on notice. It is part of normal upbringing that one learns in childhood to cope with the dangers
posed by such useful everyday items.").
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MICHIGAN
Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.434 The same rule applies to a child's
capacity to commit an intentional tort.435
MINNESOTA
A rule which conclusively establishes that all children under the
age of seven are incapable of negligence as a matter of law "does
not square with the way responsible people manage their affairs
and those of their families in Minnesota today.
436
MIississiPPi
Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.437 Minors between the ages of seven and
434. Baker v. Alt, 132 N.W.2d 614,619 (Mich. 1965) (noting that "[i]f an infant of [plaintiff's]
age (6 years, 10 I/2 months) can be guilty of contributory negligence, [plaintiff] is a classic case of
one who was so in fact.") (emphasis added); accord Robinson v. Russ, 226 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1975) (3-year-old; reversed judgment of directed verdict in favor of defendant on ground
"all reasonable men would not agree that the defendant's acts were prudent"); Bravo v. Chernick, 184
N.W.2d 357, 358 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (4-year-old; proper for trial court to refuse to allow
questioning "which tended to show contributory negligence on the part of [plaintiff]"); see also
DeCamp v. Fleckenstein, 181 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (7-year "bright line" rule refers
to chronological, not mental, age; 8-year-old with mentality of 5-year, 10-month-old therefore not
protected by presumption of incapacity).
435. See Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965).
436. Toetschingerv. Thmot, 250 N.W.2d 204,210 (Minn. 1977) (5 year, 8 month old); see also
GRYC v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (trial court properly declared
4-year-old incapable of comparative negligence where evidence showed that child could not have
appreciated the danger "that [plaintiff's] pajamas would ignite and immediately bum rapidly when
they came in contact with [an] electric burner"); Eckhardt v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776, 777 (Minn.
1936) (6 year, 6 day old; a seven year "bright line" age rule "is arbitrary and always open to the
objection that one day's difference in age should not be the dividing line as to whether a child is
capable of negligence or not").
437. Gault v. Tablada, 400 F. Supp. 136, 140 (S.D. Miss.), aft'd, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975)
(defendant conceded 6h-year-old was incapable even though the minor had been warned of the
danger of playing near the pool in which the minor drowned); Kopera v. Mosehella, 400 F. Supp.
131, 135 (S.D. Miss.), aftid, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975) (6-year-old incapable); Tidwell v. Ray,
208 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Miss. 1962) (defendant conceded 7-year-old was incapable of
contributory negligence); see also Agregaard v. Duncan, 173 So. 2d 416,418 (Miss. 1965) (without
discussion or citation to authority, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the 61/z-year-old could
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fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence.
438
Unless there is evidence of incapacity, children above the age of
fourteen are presumed capable of negligence and charged with the
same standard of care as competent adults. 43 9 Recently, however,
the Mississippi Supreme Court has limited this system of
presumptions.'
MISSOURI
Children between the ages of two and four have been held
incapable of negligent conduct under the circumstances of the
case.44' In Volz v. City of St. Louis,42 the supreme court,
without citing any Missouri authority, noted that "a boy six years
of age cannot be guilty of contributory negligence.";" this
not be contributorily negligent; affirmed judgment for defendant on ground evidence insufficient to
support charge defendant was negligent); Morris v. Boleware, 87 So. 2d 246, 248 (Miss. 1956) (8-
year-old presumed incapable of negligence).
438. See Johnson v. Howell, 56 So. 2d 491,492 (Miss. 1952) (8-year-old). The presumption
may be overcome by proof, in which event it becomes a question of fact for the jury, but such proof
must show the exceptional capacity of the child and his possession of the faculty of judgment in such
degree as removes him from the class of infants presumptively held incapable of exercising
discretion. Id.; accord Moak v. Black, 92 So. 2d 845, 852 (Miss. 1957) (9-year-old; no evidence the
plaintiff was "of exceptional capacity for his age").
439. See Moak, 92 So. 2d at 851 (dicta); Cochran v. Peeler, 47 So. 2d 806, 810 (Miss. 1950)
(14-year, 5-month-old).
440. In Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Miss. 1982), the court held that "anyone
operating any motor-propelled vehicle upon a public street or highway must follow the same 'rules
of the road' and exercise the same standard of care as adults." The court noted the inconsistency of
this holding with their prior decisions, and stated that "[fjuture cases involving contributory
negligence of children under fourteen years of age will be decided" in accordance with their holding
in Davis. Id. at 1067 & n.1.
441. See Price v. Bangert Bros. Rd. Builders, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 53,56 (Mo. 1973) (4-year-old
cannot be negligent "in the circumstances here"); Schmidt v. Allen, 303 S.W.2d 652,658 (Mo. 1957)
(4-year-old was holding mother's hand and was struck by automobile); Reynolds v. Kinyon, 222
S.W. 476,479 (Mo. 1920) (between 2 and 3 years of age; "It is admitted that the child was so young
as to be incapable of any act of negligence.") (emphasis added); Messer v. Gentry, 290 S.W. 1014,
1016 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927) (4-year-old could not have been contributorily negligent "under the facts
in this case"); Hillerbrand v. May Mercantile Co., 121 S.W. 326, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909) (4-year-
old; defense of contributory negligence not raised).
442. 32 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1930).
443. Id. at 74.
1429
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 24
passage, however, is dicta.4' In cases involving older children,
Missouri courts have declined, as a matter of public policy, to
recognize age as the only measure of a child's capacity for due
care."5 Arguably, this same policy should apply to young
children as well.
MONTANA
Minors below the age of seven are incapable of negligence.446
444. Id. at 74. The plaintiff, who was 11 years of age, tried to rescue his younger brother (6
years of age) after his brother fell through ice and was drowning. As he was reaching to help is
brother, the ice underneath the plaintiff broke and he fell into the water and drowned. Id. at 73. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the trial court granted the defendant's motion for new
trial. The plaintiff appealed and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "[t]he drowning
did not result from an unusual or hidden danger." Id. at 74. The court reasoned:
A warning [posted by the park] in regard to the condition of the ice would not have
imbued [the children] with greater knowledge than they had. The boys knew, or were
presumed to know, that if the ice broke they would fall into the water, and that in water
people drown.
Id. Volz is therefore not authority for a six-year "bright line" rule.
445. See United States v. Stoppleman, 266 F.2d 13, 18-20 (8th Cir. 1959) (11 year, 11 month
old; evidence insufficient to support contention the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law); Jackson v. Butler, 155 S.W. 1071, 1079, 1080 (Mo. 1913) (between 17 and 18 years of age;
"There is no fixed rule of law by which to gauge, or scale by which to nicely weigh, the acts of a
minor to determine if he is guilty of contributory negligence"; "[A child's] capacity, not his age, is
the criterion by which his responsibility and conduct should be measured."); Moeller v. United Rys.
Co., 147 S.W. 1009, 1012 (Mo. 1912) (12-year-old; "The court cannot specify the age to which a
child, when attained, shall be held as liable in such case as a person of full maturity, because there
are other facts to be taken into account-the peculiar circumstances of the particular case, the
knowledge and experience of the child in reference to those circumstances, and his capacity to
appreciate the danger"; reversed judgment that child was contributorily negligent as a matter of law;
question should have been submitted to the jury); Wilson v. White, 272 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964) (13 year, 51/2 month old; relying on Jackson and Moeller for the proposition that the law does
not fix an age of discretion and that age is not the only measure of a child's capacity for negligence;
rejecting defendant's contention that the minor appreciated danger and was therefore contributorily
negligent as a matter of law).
446. Burns v. Eminger, 261 P. 613, 615 (Mont. 1927) (6 year, 3 month old); see also Graham
v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263, 267-68 (Mont. 1967) (8 year, 6 month, 18 day old; affined 7 year
"bright line rule", but refused to adopt the 7-14 rebuttable presumption rule; the law with regard to
the standard of care required of minors between the ages of 7 and 14 is "in hopeless and irrecon-
cilable conflict"); accord Ranard v. O'Neil, 531 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Mont. 1975) (8-year-old).
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NEBRASKA
There can be no arbitrary rule which fixes an age below which
children are considered capable or incapable of understanding and
avoiding dangers." '
NEVADA
The Nevada Supreme court has held: "In our opinion it is not
advisable to establish a fixed and arbitrary rule.... We prefer to
treat the issue of contributory negligence of a child as a fact issue
447. Camerlinckv. Thomas, 312 N.W.2d 260, 267-69 (Neb. 1981); Armerv. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 37 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Neb. 1949) (11 year, 3 month old); accord Korbelik v.
Johnson, 227 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Neb. 1975) (5-year-old; "Even if a child is not capable of contributory
negligence, if such child's conduct can be considered the sole proximate cause of his injury, there
can be no recovery."); Bear v. Auguy, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (Neb. 1957) (14-year-old); Siedlik v.
Schneider, 241 N.W. 535, 536 (Neb. 1932) ("A child of tender years-and it must be conceded that
the [7-year-old] plaintiff was a child of tender years-is not chargeable with negligence or
contributory negligence. [Citations.] That does not mean, however, that the defendant was the insurer
of plaintiff's safety or that the defendant would be responsible for injuries received by the plaintiff
which were caused by the recklessness or carelessness of the plaintiff alone with which there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant.... In determining whether the defendant was negligent at
all the jury might well, and should, be told they could consider the acts and conduct of the plaintiff
considering his age, discretion and experience."). But see Wooley v. Kittle, 309 N.W.2d 805, 808
(Neb. 1981) (trial court properly cautioned jury that 6-year-old child was incapable of contributory
negligence).
In Adams v. Welliver, 51 N.W.2d 739,744-45 (Neb. 1952), the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the trial court properly submitted the question of a 9-year-old's contributory negligence to the
jury. In its reasoning the court rejected conclusive presumptions based on age and stated:
The cases determined by this court which hold that an infant of tender years is not
chargeable with contributory negligence appear to be cases where the infant is shown to
be 7 years old or less, and where the evidence discloses the infant did not possess
sufficient knowledge, discretion, and appreciation of the danger...
Id (emphasis added.) And in Camerlinek v. Thomas, the supreme court explained:
The more recent cases ... appear to uphold the rule that there is no arbitrary rule fixing
the time at which a child during his minority may be wholly capable or incapable of
understanding and avoiding dangers to be incountered [sic], and that whether or not
negligence may be attributed to a minor is usually a matter for the jury.... [$] It appears
that the rule advocated by the [minor] defendant in this case which attempts to fix a
minimum age below which a child is held incapable of negligence, is not the majority rule
in this country...
312 N.W.2d at 267-69. The court further held that the 6-year-old defendant had sufficient knowledge
of the dangers of thro,4ng things at other children to the extent that the question of his negligence
should have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 269.
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for the jury . . .unless reasonable minds could come to but one
conclusion from the evidence."
448
NEW HAMPSHmRE
"The adoption of an exact age for any presumption either absolute
or rebuttable is neither required nor desirable.... "449
NEW JERSEY
In Dillman v. Mitchell,40 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a child's age is not determinate of capacity, thereby refusing
to establish a "bright line" age rule.451 The New Jersey Supreme
448. Quillian v. Mathews, 467 P.2d 111, 113 (Nev. 1970) (6-year-old). The Quillian court
endorsed a bifurcated test which required that the trial court:
[D]ecide initially whether reasonable minds could believe that the particular child has the
capacity to exercise that degree of care expected of children of the same age, experience
and intelligence in similar circumstances. Should the court determine that the child has
such capacity, the jury is then to decide whether such care was exercised in the particular
case. Should the court rule otherwise, then, ofcourse, the issue of contributory fault would
not be submitted for jury resolution.
Id. Five years after Quillan was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Quillian did
not apply to a 4-year, 5-month, 26-day old minor who was struck by a chain suspended four feet off
the ground while running to his mother. Clark v. Circus-Circus, Inc., 525 F.2d 1328, 1329 (9th Cir.
1975). In a concurring opinion, however, one justice noted that the court was bound by Nevada law
and "that if and when the Nevada court gets around to deciding the precise question presented in this
case, it will decide it differently than this court has done." Id. at 1333 (Hill, J., concurring); see also
id. ("the rule of law which the California courts have adopted, that a child under 5 years of age
cannot as a matter of law be guilty of contributory negligence, is a just and proper rule").
Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court recently reiterated its view in Quillian in Galloway v.
McDonalds Restaurants of Nevada, and applied the Quillian rule to a 31h-year-old. 723 P.2d 826,
828-29 (Nev. 1986). The court held, "we have expressly repudiated any Procrustean rule that, merely
because a child has not reached some specified age, he or she is incapable of contributory negligence
no matter what the situation, and no matter what the experience or capabilities of the child." Id
449. Hamel v. Crosietier, 256 A.2d 143, 145 (N.H. 1969) (6 year, 10 month old); accord
Corbell v. Rouslin, 293 A.2d 760, 761 (N.H. 1972) (7-year-old); Perry v. Fredette, 261 A.2d 431,
432-33 (N.H. 1970) (8-year-old).
450. 99 A.2d 809 (NJ. 1953).
451. kd at 811. The court explained that "the age of a child does not alone determine its
capacity to care for itself and avoid dangers, and the law should not arbitrarily fix an age at which
the duty to exercise some care begins." Id; see also Hellstern v. Smelowitz, 86 A.2d 265, 270-71
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (5 year, 31/2 month old; "Under the so-called Illinois rule a boy who
is one day under seven years of age may be guilty of the most flagrant contributory carelessness and
yet evidence of his exceptional precocity and breadth of judgment and experience cannot be
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Court later elaborated upon their holding in Dillman and
established a bifurcated test that should be employed when
determining the contributory negligence of young children. 5
introduced to overcome the illusory presumption of babylike puerility."). In Dillman, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the issue of the contributory negligence of a 5th-year-old was properly
submitted to the jury. The court held the evidence regarding the child's capacity to care for his safety
while crossing busy streets was sufficient. Dillman, 99 A.2d at 811. Specifically, the court ruled:
The boy's father testified that his son understood what he was doing, he had crossed that
highway many times, he had been told to watch traffic in crossing the street, he
understood what was told him and always did so, he 'positively' understood that if there
was traffic at that intersection he would have to watch.
Id.
452. Bush v. New Jersey & N.Y. Transit Co., 153 A.2d 28,36 (NJ. 1959). In Bush, the court
held that in the absence of evidence the 4 year, 1 month, 19 day old had the capacity for negligent
conduct, a trial court commits reversible error if the question of contributory negligence is submitted
to the jury. kL The Bush court held:
[A] child of less than seven years of age is rebuttably presumed to be incapable of
negligence and hence the issue may not be submitted to the jury in the absence of
evidence of training and experience from which the jury could infer that the child was
capable of understanding and avoiding the danger of injury involved in the circumstances
of the case.
Id. at 35. Next, the court specifically outlined the method for applying the rebuttable presumption rule
and argued:
If evidence of capacity is introduced, then the trial judge must determine if such evidence
is sufficient so that reasonable men might disagree concerning the question of whether the
child had the capacity to perceive the risk and avoid the danger to himself. If the answer
is in the affirmative and if there is further evidence that the child did not act in a manner
which would be expected of a child of similar age, judgment and experience, then the
question of contributory negligence must be submitted to the jury. The trial court must
instruct the jury that there is a presumption of incapacity, that it is first to determine
whether there is such evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of incapacity and
to render the child capable of being contributorily negligent, and, then, if the jury finds
that the child is capable, it must determine whether the child was contributorily negligent
under the facts of the particular case.
Id. Finally, the Bush court outlined in broad strokes possible factors that may be introduced by
defendants to show capacity on the part of a young child. These include: "his attending school, his
being taught traffic safety regulations, his experience in caring for himself in traffic, and any other
evidence of the child's physical and mental capabilities." Id. at 36. Compare Dillard v. Fue, 167 A.2d
423, 424-25 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (reversed trial court's decision to submit question of
contributory negligence to jury where evidence showed 5-year, 3-month-old had not "ever been
'taught safety regulations' or that he had any 'experience in caring for himself in traffic.") with
Zuckerbrod v. Burch, 210 A.2d 425, 429 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (reversed judgment for
minor defendant and held, "[w]e think the jury could have found that every normal 51/h-year-old child
knows that an object thrown in the direction of another may strike him and cause hurt and that he
must take care to avoid it").
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NEw MEXICO
In Frei v. Brownlee,453 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
a five-year-old could not be charged with contributory negligence
because of his "tender years., 454  However, the decision is
questionable authority for a "bright line" rule because the plaintiff
was injured while he was a passenger in the automobile driven by
his father.455 In another case, involving a thirteen-year-old with
a mentality of a ten-year-old, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that there is no precise age that is determinate of capacity;
however, the court ruled that the mental capacity required to be
charged with an adult standard of care cannot be reached by age
thirteen.
456
453. 248 P.2d 671 (N.M. 1952).
454. Id at 677; accord Latimer v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d 788, 795 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (5-
year-old).
455. Frei, 248 P.2d at 672. In other words, the plaintiff could not possibly have been
contributorily negligent under the facts of the case. Frei was followed in Sanchez v. J. Barron Rice,
Inc., 427 P.2d 240,242 (N.M. 1967), where a 2-year-old child died from carbon monoxide poisoning.
There too, however, the plaintiff could not have been contributorily negligent under the facts of the
case. In Sanchez, the plaintiff died because the door to a gas furnace was not properly shut, therefore
causing carbon monoxide fumes to circulate through plaintiff's house. Id. at 242-43.
456. Thompson v. Anderman, 285 P.2d 507, 516 (N.M. 1955). The court explained:"[i]t is a
matter of common knowledge that the stage at which physical and mental maturity is reached varies
with the individual and is dependent on many factors. It cannot be determined with mathematical
accuracy, but it is universally recognized that it is not reached at the age of thirteen." Id. (emphasis
added). Arguably, this language should apply to young children as well. See also Wilson v. Wylie,
518 P.2d 1213, 1216-17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (question whether 7 year, 10 month old was
contributorily negligent was properly submitted for jury determination).
1434
1993 / The Standard Of Care Required Of Children
NEW YORK
Children under the age of four are presumed incapable of




Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.459 Minors between the ages of seven and
fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence.
457. See Veni v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d 431,432 (N.Y. 1946); Smith v. Sapienza, 496 N.Y.S.2d
538, 539-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (3'12-year-old; extended 4-year "bright line" rule to assumption
of risk cases); Galvin v. Cosico, 456 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (in a medical
malpractice action, 3 year, 10 month old held incapable of contributory negligence); Beekman Estate
v. Midonick, 252 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887-88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (3 year, 11 month old defendant held
incapable under the rule announced in Vern); Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 16 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673-74 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1940) (3 years, 7 months).
458. See Woods v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (E.D. N.Y. 1961) (4 year, 10
month old; child lacked appreciation of the danger of a truck backing up and therefore was not
chargeable with contributory negligence); Quinby ex reL Camardo v. New York State Rys., 159 N.E.
879, 880-81 (N.Y. 1928) (4 year, 10 month old; "no general rule can be deduced that at a definite
and fixed age the basis for an inference that a child is incapable of caring for itself under particular
circumstances fails"; "[t]he law does not disregard variations in capacity among children of the same
age"); Dimino v. Burriesci, 509 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Redmond v. City of New
York, 439 N.Y.S.2d 200,201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (4 year, 10 month old); Egan v. Tambone, 437
N.Y.S.2d 713,714 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (9-year-old); Yun Jeong Koo v. St. Bernard, 392 N.Y.S.2d
815, 817-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (4 year, 10 month old); Zaepfel v. City of Yonkers, 392 N.Y.S.2d
336, 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (8 year, 10 month, 2 week old): Trippy v. Basile, 354 N.Y.S.2d 235,
236 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (51/h-year-old); Searles v. Dardani, 347 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1973) (41'/-year-old); Snell v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 310 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (reversed judgment of nonsuit against 4-year-old); Ehrlich v. Marra, 300
N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (4 years, 10 months; question of child's contributory
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury because the only proof that the child had been
negligent consisted of an assertion by the defendant that the minor "was crossing the street at the
direction and under the supervision of his mother"); Weidenfeld v. Surface Transp. Corp., 55
N.Y.S.2d 780,783-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945) (child "just past his fourth birthday"); Day v. Johnson,
39 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) (4 year, 1 month, 7 day old).
459. See Walston v. Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. 1958) (6 year, 9 month old); Mitchell
v. K. W. D. S., Inc., 216 S.E.2d 408, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975).
460. See Duvall v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 625, 632-33 (E.D. N.C. 1970) (7 year, 1 week
old; "[t]here is no evidence in this case to show that plaintiff possessed any knowledge of danger in
dealing with explosives or 'old bombs' ... Plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence which in any
way contributed to the accident."); Anderson v. Butler, 202 S.E.2d 585,590 (N.C. 1974) (9-year-old;
.a child between the ages of seven and fourteen may not be held guilty of contributory negligence
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Minors above the age of fourteen are presumed to have the




There can be no precise age below which a child is considered
incapable of negligent conduct as a matter of law.462 "'A definite
as a matter of law"); Hoots v. Beeson, 159 S.E.2d 16, 21 (N.C. 1968) (11-year-old; reversible error
for trial court to not instruct jury regarding the 7-14 rebuttable presumption rule); Bell v. Page, 156
S.E.2d 711, 715 (N.C. 1967) (9-year-old; reversed judgment of nonsuit in favor of the defendant
concluding "the issue of contributory negligence ... is for determination by the jury"); Mercer ex
reL Mercer v. Crocker, 327 $.E.2d 31, 32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (13-year-old; reversible error for trial
court to direct verdict in favor of defendants; question whether minor was capable of negligence was
for jury determination); Wallace ex reL Magers v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(children of 7 and 11 years of age cannot be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law; reversed
judgment of directed verdict in favor of defendant on ground the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court's finding); Allen v. Equity & Investors Management Corp., 289 S.E.2d 623, 625 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982) (8-year-old; reversible error for trial court to grant defendant's motion for summary
judgment; "[diefendants may offer evidence at trial to rebut the presumption and show [plaintiff's]
capacity to exercise care for her own safety ... [but] this issue is one which is properly determined
not by the court but by the jury"); Adkins v. Carter, 252 S.E.2d 268, 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (11-
year-old; reversible error for trial court to direct verdict in favor of defendant on question of
contributory negligence); Lewis ex rel Lewis v. Dove, 251 S.E.2d 669, 672-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(9-year-old; evidence did not show plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; therefore
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict was proper); Johnson v. Clay, 248
S.E.2d 382, 385 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (9-year-old; whether presumption of incapacity has been
rebutted is a question for the jury); Bell v. Brueggemyer, 242 S.E.2d 392, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)
(13-year-old; because child between 7 and 14 cannot be contributorily negligent as a matter of law,
reversible error for trial court to direct verdict in favor of defendant); Townsend v. Frye, 228 S.E.2d
56, 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (reversible error for judge to fail to instruct jury that 12-year-old is
rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence).
461. See Izard v. Hickory City Sch. Bd. ofEduc., 315 S.E.2d 756,758-59 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(14-year-old contributorily negligent as a matter of law); Golden v. Register, 274 S.E.2d 892, 894
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (14 year, 81/h month old; plaintiff "did not have the benefit of the established
rule that a person between the ages of seven and fourteen is presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence"; child held contributorily negligent as a matter of law because "[plaintiff] knowingly
engaged in hazardous horseplay").
462. Enget v. Neff, 43 N.W.2d 644,647 (N.D. 1950); accord Kleinjan v. Knutson, 207 N.W.2d
247, 250-52 (N.D. 1973) (rejected defendant's contention that 9 h-year-old vias contributorily
negligent as a matter of law; followed Schweitzer and held issue was properly submitted for jury
determination); Schweitzer v. Anderson, 83 N.W.2d 416, 419-20 (N.D. 1957) (reversible error for
trial court to hold that 6 year, I I month, 22 day old child was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law where child darted out between two cars, "admitted that he did not look for any cars
before entering the street," and -that he had been told in school to cross streets only at intersections
and not to enter a street from between parked cars"; issue of contributory negligence should have
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age limit, arbitrarily fixed for application in all cases, would have
only its definiteness to commend it." 4 63
0HmO
Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.4" There is a rebuttable presumption that
children between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
negligence.46 Minors above the age of fourteen are not protected
by any presumptions of incapacity, and the question of negligence
is always one of fact.466
been submitted to the jury); Moe v. Kettwig, 68 N.W.2d 853, 859-60 (N.D. 1955) (13-year-old; fact
that plaintiff "had not made good progress in school," had failed his grade twice, and admitted school
was "difficult for him" was properly considered by the jury in determining whether plaintiff met the
standard of care required of him).
463. Enget, 43 N.W.2d at 647.
464. See Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1091 (N.D. Ohio 1975), af'd, 591
F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (1-year-old; defense of contributory negligence not raised); Hunter v. City
of Cleveland, 346 N.E.2d 303,304 (Ohio 1976) (6-year-old; child not capable and court noted: "Had
the plaintiff not been of such tender years, this court would have been compelled to find that the
injuries were the result of his own conduct under the facts of the case."); Holbrock v. Hamilton
Distrib., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ohio 1967) (6 year, 4 month, 22 day old; reversible error for trial
court to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury); Ramsey v. King, 470 N.E.2d 241,
244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (3-year-old; reversed jury verdict in favor of defendant on ground the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding the child tormented or abused a dog; strict liability dog
bite statute does not set a precise age below which a minor can be declared incapable of teasing,
tormenting, or abusing a dog but three-year-old, as opposed to five, six, or seven year olds, is
presumptively incapable of such behavior); cf. DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1975)
(applying rule that child under 7 cannot be liable for negligence to children charged with intentional
torts; "members of society must accept the damage done by very young children to be no more
subject to legal action than some force of nature or act of God").
465. See Howland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 F.2d 725,729-30 (6th Cir. 1971) (8-year-old;
reversible error for trial court not to instruct jury that child between 7 and 14 is rebuttably presumed
incapable of negligence); Sorriento v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 577 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1988) (1 1-year-old; evidence suggested plaintiff "did not exercise such care as children of like age,
education, experience, and prudence"; plaintiff held 49% at fault for injuries).
466. See Lones v. Detroit, Toledo and Ironton R.R. Co., 398 F.2d 914,918-20 (6th Cir. 1968)
(15 year, 10 month old; rejected defendant's contention that minor was negligent per se and holding
the jury properly instructed that minor expected to exercise that degree of care normally expected of
a minor of like age, experience, and capacity).
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OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma courts have adopted the three-tiered system of
presumptions from the criminal law.467 Accordingly, children
under the age of seven are conclusively presumed incapable of
negligence.468 Minors between the ages of seven and fourteen are
rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence.469 Minors above the
age of fourteen are presumed capable of exercising due care for
their safety.470
OREGON
The question whether a five-year, nine-month-old was contri-
butorily negligent was for the jury to determine.47' In a case
where a child under the age of five is found to have had knowledge
of the dangerous nature of his conduct, cases that have declared
children under five presumptively incapable of negligence offer
thin support for absolving the minor of any duty of due care.472
467. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(l)-(2) (West 1983).
468. See Strong v. Allen, 768 P.2d 369, 370 (Okla. 1989) (2-year-old; no evidence suggesting
the child was capable of or engaged in negligent conduct); Hampton ex reL Hampton v. Hammons,
743 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Okla. 1987) (51 -year-old; reversible error for trial court to sustain defendant's
demurrer on ground child was of "tender years" and therefore incapable of contributory negligence;
no evidence suggesting the minor understood the dangerous propensities of pit bull; plaintiff was
deprived of having a jury decide whether defendant was guilty of common law negligence); Connor
v. Houtman, 350 P.2d 311,312-13 (Olda. 1960) (3 year, 9 month old defendant (plaintiff was 4 years
of age); "the majority of courts hold that an infant under 5 years of age is incapable of negligence";
affirmed judgment in favor of minor defendant; evidence was insufficient to support contention that
minor defendant understood danger of playing with bow and arrow).
469. See Lewis v. Dependent Sch. Dist. No. 10, 808 P.2d 710,713 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (10-
.year-old; reversible error for trial court not to instruct jury that 10-year-old is rebuttably presumed
incapable of negligence); Ramage Mining Co. v. Thomas, 44 P.2d 19, 23 (Okla. 1935) (11 -year-old;
same); City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 137 P. 724, 732 (Okla. 1913) (9-year-old; case involved
application of the attractive nuisance doctrine).
470. See, e.g., Keck v. Woodring, 208 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Okla. 1948) (reversible error for
trial court to instruct jury on attractive nuisance doctrine where minor was 15 years of age and
therefore capable of exercising judgment and discretion).
471. See Taylor v. Bergeron, 449 P.2d 147, 148 (Or. 1969).
472. See Oviatt v. Camarra, 311 P.2d 746, 751 (Or. 1957) (4-year-old incapable of negligence
as a matter of law); Kudrna v. Adamskl, 216 P.2d 262, 263 (Or. 1950) (same); Macdonald v.
O'Reilly, 78 P. 753, 756-57 (Or. 1904) (4-year-old presumptively incapable of negligent conduct).
The Taylor court refused to re-examine prior decisions which apparently held that children under the
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PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania courts have borrowed from the criminal law and
established a three-tiered system of presumptions. Minors under the
age of seven are conclusively presumed incapable of
negligence.473 There is a rebuttable presumption that children
between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
negligence, with the presumption strongest the closer the child is
to the age of seven and weakest as the child approaches
fourteen.474 Minors over the age of fourteen do not benefit from
age of five are conclusively presumed incapable of negligence. However, it is doubtful whether any
of these decisions is persuasive authority for a five-year conclusive presumption rule.
In Macdonald, a 4-1/2-year-old boy was playing on a pile of lumber when the lumber rolled
down and crushed him. 78 P. at 754. The court affirmed the judgment for the minor and confined
its holding to the facts before them:
[N]o one will.., contend that a child of the age of plaintiff's intestate - 4-1/2 years - has
reached such a degree ofjudgment, intelligence, or discretion as to be deemed capable of
negligence in playing on a pile of lumber or timber left in the public street near his home.
lei at 757 (emphasis added). Macdonald therefore does not stand for the proposition that all 4-1/2-
year-olds, under all circumstances, are incapable of exercising due care for their safety. Nevertheless,
some forty years later, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on Macdonald in a case that did not even
involve the question of contributory negligence on the part of the minor plaintiff. See Kudrna, 216
P.2d at 262, 263 ("The sole question for decision is whether the [4-year-old] plaintiff, at the time of
the accident, was being transported by the defendant as his 'guest'" (emphasis added). And in Oviatt,
the supreme court held it was reversible error for the trial court to submit the question of the 4-year-
old plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury, citing Macdonald and Kudrna in support of their
holding that "a child under five years of age is incapable of negligence as a matter of law." Oviatt,
311 P.2d at 751; see also Nikkila v. Niemi, 433 P.2d 825, 827 (Or. 1967) (15-year-old; "A party's
youth is taken into consideration when judging whether or not he knew or should have known of the
danger, but it does not excuse his embarking on a course of knowingly dangerous conduct.").
473. See Geiger v. Schneyer, 157 A.2d 56,57 (Pa. 1959) (6-year-old); Kuhns v. Bragger, 135
A.2d 395, 401 (Pa. 1957) (12-year-old defendant; in dicta, the Supreme Court outlined the various
presumptions that apply to minors charged with negligence; evidence sufficient to support the
conclusion the minor defendant was negligent in the handling of a pistol); Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d
782, 784-85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (5 year, 7 month old defendant; applying seven year "bright line"
rule to minor defendants and holding: -Utilization of the presumptions [when the minor is a plaintiff
only] ... would result in holding a child less responsible for his acts when he is a plaintiff than
when he is a defendant."); Smith v. Walderman, 164 A.2d 20,22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (5- and 61/2-
year-old).
474. See Novicki v. Blaw-Knox Co., 304 F.2d 931, 933-34 (3d Cir. 1962) (10-year-old;
reversible error for trial court to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant; court
found that 'it is not enough that [plaintiff] be aware of the separate facts that grease is slippery,
gravity pulls a body down and meshing gears can crush flesh and bone. He must also realize that
there is a substantial likelihood that his conduct will bring these factors into combined and
cooperating effect to his injury.") (emphasis added); Rosa v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 469, 478
(M.D. Pa. 1985) (8'I2-year-old; judgment for minor plaintiff on ground defendant was wilfully
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any presumptions unless there is evidence suggesting that the minor
was incapable of exercising due care.475
RHODE ISLAND
The question whether a child has been contributorily negligent is
for jury determination.476
SOUTH CAROLINA
The South Carolina Supreme Court abandoned all age-based
presumptions fo incapacity and held that: "no arbitrary limits as to
minimum age should be set. The capacities of children vary
greatly, not only with age, but also with individuals of the same
negligent and failed to present evidence rebutting the presumption of incapacity); Scarborough ex rel
Scarborough v. Lewis, 518 A.2d 563, 569 & n.9 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 565
A.2d 122 (Pa. 1989) (1 1-year-old;reversedjudgment for plaintiff on instructional grounds; substantial
evidence indicated the child 'realized that he could be seriously injured by boarding moving trains");
Ross v. Vereb, 392 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Pa. 1978) (11-year-old; court correctly submitted the question
of contributory negligence to the jury; rejected defendants' assertion that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law and holding the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion
that the child was not negligent); White ex reL Stevens v. Southeastern Pa. Trnnsp., 518 A.2d 810,
816-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (12-year-old; trial court properly instructed jury that minors between
the ages of 7 and 14 are rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence; there was substantial evidence
to support the jury's verdict); Berman ex reL Berman v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 545,
549-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (11-year-old; court found evidence insufficient to rebut presumption of
incapacity and rejected defendant's contention that plaintiff assumed the risk and was contributorily
negligent; court reasoned: "we find no evidence in the record that portrays [plaintiff] as a young boy
possessed of superior intelligence thereby giving him exceptional perceptions of the risks and dangers
of hockey.... [Plaintiff] was unable to witness any serious injury by which we could charge him
with knowing the risk involved-); Leopold v. Davies, 369 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (7 /-
year-old; reversible error for trial court to instruct jury that plaintiff cannot recover if plaintiff crossed
the street against the light).
475. See, e.g., Congini ex reL Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515,518 & n.5 (Pa.
1983) (18-year-old presumed capable of negligence); Pannell v. Taylor, 403 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (15-year, 3-month-old; trial court properly refused to instruct jury on the subjective
standard of care where "the evidence disclosed that [plaintiff] was cooperative, industrious, engaged
in gainful employment, intelligent, helpful at home, excellent in cooking, ambitious, and skilled at
sewing. Nothing in [plaintiffs] case indicated any incapacity ..... ).
476. See Caparco v. Lambert, 402 A.2d 1180, 1182 (R.I. 1979) (41/2-year-old); Fontaine v.
Devonis, 336 A.2d 847, 851-53 (R.I. 1975) (3h2-year-old); Haddad v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 280
A.2d 93,96 (R.I. 1971) (5-year-old); Milliken v. Weybosset Pure Food Mkt., 44 A.2d 723,725 (R.I.
1945) (2 year, 4 month old).
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age. Therefore, no very definite statement can be made as to just
what standard is applied to them.
4 77
SouTH DAKOTA
No arbitrary age limit should determine whether or not a child has
the capacity for negligence.478  Any rule which relies on
chronological age alone to set the standard of care required of
children "lead[s] to the absurd conclusion that one day's difference




There is a rebuttable presumption that children under the age of
fourteen are incapable of negligence.48 0 In Garis v. Eberling,481
477. T.Z. Standard v. Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786,787 (S.C. 1982) (6-year-old); accord McCormick
v. Campbell, 329 S.E.2d 752, 752-53 (S.C. 1985) (14-year-old plaintiff and 16-year-old defendant);
Inman v. Thompson, 375 S.E.2d 358, 350-60 (S.C. C. App. 1988) (8-year-old).
478. Doyen v. Lamb, 59 N.W.2d 550,551 (S.D. 1953) (5 year, 10 month old); accord Finch
v. Christensen, 172 N.W.2d 571, 573-74 (S.D. 1969) (11-year-old).
479. Doyen, 59 N.W.2d at 551.
480. See Keenan v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 603, 604 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (4-year-old who
received injuries after being hit by truck while riding on the handlebars of a bicycle not chargeable
with contributory negligence); Wells v. McNutt, 189 S.W. 365, 365-66 (Tenn. 1916) (6-year-old);
Wolfe v. Hart, 679 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. at. App. 1984); Wilburn v. Vernon, 447 S.W.2d 382,
388 (Tetn. t. App. 1969); Bailey v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tenn. t. App. 1960) (8-
year-old plaintiff, 7-year-old defendant); West v. Southern Ry. Co., 100 S.W.2d 1004, 1008 (Tenn.
at. App. 1937) (11-year-old). The standard of care required of a minor is not confined to
chronological age alone. See Prater v. Bums, 525 S.W.2d 846, 852-53 (Tenn. t. App. 1975)
(reversible error for trial judge to mention only age in standard of care instruction regarding the
negligence of a 14-year-old plaintiff and 13-year-old defendant). The Tennessee Supreme Court in
Wells based its holding on the view that:
There should not be fixed arbitrarily an age when an infant is presumed, as a matter of
law, to be capable of exercising discretion and care. Some children mature earlier than
others; some have natural capacity or better training in habits of thought than others who
are older. Moreover, care or lack of care is a thing related to the particular surroundings,
simple or complex, of the accident under investigation. It is also easily conceivable that
a child nearly seven years of age by reason of living near the scene of the injuries may
be better acquainted with and appreciative of the dangers incident to it than some other
child of fifteen unacquainted with it.
Wells, 189 S.W. at 365-66; see also Cleghom v. Thomas, 432 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tenn. t. App.
1968) (3-year-old who, "exhibiting the normal curiosity and interest of a child of his age, opened the
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a five-and-a-half year old boy was killed after the hand brake of
the car on which he was sitting malfunctioned and began rolling
down the driveway, thereby knocking him off and crushing
him. 482  Citing Wells v. McNutt,483  the Garis court held that
these facts coupled with evidence that the child had the mental
capacity of a seven to eight year old were insufficient to rebut the
presumption that the child was incapable of negligence.484
Conversely, in Hadley v. Morris,485 a seven-year-old boy was
killed when he ran into a highway and was hit by a car.486 The
evidence showed that the plaintiff's parents had warned him to
refrain from crossing the highway but that the plaintiff had done so
anyway; the child ignored warnings against using his bicycle on the
highway; and the child had ridden his pony for about one year
along the highway and observed the daily traffic. 487 The Hadley
court held that this evidence was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of incapacity.488
TEXAS
Children below the age of five are conclusively presumed incapable
of negligence.4 9 Children above the age of five are charged with
that standard of care required of a child of like age, knowledge,
unsecured valve on the 'tar kettle', allowing molten tar to run out of [the] valve or faucet upon the
feet and legs of plaintiff," was too young to be contributorily negligent).
481. 71 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).
482. Id. at 219.
483. 139 S.W. 365 (Tenn. 1916).
484. Id. at 227.
485. 249 $.W.2d 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).
486. Id at 298-99.
487. Id. at 299.
488. Id.; see also Williams v. Williams, 470 S.W.2d 368, 373-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) (71/2-
year-old plaintiff was burned while trying to stomp out fire; court held that it was a question for jury
whether child's "impulsive act" was negligent).
489. See Chambers v. United States, 656 F. Supp. 1447, 1456 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (5-year-old held
to come within scope of rule announced in Yarborough); Yarborough v. Berner, 467 So. 2d 188, 190
(rex. 1971) (4 years, 10 months old; trial court properly refused to instruct jury on the subjective
standard of care); Molina v. Payless Foods, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 944,946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (2-year-
old incapable of negligence; no evidence the child was contributorily negligent).
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and experience behaving under the same or similar
circumstances.4"
UTAH
Whether a child should be charged with contributory negligence is
to be determined by a bifurcated test.49  In Kilpack v.
Wignall,492 the supreme court cited language from Nelson v.
Arrowhead Freight Lines493, which stated that children under the
age of seven are conclusively presumed incapable of
negligence.4 94 That language, however, was dicta because the
children in Nelson were sixteen and twenty years of age.
495
490. See Guzman v. Guajardo, 761 S.W.2d 506,510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (7-year-old; rejected
defendant's contention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law on the ground
that "the jury's 'failure to find' negligence could have been based on the fact that (plaintiff], a seven-
year-old, was following the lead of his older companions [about ages 8 and 9] and yet was unable
to react as quickly as they did when [defendant's] truck began to approach"); MacConnell v. Hill,
569 S.W.2d 524, 526-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (6-year-old; jury's apportionment of 60% fault to
minor plaintiff was "against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence"; reversed judgment
in favor of defendant and commented that "an additional instruction should be given which again
apprises the jury that a different standard should be applied in determining the negligence of a child
when compared to the negligence of an adult").
491. Mann v. Fairboum, 366 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1961) (51 -year-old). The bifurcated test
operates as follows:
If the trial judge, after a consideration of the age, experience and capacity of the child to
understand and avoid the risks and dangers to which it was exposed in the actual
circumstances and situation of the case, determines that fair-minded men might honestly
differ as to whether the child failed to exercise that degree of care that is usually exercised
by persons of similar age, experience and intelligence, the question of the child's
contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury, but if the trial judge determines
that fair-minded men could not conclude that the child had the capacity to be negligent,
then he should decide the question of incapacity.
Id.; accord Donohue v. Rolando, 400 P.2d 12, 14 (Utah 1965) (6 2-year-old); Rivas v. Pacific
Finance Co., 397 P.2d 990, 991 & n.2 (Utah 1964) (child under 6).
492. 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979).
493. 104 P.2d 225 (Utah 1940).
494. Kilpack 604 P.2d at 465-66.
495. Nelson, 104 P.2d at 227-28. The supreme court in Mann recognized this fact and declined
to apply Nelson to cases involving children under the age of seven. Mann, 366 P.2d at 606. In any
event, the language from Nelson was inconsequential to the outcome in Kilpack because the Kilpack
court concluded the evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was insufficient to support the
charge. Kilpack, 604 P.2d at 464-66.
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VERMONT
There is no precise age below which a child can be deemed
incapable of negligence as a matter of law.496 "The test of age
alone is not sufficient. Much depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case, especially the mental development and previous
training and experience of the child." 97
VIRGINA
Minors below the age of seven are conclusively presumed
incapable of negligence.498 Between the ages of seven and
fourteen, there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity.499 While
496. See Mitchell v. Amadon, 260 A.2d 213,217-18 (Vt. 1969) (trial court properly submitted
question of contributory negligence of 5-year-old to jury where plaintiff "was of average intelligence,
had been repeatedly warned not to cross the travelled highway where the accident happened, but had
darted out from behind one motor vehicle into the path of another").
497. Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 106 A. 682, 685 (Vt. 1919) (6 year, 9 month old).
"[I]n the case of a child the question of capacity in its comprehensive sense is preliminary to the
usual inquiry respecting contributory negligence; for, unless such capacity is found, negligence will
not be imputed." Id. at 686; accord Beaucage v. Russell, 238 A.2d 631, 635-36 (Vt. 1968) (8-year-
old; "the capacity of the plaintiff to comprehend the dangers of entering the highway at a substantial
speed, without proper control of his bicycle, knowing the defendant was not looking in his direction
was an issue of fact for the jury to resolve"); Vitale v. Smith Auto Sales Co., 144 A. 380, 381-82
(Vt. 1929) (9-year-old with the mentality of a 5 year, 2 month old); Parker v. Gunther, 164 A.2d 152,
155-56 (Vt. 1960) (6-year-old; "[n]o evidence appears in the case that [plaintiff] was aware of the
approach of the defendant's tractor-trailer, nor is the[re] evidence that he was trying to cross the road
when he was struck").
498. See Grant v. Mays, 129 S.E.2d 10, 13 (Va. 1963) (dicta); Birtcherd Dairy v. Edwards, 91
S.E.2d 421, 424 (Va. 1956) (3-year-old; no defense of contributory negligence); Sheckler v.
Anderson, 29 S.E.2d 867, 869 (Va. 1944) (4-year-old; defense of contributory negligence not raised).
499. See Doe v. Dewhirst, 396 S.E.2d 840, 842-43 (Va. 1990) (1012-year-old; reversible error
for trial court to refuse to submit question of contributory negligence to the jury; plaintiff "knew the
importance of looking for oncoming traffic before alighting from a vehicle"; on this record, the court
should have allowed the jury to determine whether plaintiff "had the capacity and knowledge to
understand the danger of stepping into the travel lane of the street without looking for approaching
traffic"); Endicott v. Rich, 348 S.E.2d 275, 277-79 (Va. 1986) (13 years, 9 months old; reversible
error for court to hold plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law; distinguished Barker on
the ground "[t]here is no proof in [plaintiff's] case that he was capable of understanding that the
choice he made to avoid the accident was a dangerous one. On the contrary, the choice [plaintiff]
made goes far to show why the presumption [of incapacity] exists."); Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt
Line R. v. Barker, 275 S.E.2d 613, 616-17 (Va. 1981) (10-year-old; reversed jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and held minor contributorily negligent as a matter of law on ground "[plaintiff] had
the capacity to know and, in fact, did know that his conduct was dangerous"; plaintiff testified that
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children above the age of fourteen are not protected by any
presumption of incapacity, they are not held to the same standard
of care as adults.' °
WASHINGTON
Children under the age of six are conclusively presumed incapable
of negligence.5"1 Children above the age of six are not protected
by any presumptions and the question of whether a minor has been
negligent is for jury determination.5 2
WEST VIRGI IA
Minors below the age of seven are presumed incapable of
negligence.5"' There is a rebuttable presumption that minors
between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of
"he had been jumping on trains since he was 'around eight or nine years old,* that his father and
school friends had warned him about the practice, and that he knew it was dangerous and 'you could
get hurt by riding a train,' but that he was 'willing to take that chance.'"); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Fincham, 189 S.E.2d 380,384 (Va. 1972) (9-year-old; rejected defendant's contention that plaintiff's
awareness of the danger precluded his recovery as a matter of law).
500. Grant, 129 S.E.2d at 13; Meade v. Meade, 147 S.E.2d 171, 176 (Va. 1966). A Virginia
court has ruled: "[T]he standard by which his conduct is to be measured is that degree of care which
children of the same age, experience, discretion and knowledge would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances." Grant, 129 S.E.2d at 13.
501. See Cox v. Hugo, 329 P.2d 467,469 (Wash. 1958) (5-year-old; trial court did not err in
granting plaintiff a new trial on the ground that even though the trial court did not instruct the jury
on contributory negligence, evidence of the child's contributory negligence "'definitely influenced
the jury in reaching (a] decision" for defendants); accord Arnold v. Laird, 621 P.2d 138, 140 n.2
(Wash. 1980) (4-year-old); cf. Brannon v. Harmon, 355 P.2d 792, 794 (Wash. 1960) ("The inherent
danger of fire cannot be doubted"; court held: "we do not believe that a young child of the age of
three and one-half years ... is to be charged, as a matter of law, with the knowledge of [a concealed
fire].").
502. See Seholm v. Hamilton, 419 P.2d 328,330-31 (Wash. 1966) (Cox does not apply to child
between 6 and 7); Graving v. Dora, 386 P.2d 621,622-24 (Wash. 1963) (13-year-old; affirmed jury
verdict for defendant and held minor not entitled to jury instruction that establishes a rebuttable
presumption of incapacity for minors between the ages of 6 and 14).
503. See Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55,57 (W.Va. 1991) (dicta); Miller v. Warren, 390 S.E.2d
207, 209 (W. Va. 1990) (2-year-old; no citation to authority and defense of contributory negligence
not raised; court erroneously instructed jury in a manner that would have allowed the jury to impute
the negligence of the parents to the child).
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negligence, with the presumption growing weaker as the child
approaches fourteen.5"
In Pino v. Szuch, 0 5 the West Virginia Supreme Court
established a three-tiered system of presumptions that reflects the
"considerable favoritism" West Virginia shows to children charged
with negligence." 6 In Pino, an eight-year-old boy rode his
bicycle into a neighbor's yard and collided with a lawn mower,
thereby severely injuring his leg and foot. Plaintiff sued the driver
of the lawn mover alleging that the driver negligently operated the
vehicle. The defendant raised a defense of comparative negligence,
The jury found the plaintiff forty-five percent at fault for his
injuries. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for new trial and
the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court committed
reversible error for failing to instruct the jury that children between
the ages of seven and fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable
of negligence. The supreme court agreed and reversed, holding
"[f]or children between the ages of seven and fourteen, the
conclusive presumption disappears, and a rebuttable presumption
applies. However, the burden is upon the party attempting to
overcome the presumption to prove that the child has the capacity
to be contributorily negligent." 507
504. See Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 625-26 (W. Va. 1974) (10-year-old; jury was
correctly instructed that child between 7 and 14 is rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence),
Compare French v. Sinkford, 54 S.E.2d 38, 29 (W. Va. 1948) (there was "no testimony tending to
rebut the presumption that [the 11-year-old plaintiff] was incapable of contributory negligence") with
Shaw v. Perfetti, 125 S.E.2d 778, 780-85 (W. Va. 1962) (presumption rebutted and judgment for
defendant affirmed where child between 7 and 8 years of age "had been repeatedly warned by both
his father and mother to be careful in crossing [the] heavily traveled national road. In fact, [the
plaintiff] had been warned on the day of the accident by his father, and only a few minutes before
the accident by his mother. The evidence indicates that [the plaintiff] . . . had the capacity to
understand the danger of crossing the highway, and did understand such danger. [The plaintiff] knew
that the highway... he crossed was used by many automobiles traveling in both directions.").
505. 408 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1991).
506. Id. at 57-59.
507. Id. at 57-58. The court stated that "[t]he rationale for the rebuttable presumption ... is
that these children usually lack the intelligence, maturity, and judgmental capacity to be held
accountable for their actions." Id. at 58. Applying this rule to the facts before them, the Pino court
concluded that "this case involved a child who was at the opposite end of the presumption spectrum.
In this situation, the presumption is strong, and the defendant must show that the child's maturity,
intelligence, experience, and judgmental capacity is significantly beyond that of the average eight-
year-old to overcome it." Id. at 59. The court provided broad guidelines for determining the type of
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Children above the age of fourteen are presumed to be capable
of negligence and the party asserting incapacity has the burden of
proving it.5"8
WISCONSIN
Children under the age of seven are presumed incapable of
negligence by statute.5°9
WYOMING
The standard of care required of children is that care which may
reasonably be expected from children of similar age, knowledge,
capacity, and experience.510
evidence which can be introduced to rebut the presumption of incapacity as well as the way in which
juries should evaluate such information:
Merely showing that the child is a bright eight-year-old or does well in school does not
rebut the presumption, and to hold otherwise would undercut its very foundation.... It
is . . . permissible to show that the child had been recently warned of the dangers
associated with the activity that gave rise to his injury. Moreover, the jury should be
instructed about the rebuttable presumption and that it should consider the foregoing
factors along with the entire chain of events leading up to the accident to determine
whether the presumption has been rebutted.
Id. The court rejected the defendant's contention that West Virginia should adopt the standard
reflected in section 283A of the Restatement of Torts on the ground the Restatement standard was
"too vague to assist a jury." Id. at 58 & n.1. Finally, the court noted that the three-tiered system of
presumptions applied with equal force under the doctrine of comparative negligence. Id. at 60 n.3.
508. See Pino, 408 S.E.2d at 58 (dicta); French, 54 S.E.2d at 39 (dicta).
509. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.44 (West 1966); see also Bair v. Staats, 102 N.W.2d 267,
271-72 (Wis. 1960) (6 year, 1 month old; trial court properly granted plaintiff new trial where jury
instruction compared conduct of plaintiff to that of an eighteen-year-old).
510. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 241 P. 710, 711 (Wyo. 1925) (between 7 and 8 years of
age); see Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 878-79 (10th Cir. 1976) (question whether 14-year-
old was contributorily negligent is for jury determination); Stilwell v. Nation, 363 P.2d 916, 918
(Wyo. 1961) (9-year-old; -A child old enough to ride a bicycle knows the danger of riding against
fences or other objects. Not seeing such an object is a matter not related to age.").
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